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In Scotland, the four counties of cities, 33 counties
and 194 large and small burghs, which are the main administrative
units of local government, are at present involved in current




Education 69 * 7 34
Police 10*1 5
Fire 2-2 1
Local Health 6-0 3
Welfare 2-8 1





housing) 29 *4 14
Other purposes 32-1 16
206-1 100
These local authorities, while they range in size
in terms of population from a few thousand to over a million,
all have two essential characteristics, namely that they are
independent /
(1) Table based on figures supplied by the Scottish
Statistical Office for 1957-58.
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independent local organisations of self-government, the
members of whose councils are locally appointed by popular
election, and secondly that they have the power to finance
their activities by levying rates. Each, in its way, is a
government within a government, deriving its delegated powers
from Parliament.
A scrutiny of the figures in the foregoing table
gives rise at once to two related thoughts; firstly, that
these are massive and increasing commitments calling for
continuous financing, and secondly, that the services listed
are important ones in that they cover so many aspects of
national life. As to the first thought, if we ignore the
by no means unimportant contribution of fees, rents, and
other miscellaneous items of income, the local authorities
find the money from two sources, that is, from the yield
of their rates and from grants from the State.
The second consideration is the services them-
:selves and the principles upon which they operate. These
have arisen as the outcome of social policies pursued in
many cases for at least a century; they are nowadays
broadly classified into three groups: environmental,
protective, and personal services. Education, for example,
a personal service, is seen to be by far the most expensive,
while other services like Police and Roads, though less





has been a point of heated public discussion for years. In
these social services, because of their universal application,
the principle of uniformity operates though not simply in the
narrow sense that everyone shall enjoy exactly similar services.
The possibility of rising standards must also exist, so that
while there must be fixed a minimum below which no authority
may be permitted to fall, there should be nothing to prevent
individual authorities choosing to have services of a higher
standard if they so desire.
One important feature of the local authorities'
administration of all these varied and complex services is
that it comes continually under the limelight of public
opinion and criticism. If the public is dissatisfied with the
local administration of welfare services, for example, it has
the right to say so through its elected members of local
councils, so as to exercise public control over public
expenditures on public services.
The responsibility for these services, which are
nowadays considered essential, has rested on the local
(2)
authorities - using that term in its widest sense - for
the last century, and all the time throughout that period
new services have been added with each fresh advance in
social progress, so that to-day the local authorities have,
of /
(2) Until the passing of the Local Government(Scotland)Aot 1929
many agencies combined to carry out the functions of the modern
local authority. These included parish councils, education
boards, county road boards, district boards of control, and
town and county councils.
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of necessity, become highly organised to deal with the
specialised administration of these services. At first
this arrangement arose out of expediency. Hie early local
councils and ad hoc authorities were able to raise money
by levying a rate and sc recover from the individual the
cost of services provided, and the arrangement seemed sound
administratively since the services were of a local nature
for local people - the provision of streets, the clearing
of refuse, the maintenance of a police force. The traditional
method of raising money by the levy of a local rate based on
the "real rent of all local heritable subj eetsn£^too, seemed
the most effective, indeed, the only way available.
But then it was seen that certain of the new services
being provided were not entirely local by their nature, but
were to a very considerable extent of national importance,
so that it became necessary to distinguish between those
services in which the looal authorities should take a
particular interest, such as the provision of parks, and those,
like Police, in whioh the State had a general interest
transcending local boundaries. The local population derived
benefit from the new police force, it was true, but the
preservation of law and order and the protection cf public
property was undoubtedly a State concern which Adam Smith
had/
(3) Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Reform. 1835.
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had classified as one of the "duties of the Sovereign" as
(4)
far back as 1776. Furthermore, it was clearly desirable
to achieve a uniform standard of service everywhere, so that
law and order was no worse preserved in one area as compared
to another.
In this way there emerged a kind of uneasy partnership
between central and local government in financing the
developing services. There is little doubt that a number FINANCING
TH3
of problems would have been resolved if from the first the SERVICES.
relationship had been one of principal and agent, but this
arrangement was never acceptable. For political reasons
it had to be a partnership, and what was gained politically
was lost in terms of financial administration.
In Scotland, this partnership is now represented by
the Secretary of State for Scotland on the one hand, and by
the representative bodies of the local authorities, mainly
the Convention of Royal Burghs, the Associations of County
Councils and of District Councils and the Counties of Cities
Association, on the other. It was a combination in which,
from the start, it was extremely difficult, even impossible,
to say with any degree of precision the relative interests
of the two partners. It was simple and expedient to assume
an equal partnership, but this was not necessarily a true
assumption, /
(4) Wealth of Nations. Book 5, Chapter I.
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assumption, and even the term "partnership* only suggests the
nature of the relationship.
What further complicated the matter was the manner in
which each of the partners found the money to contribute to
the partnership. The State's share was met by transfers of
"grant" to the local authorities out of national taxation
which was very flexible and reasonably uniform everywhere.
In its incidence it was based on "ability to pay", so that its
effects fell with some degree of equity on the individual. The
local authorities' share, on the other hand, was met from looal
rates which were, and still are the only tax open to them, and
while this may not hare been unduly inequitable when local
services were few and their cost small, the rapid growth of
the services, together with long-term inflation soon brought
into sharp perspective all the shortcomings of the rating system.
The fact was that the system was being asked to meet a
(5)
developing situation for which it was never intended. Turner* '
points out that about 185C the whole of the rates levied in
Scotland did not much exceed £900000, and goes on to remark that
sixty years later the rating system was a "somewhat inadequate
expression of our enlarged conceptions of equitable chargeability".
(6)
There is a note of despair, too, in the Dunedin Committee's
pronouncement ten years later that "Parliament should recognise
that" /
(5) History of Local Twcation in Scotland. - S.H.Turner (1908).
(6) Departmental Committee on Local Taxation in Sootland,1922.
Cmd 1674.
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"that the present system of rating is near its breaking point".
By that time the rates in Scotland were bringing in close on
£18,000,000. To-day, the yield is in the region of £70,000,000.
Rates were narrowly based and regressive where national
taxation was progressivej thoy fall on the ownership and
occupation of property, which was not necessarily a proper
index of an individual's capacity to contribute to the common
pool. In Scotland, too, the rating system was applied somewhat
differently to that found in England, so that comparisons were
difficult, and indeed, rateable values varied widely even between
parishes in the same Soottish county.
As services grew and the expenditure on them mounted
these flaws in the rating system became increasingly obvious
and the central/local relationship had to be adjusted periodically.
Efforts at adjustment were necessarily piecemeal, often quite
unsystematic and sometimes so tortuously contrived as to be almost
unworkable, but these efforts have resolved themselves over the
years into the existing system of grants in this country.
Under this system there were until May 1959 not far
short of a hundred different grants to local authorities in
Scotland, each with its semrate regulations. Some of these
(7) (8)
grants have now been grouped together and others discontinued
but in general they fall into two main classes with subdivisions
of each class as follows:
I./
(7) See Appendix B.
(8) See Appendix G.
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I• Specific contributions* THE
GUsml
(a) Percentage grants. jSraFjSM.
(b) Unit grants.
II. General Contributions.
(a) Block grants of fixed or semi-fixed nature.
(b) Equalisation payments.
In addition, there are two other forms which grant payments
dould take, though these forms are not now in use in this country.
These are, first, the assigning of certain earmarked State taxes
to the particular purposes of the local authorities, and secondly,
the practice of allowing the local authorities to make surcharges
on some selected State tax up to a fixed percentage. Beth these
methods are commonly found abroad.
(9)
Chester has further classified grants according to their
characteristics in the following way -
(1) Conditional and unconditional grants.
(2) Specific grants.
(3) Fixed grants
(4) Means and uniform grants.
(5) Grants in money or in kind.
All grants have a number of characteristics, so that under
the latter classification the Exchequer Equalisation Contribution,
for example, would be general, conditional, variable, means and
money. There are, however, other attributes of each type of grant
which are not so conveniently labelled, so that Chester's
classification for our purpose is incomplete and the former one will be
preferred throughout the discussion.
The types of grant referred to will be described and
discussed /
(9) Central and Local Government, Chapter 5 - D.N.Chester.(1951)
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discussed in detail in 3.ater chapters. For the present it is enough
to recognise the existence of the two main classes, which although
quite distinct will be seen to have a natural connection with eaoh
other. Their chief function, though not, as we shall see, their
on3y one, is to promote the development and maintenance of the




Where, then, is the point of balance between rates and
grant? In 1957, the Minister of Housing and Local Government pointed
out that the ratio between Exchequer grants to local authorities and
their revenue from local rates, which thirty years ago was 1 to 2,
(10)
had now become 6 to 5. Over a shorter term this trend can be seen
from the following table, where other sources of local income are
























Hates 44 *0 43-5 43-9 43-4 42-6 41-8 41 •£ 41-3 39 *4 40-7 40 -0
Grant 28-0 39-0 38-5 38-1 39-0 39-5 38.2 38-C 38.4 38-1 38.8
Other
income 28-0 17-5 17-6 18-5 18-4 18-7 20-C 20-7 22-2 21*2 21-2
Such /
(10) Hansard 12/2/57. p. 1081.
til) Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1958.
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Such a clear shift in emphasis over a comparatively short
period of time is a direct reflection of the changing central/local
relationship. This tendency for the State to assume an ever-
increasing financial responsibility for local services is an
unfortunate one, for it makes the State more than ever the partner
with the controlling interest and indicates a progressive decline in
the independence of local government units. Everything seems to
conspire to encourage the process, for with rising costs and rising
rates the local authorities are inclined to depend more and mere
on State transfers of revenue, and so give the impression,if we may
borrow the phrase, of containing within themselves the seeds of their
own destruction. Nor is the tendency confined to Great Britain alone;
it is to be found to a greater or less degree in most other countries,
as was evidenced by the proceedings of the International Union of
Local Authorities in 195^8)
In view of this the thought suggests itself that
instead of arranging matters so that State and semi-State
services are administered locally by the local authorities,
it might he more efficient finance to relieve the local
authorities of this work and make it a State responsibility
administered by government officials. In this way it would no
longer be necessary to attempt to measure the financial relationship
between central and local government for finance would be provided
out of national taxes. Hie complicate and financially clumsy grant
arrangement /







arrangement would cease and the local authorities would be left to
administer the few minor optional services of a purely local nature
which remained; the provision of wash-houses, for example, levying
their local rates to meet the cost.
The structure of local government is indeed being reviewed
at the present time, and two matters of cardinal importance have
been raised by this review. Is local government useful? If so,
then is it useful in its present form? These are fundamental
questions which will be further discussed in a later chapter while
the existence of the problem is merely raised at this point. In a
White paper presented to Parliament on 31st July, 1956 by the Minister
of Housing and Local i>overnment, the governments view3 on these
questions were summarised as follows:
"The test of any system of local government in this country
must be whether it provides a stable structure, capable of discharging
efficiently the functions entrusted to it, while at the same time
maintaining its local democratic character.
A fundamental alteration of the existing structure oould
be justified only if it had shown itself to be incapable of meeting
present day needs. That is not the situation. The present system
has, over many years, stood up to the severest tests. It responded
well to the abnormal demands made on it during the war and, despite
certain weaknesses, has on the whole shown itself capable of
adaptation to changing conditions. Moreover it is firmly established
and /
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"and the local loyalties and civic pride which have grown up around
it are a source of strength to local government which should not
be underestimated.
There is, therefore, no convincing case for radically
reshaping the existing form of local government in England and Wales.
What is needed is to overhaul it and make such improvements as arc
(13)
necessary to bring it up to date". What has been said of England and
Wales in this respect might equally be said of Scotland.
Public administration is rarely ready made to fit the
function being administered * more usually it grows up with the function,
often piecemeal, and is tailored periodically to fit the changing
pattern of design. A century ago, when State services began to
develop, their administration was put in the hands of the local
authorities and local boards set up for the purpose as a matter of
expediency; it was the simplest solution. The local councils were on
the spot, they had some form of organised administrative machinery,
however defective at the time, and they bad the power to raise money
locally by levying rates. It seemed most appropriate that the State
should develop services which in any case were of a partly local nature
through this existing machinery.
Since then, there have been adjustments and redistributions
of the burden of services between central and local government, and
a number of services have been taken over by the State in the manner
proposed. Such functions include, for example, the hospital service,
the /
(13 ) Areas and Status of Local Authorities in England and
Wales - Cmd. 9831.
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the gas and electrioity industries and. the main part of the poor law
service. There is no reason to suppose, either, that further such
adjustments will not be made in the future, say by the transfer to
the State of the responsibility for highways.
The question of which services of a national character are
suitable for local administration is one on which Parliament has
always had to feel its way. The doctrine of general and particular
interest, too, which no doubt seemed quite clear a century ago, has
undergone modification over the years. A century ago, there was the
greatest reluctance to permit any local rate at all to be levied for
education; there was thought to be a risk that its distribution would
give rise to inter-denominational animosities, while it is altogether
likely that even such a basic service as the relief of the poor would
have been frowned upon by the earlier economists like Ricardo or
Malthus. The point at which a service should cease to be local and
become national, however, is a matter involving wider issues than we
are here concerned with. Apart from such considerations the services
entrusted to the local authorities over the years remain, and with them
the artificial financial relationship with the central government.
Expediency and the chance of history, are not the only
reasons for matters remaining on this footing. Even if it were considered
practicable now to dispense with the experience and established
administration of the local authorities on the grounds of efficiency
it is doubtful whether such a step would ever be taken, for there are
strong political agruments against it. A powerful central government
where all authority is concentrated is alien to our conception of what
is /
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is right. There is an abhorrence of the totalitarian and we see a
virtue in the independence of individuals, and therefore of local
groups of individuals. Civics are taught in the schools, and the
man-in-the-street is enocuraged to take an active interest in the
work of government. This is democracy. This is our way of life,
and it is unlikely to change.
As a basic premise, therefore, this thesis will assume
that the State will continue to cherish the local authorities and
to be extremely wary about adopting any measure which would limit
local initiative and independence. The semi-State services will
continue to be the responsibility of the authorities on the spot,
and the financial relationship between these authorities and the
oentral government will remain as a sensitive, delioately adjusted
and ever-changing factor.
Ill
One consideration - population - will recur perhaps more
than any other in a discussion of the central/local equation.
This factor is so important as to be fundamental to the UNIFORMITY
BETWEEN
problem for it is with people that we are dealing - those AUTHORITIES.
of whom the services are provided and who pay for them.
Populations are never evenly spread; in a comparison
of two similar localities, one may be found to be densely populated,
with a high volume of rateable value but a low rateable value per
head of population; the other may be less densely populated. The
rate /
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rate charge per head of population for equivalent services will
obviously fall more heavily on the second area. On the other hand,
in two burghs of similar size, one may be industrial the other
residential with a relatively higher rateable value per head of
population. Existing local government areas which are artificial,
do not necessarily fit into the modern pattern of industrial
development, which has left big aggregations of population in some
areas, while others remain sparse.
Some localities, too, may have a declining population, due
perhaps to a preponderance of women in local employment, so that local
expenditure per head of population will rise because of fixed expenses
which the local authority must continue to pay whatever the size of its
population. There may be shifts of population, often unpredictably,
from one area to another.
Son© areas are poor, others rich. Scotland, for example,
(14)
has a persistently higher level of unemployment than England.
Poverty and unemployment, due to adverse local economic conditions,
will force populations to drift elsewhere where conditions are better,
while planned migration and the overspill of population to new towns
as part of government policy is the cause of further shifts, with
resultant effects on local costs per head of population. High levels
of taxation may prove such a disincentive that emigration from the
country follows; in the same way, with the growth of rapid communications.
a man may work in a highly-rated community but live in another, where
the /
(14) Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs. Cmd.9212.
p. 19.
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the local tax is lower.
In more general terms, it may be said that the character of
the population as a whole is changing gradually to reflect a
proportional over-all ageing, and this thought will underlie all our
formulations of social policy in time to come.
Such nomad movements and tendencies to change which defy
classification in the variety of their combinations, must have their
effect on the financing of local services and serve to hamper the
search for uniformity, for if uniform basic standards in the services
are to be provided everywhere it follows that some authorities will
be better able to afford them than others. Somehow, for these
purposes, all authorities must be placed on an equal footing.
One further question of difficulty must be raised at the
outset. Scotland, by reason of her historical development,has
many points of variance with England and Wales, and although the
tendency since 1707 has been for closer and closer ties to be
established between the two countries the central/local relationship
has always been complicated by these differences.
(15)
"Very probably", wrote Turner, "had Sootland stood UNIFORMITY
B5T;'T^N
alone and uninfluenced by English schemes the development COUNTRIES
of her system of grants would have been quite different, but
of course it is impossible for Scotland to subscribe to national funds
to be given in relief of English ratepayers without obtaining an
equivalent for itself".
Should /
(15) History of Local Taxation in Scotland - S.H.Turner.(1908)
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Should Scotland "stand alone" for these purposes? The
question is in part a political one, but it is one which can only be
answered in the light of cold reason and by reference to things as
they are. By the Aot of Union this country, while her laws are
preserved, has no real separate identity in matters of financial
administration. Time and again "equivalents" have had to be
devised to adapt financial arrangements, primarily designed to meet
English administrative requirements, for Scottish purposes. There
are limits, too, to which administrative devolution can go. Public
expenditure involves a great deal more than just the local
government services and it would scarcely be practicable to deal
with Scotland separately for grant purposes and not for others. It
will be recalled, moreover, that the Catto Committee^ in 1952 found
it impossible even to make any separate financial analysis of the two
countries, which "are component parts of one unified economic system".
Scotland, with its different rating system, conceived until
recently on an owner-occupier basis, and indeed with its different
outlook on many matters, yet forms part of the United Kingdom and
is subject to the central/local relationship as much as Devon and
Yorkshire are. But how to compare these different parts of the
country so that a man in Plymouth is asked to pay exactly the same as
a man in Peterhead for the same standard of local services is a problem
that has up till now proved impossible to solve with any degree of
accuracy owing to differing conditions and differing levels of
rateable /
(16) Committee on Scottish Financial and Trade Statistics.
1952. Cmd. 8609.
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rateable values in the two plaees.
Yet, because of deeu-rooted feelings of nationalism, it
is important to all concerned to ensure that there can be no suggestion
of unfair treatment of this particular part of the United Kingdom where
the distribution of grant is involved.
With the changes in valuation procedure to be brought about
by the Valuation and Hating (Scotland) Act of 1956 these difficulties
will no doubt be overcome to some extent, but the ideal of oomplete
and absolute uniformity throughout the United Kingdom will still
remain as a will o' the wisp to be chased by complex formulae.
A preliminary review of all these considerations THE LOOM,
serves to introduce the problem of the grant system and PROBLEM'♦
the many complexities with which it is surrounded. Consider
for a moment some of the alternatives which, in theory at any-rate,
are available to a government minded to reform. They could;
(a) continue the present system of allowing the local
authorities to administer local services, financing
them out of rates and grant.
(b) Although allowing the local authorities to
administer the local services, abolish the rating
system and replace it by a local income tax.
(c) Retain the rating system, but shore it up with a
number of lesser looal taxes.
(d) /
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(d) "Nationalise" the services, and pay for them out
of national taxation by 100$ grants, yet still
retaining the established administration of the
local authorities.
(e) Nationalise them like the hospital service, and
put their administration in the hands of a
government department, so that the local
authorities would have no further interest in
them, and they would be financed out of State
taxation.
(f) Concentrate on improving the grant system so
as to make the charge on the individual for
local services more uniformly equitable.
(g) Isolate Scotland for these purposes and try
to deal with her separately.
Each of these alternatives could be defended. Which one will best
meet the requirements of the country during the next half century?
Or is there perhaps another solution which has so far passed unnoticed?
Without doubt, financial administration is the most
persistent problem of .local government, and in spite of repeated
attempts to find a permanent solution to it over the past hundred years
it still remains. Above all. it is a problem which, because of its
many aspects, is extremely difficult to isolate and study. It may
be that the best that can ever be done is to come to a compromise;




"To use local government - really Independent local
government - as a vehicle for the execution of a social policy that
is national in scope, is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do;
but it can be done, and it is certainly well worth doii.g"i
(17) The Problem of Valuation for Rating - J.R. Hicks, U.K. Hicks,
and G.E.V.Leser.(1944). p.10.
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2. - THE EVOLUTION 07 THE GRANT SYST'M.
I.
If we survey the Scottish scene a hundred and thirty
THE
years ago in the first part of the 13th century, we find a BEGINNINGS
OF MODERN"
social life vastly different to that with which we are now LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
familiar, a society with which we are already far out of
touch. Looking back, we ask ourselves in astonishment: were
these our forbears?
The new industrialisation of the country was by then well
under way and great and dynamic migrations were taking place from the
country and from Ireland and the Highlands to the cities and the towns.
Hie population of Scotland, which in 1811 was almost equally divided
between rural and urban areas, had shifted by the census of 1881 so
that 72*77% were town-dwellersj Coatbridge, for example, which in
1831 was a mere village of 741 was to acquire a population of 17,500
in the course of the next fifty years. These towns, unable to expand
at a rate sufficient to cope with the new influxes, rapidly became
overcrowded.
Planning was unknown and building standards were hopelessly
inadequate, with often from fifteen to twenty persons sharing a
single room. Public sanitation was worse, with open sewers a
commonplace so that periodic outbreaks of typhus, oholera and plague
took an appalling toll of the inhabitants, unprotected as they were
by any organised system of public health. Dirt was a daily
commodity and smallpox was "the poor man's friend".
Poverty,/
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Poverty, till now relieved by the churches, mainly from
the proceeds of voluntary contributions, became a mass problem for
the authorities on the spot; the local councils. The condition of
the streets and roa&% too, kept up as the latter most commonly were
from the proceeds of the turnpike tolls, was desperate, and there
was often net so much as a proper provision of clean drinking water.
If we except the primitive efforts at local self-government
which were being made by the early Commissioners of Police in some of the
burghs and the Commissioners of Supply in the oounties it is true to
say that most of the amenities we take for granted to-day were entirely
lacking. Scotland was backward and the lot of the common man was one
of hardship and squalor; we can never adequately place ourselves in
that man's shoes.
Dr. George Bell, writing at the time, has described the life
in the burghs of these days in graphic language:
"We return day after day and night after night to the
scenes of misery, disease and death; we listen to the cry of
children, the wail of women and the deep utterances of men. This
awful harmony is in keeping with the picture before us; the pathos
of the drama is profound....it is difficult to understand why so many
thousands of our countrymen are as ignorant, squalid and savage as the
aborigines of New South Wales. Yet such is the Case, as one may
learn experimentally any day in, the wynds of Edinburgh. Perhaps
the very first person the enquirer will meet will be an Irish
immigrant, the father of a large family, a man with young subjects
of the Queen under his charge who does net know the name of his
Sovereign. The creature has a mental and moral part, but it is
petrified /
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petrified by superstition and crusted over by ignorance".
Such were conditions in the capital city of Scotland, and
those elsewhere were no better; in Glasgow the average death rate
was 1 in 34, and every second child born there was dead before it
was five. Bell's pamphlets make startlingly terrible reading, as
was his intention, hut it must be remembered that "laissez-faire"
was the economic poliey of the day. The view that "suffering and
evil are Nature's admonitions" was widely held to be a basic truth.
Neither the State nor the local councils acknowledged any social
responsibility in such matters and the latter at least were in no
way organised to assume such responsibilities. Aberdeen town council
had gone bankrupt in 1817 as the result of gross mismanagement, and
in 1833, at the time of the Municipal P.eform Aot, the burghs of
Scotland were described as "sinks of political and municipal iniquity".
Nevertheless, a movement towards betterment was on the way,
inspired by reformers such as Bell, Stark and Littlejohn, and the
local councils found that the responsibility for this forward movement
was being thrust upon them. The next century was to be one of
dramatic change and improvement, and that at a rate which would then
have been thought impossible. The local government system,
developed during that period, has been properly described as one of
(1)
the most original ideas of the 19th century.
In 1835, the Royal Commission which had been appointed to
enquire into the state of the municipal corporations in Scotland
reported /
(1) The Age of Reform, 1815-1875. I.L.Woodward.
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reported in great detail as to the administrative shortcomings of
these corporations* In the same year the government introduced the
first grant-in-aid to local authorities in England.
This first modest subsidy was 50$ of the cost of criminal
prosecutions at Assize and Quarter Sessions, a sum in all of £80,000,
with a further £30,000 towards the cost of removing convicted EARLY
mm
prisoners from local prisons. It arose, almost haphazardly SUBYMTICHi
as it would seem, out of the dilemma which faced Select Committees
of the Lords and Commons which were at that time investigating increases
in local rate burdens, namely that "thefts are necessarily of chattels;
the costs of prosecution, being taken out of the Poor's Rate, fall
entirely on real property." It was clearly anomalous and inequitable
to allow a charge to fall on one section of the community, owners
of property, when the benefit was enjoyed by all classes.
Even in Scotland, where the system of reporting cases to the
Lord Advocate and recovering the expenses of such criminal prosecutions
was differently organised, complaints appear t.o have been made to the
Crown as to the incidence on landed property of the rogue money
assessed to pay the expenses of unreported cases. There was undoubtedly
considerable pressure brought to bear by the land-owning and
agricultural classes of the English oounties at the time, and this may
well have influenced the Treasury to allo\* the payment. The fact
remains that the argument adduced was a true one, one which is at the
root of all subsequent State aid.
In 1846, the year in which the Corn Laws were repealed and
protection to the farming community was thereby removed, the grant was
increased /
as
increased to 100$ and £10,000 was made available to the Scottish local
(2)
authorities, as represented by the newly formed Board of Supervision,
towards certain poor law expenses, namely the salaries of medical
officers in poorhouses. A prerequisite of this grant, which was
aimed at development, was a much needed improvement in the service
provided, nothing being received unless expenditure per head of
population exceeded a certain minimum which varied according to the
(3)
density of the population. Here, thus early, we see the foundations
of State intervention being laid; the government had recognised that
what had been given till now as a matter of equity could also be used
as an instrument of fiscal control in stimulating expenditure as
opposed to the mere relief of rates.
The grant for criminal prosecutions did not, properly
speaking, have application to the Scottish counties where, because of the
differing administrative arrangements, the cost of "unreported" cases
continued to be met out of locally assessed rogue-money. In England
such eases were tried at Assizes and Quarter Sessions, and were therefore
grant-aided, /
(2) This Board, set up under the Poor Law (Scotland) Act 1845,
consisted of the Lord Provosts of Edinburgh and Glasgow, the Solicitor
General of Scotland, the Sheriffs depute of the counties of Perth, Renfrew
and Ross and Cromarty, along with three members appointed by the Crown.
In 1894 its work was taken over by the Local Government Board for Scotland
(3) Grant class Population per Minimum expenditure per
square mile. head in pence.
1 1 — 25 S . „
2 26 - 50 1 V16ths
3 51 - 100 1 14/16ths.
4 101 - 200 1,13/16 ths.
5 201 - 400 1 12/I6ths.
6 401 - 1,000 1 11/ieths.
7 1,001 - and over. 1 10/16ths.
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grant-aided, so that in order that the measure of relief afforded to
England might, so far as the different modes of procedure would permit,
be extended to Scotland the Lords cf the Treasury of Minutes of 1851
and 1855 granted relief to Scottish counties for the expenses of
K)
unreported cases.
Cf interest here was the position of Edinburgh, whose burgh
court officials were paid exclusively out of council funds, and in
respeot of whion a memorial was presented to the Treasury in 1855
founding upon the fact that the city was a separate county by itself
and claiming that it should ce placed cn a similar footing to other
counties in Scotland. The Treasury, after some negotiation, admitted
the claim and the arrangement v/as duly set forth in an agreement signed
by the Lord Provost and the Queen's and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer.
The following year, in 1856, tne Police Act extended the
grant for police pay and clothing from a purely metropolitan to a
national basis, and this was applied to Scotland under the Police
(Scotland) Act, 1857, which provided (section 66) that:
"Upon a certificate of one of Her Majesty's
principal secretaries of State that the police of
any county or burgh has been maintained in a state of
efficiency in point of numbers and discipline for the
year ending ... it shall be lawful for the Commissioners
of Her Majesty's Treasury to pay from time to time out
of any monies to be provided by Parliament for the
purpose such a sum towards the expenses of such police...
as shall net exceed one fourth of the charge for their
pay and clothing".
This 25% grant, which in the first year amounted to less than.
£26,000 /




£26,000 for the whole of Scotland, was continued until 1874 when it
(6)
was increased to 50$,, and again the proviso as to the maintenance of
a standard of efficiency is noteworthy. The government, gratified at
the results of Sir Robert Peelfs London police force, was justifiably
attempting to secure national standards for what it had decided was
a semi-State service, but "laissez-faire" was gone for ever and State
intrusion into local affairs had begun. From now on the financial
relationship between central and local authorities was to be a factor
of increasing importance.
Further government subventions were made under the Sheriff
(7)
Court Houses (Scotland) Act 1860 and in 1874 a 50% grant was made
towards the cost of maintaining pauper lunatics - some £60,000, with
cost per patient week not to exceed 8/-, a grant which because of its
lack of administrative control was later to be condemned as "an
encouragement to extravagance". For the same reason this grant, too,
was held to be responsible for the alarming increase in the number of
"pauper lunatics".
Hie importance of the part played in the early development of
services by voluntary societies and Church agencies should not be
overlooked. All along self-help has commonly preceded State aid. An
instance of this is the Royal National Life-Boat Institution, founded
in 1824, and carried on to provide a service which was an undoubted
necessity to coastal areas. The development of this service is of
special interest for it did not follow the usual pattern of absorption
as /
(6) Police (Expenses) Act, 1874.
(7) 50% of the cost of providing court houses.
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as a local, government function, but instead has continued till the
present time, financing itself by voluntary subscription.
During the period from 1854 to 1869 the Institution received
an annual subsidy from the government, subject to the now familiar
conditions, including government inspection. These conditions were
somewhat distasteful, and it was found in any case that voluntary
subscriptions were harder to raise when it was known that government
grant was available, so the decision was taken in 1869 by the
Institute's Committee of Management to forgo the grant. Had this
decision not been taken it is likely that the lifeboat service might
long since have been one of the grant-aided functions of maritime
counties.
For such beginnings, too, grew the Education service. This
funotion which in England had till now been carried out by two voluntary
societies with some finanoial assistance since 1833 in the form of
Parliamentary grants supervised by the Privy Council, was made a local
responsibility. School Boards were set up to administer the service and
substantial grants were introduced. The main grant which had formerly
been distributed to the societies according to examination results was
now allocated on the basis of the number of children in average daily
attendance at school, an additional amount being provided for areas where
the rate produce fell short of a fixed sum per pupil.
In the field of education Sootland was already somewhat ahead
of England. As far back as 1697 a sum of £150 a year had been granted
under /
(8) by the Elementary Education Aot 1870.
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under Warrant of William III out of the revenues of the Bishopric of
Dunkeld towards the maintenance of schools in Scotland, hut by the
beginning of the 19th century the administration of sohools had become
a matter for the Heritors and Minister of each parish, the only
Exchequer interest being in the striking of the fiars' prices.
In 1838, however, following representations by the General
(9)
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, provision was made for Parliamentary
grants to "facilitate the foundation and endowment of schools in
Scotland", and annual amounts totalling £899 were provided by the
Treasury to pay schoolmasters1 salaries throughout thirty parishes
under the supervision of a Committee of the Privy Council - later
to become the Scotch Education Department,
By the Education (Scotland) Act of 1872 a School Board was
set up in every parish and burgh for the management of the schools
in them, making those schools independent of the Church, and establishing
the modern education service. Grants were made available depending on
examination results and subject to inspection - a payment, indeed,
by results* Later this "examinations" basis was changed to one
dependent on average attendance and a general report of the inspector
on the condition of the school - the so-oalled "block-grant" system.
By now the social progress envisaged by the reformers of
the/
(9) by the Highland Sohools Act, 1838, the Commissioners of the
Treasury purchased £24,667;10i4d of Consolidated Bank Annuities,
the income from which was to be paid as grant totalling £899 per annum
to the schoolmasters of these Highland Schools, In 1873 this principal
was paid into the consolidated Fund, out of which the annual sums have
since been met.
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the 30's was gathering momentum, while Benthamism and "laissez-faire'1
were gradually being discarded as a practical policy. The rail-
jways had opened up the country, and gas and water supplies, until
now largely provided by Parliamentary Companies, were being taken
(10 J
over piecemeal by the local authorities.
Local improvement Acts, coupled with the Public Health (Scotland)
Act of 1867, had made better sanitation a fact, so that by 1881 the
death rate was down to 18.8 per 1,000. Goshen, in a monumental
survey of the country, had reported to the English Poor Law Board
in 1870 a doubling of the local rates in the past thirty years, and
many towns and cities had spread their boundaries by extension Act
powers. In council chambers throughout the country a new tradition of
local government was being created, and most of all, industrial and
scientific discoveries had made the age an expansive one, while the
writings of reformers like Dickens and Carlyle had given it a sooial
conscience.
By now, too, the old turnpikes had finally disappeared from the
roads and the burden of roads unkeep had been cast upon the local
(11)
rates. In 1882 a new State grant of £250,000 was divided among
the local authorities towards this cost, again because this seemed
to the government to be a more-than-local responsibility for which
a national standard should be maintained. Scotland^ share of
this was £30,000 in the first year, adjusted later by reference to
population and mileage of roads. The sum involved, amounting as it
did/
(10) tinder powers given in the Burghs Gas Supply (Scotland) Act 1876,
and the Burgh Police Acfe, 1892.
(11) by the Roads and Bridges (Sootland) Act, 1878.
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did to only l/5d, for every pound spent on road maintenance, seems
little enough judged by present-day costs, but already the total
annual amounts being paid out as direct grant-in-aid by the State
had become so relatively large as to prompt the government to
review the whole position. There were other considerations too;
it was claimed that the grants mainly relieved the agricultural
landlord, that they caused extravagance on the local authorities*
part and that they were piecemeal and unsystematic.
II
The solution proposed was a simple one, namely to
disburden the State so far as possible of direct payment ASSIGNED
REVENUES.
of grant and to provide the local authorities with an
alternative source of revenue.
By the local Government Act of 1888, applied to Scotland
by the Act of 1889, all the main grants, except for Education, were
discontinued. In their place the local authorities were to receive
the proceeds of a number of locally collected licences, as follows -
40$ of licence duties on the retailing of beer, wine,
sweets and tobacco; and on -
Refreshment houses, male servants, dog appraisers, carriages,
auctioneers, plate dealers, pawnbrokers, armorial bearings, the
shooting of game and the carrying of guns.
These /
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These items were earmarked as being of a "local" nature. In
addition, the local authorities were to receive a share of the probate
duties - this was intended to produce the effect of making personalty
contribute to some extent. The total sum thereby obtained - in all
some £5,600,000, was paid over to the local authorities either through
a separate Local Taxation Account where State-collected duties were
concerned, or by being retained by the authorities where they were
collected locally.
The aim of the scheme, which was devised by Goschen, the
then Chancellor of the Exchequer and one whose name has since been
firmly associated with local government, was once and for all to
separate local from State finances. In combination with the other
provisions of the 1888 and 1889 Acts - legislation which laid the
foundations of the modern system of local government, they radically
altered the entire structure of municipal administration throughout
the country. In England the basis of distribution of the local
Taxation Account to the counties was in respect of the specific
services aided till now and to the Boards of Guardians a per capita
sum for every indoor pauper, though it is interesting in view of
later developments to observe that during the rebate on the Bill the
suggestion was put forward of using a combination of population and
rateable values as a distribution basis in order to introduce an
equalising factor. The suggestion was not, however, adopted.
So far as Scotland was concerned, the former grants now










In place of these the greater part of the excise licence duties
were assigned tc the local authorities, and though they continued
to be collected by government officials were henceforth regarded as
local income. In addition half the probate duties were earmarked,
and were distributed to England, Scotland and Ireland in the ratio
80,11,9, these being the proportions in which the three countries
were then regarded as contributing towards the public revenue as a
whole. In Scotland these monies were paid into a central Local
Taxation (Scotland) Account, and were specifically allocated to -
the relief of rates in the Highlands and Islands, the cost
of roads, police, medical relief and pauper lunatics.
Any balance remaining was appropriated to the relief of school
fees.
(I >.
By way of illustration, Turner summarises the Local
Taxation (Scotland) Account for 1905- 1906 as follows -
I /
(12) Local Taxation in Scotland - S. Horsfall Turner.(1908).
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I - Local Taxation Licences and Estate Duty
Payments into -
1. Proceeds of licences£383,935.
2. Estate Duty 315,400.
Payments out -
1. Highlands and Islands
grant
2. Roads grant
3. Police pay and
clothing grant
4. Medical relief grant
5. Pauper lunatics grant
6. Secondary education
7. Universities
8. Parish councils -
relief of rates
9. Cattle pleuro -
-pneumonia account
10. Counties and burghs -
-relief of rates














II - Customs and Excise Duties.
1. Proceeds of customs £ 18,756.
2. Proceeds of Excise 135,407
£154,163.
1. Police Superannuation £ 40,000.
2. Relief of school fees 40,000.
3. Medical Officers and
sanitary inspectors 15,000.
Counties and burghs -






III - Estate Duty (Agricultural Rates etc.(Scotland) Act 1896)
ll/80ths of grant to 1. Burgh land tax relief £ 7,990.
England and Wales £182,475.
2. Congested districts in
Highlands and Islands 15,000.




I¥ - Consolidated Fund(Local Taxation Account (Scotland)Act, 1898.
Grant from H.M. 1. County and Parish
Exchequer £ 97,938. councils -additional
relief to agricultural
occupiers £ 20,000.
2. Police pay and clothing
(additional) 25,000.
3. Marine Superintendence 15,000.
4. Residue to secondary and
technical education 37,938.
£ 97,938. £ 97,958.
At first the ne\i grant provisions seemed to work and
provided considerably more money than the discontinued grants ever did;
central /
(13) The Agricultural Rates, etc. Act 1896 provided that the
occupiers of agricultural land in England would pay only 50$
of the rate in the pound, the deficiency being met by ah
additional grant out of the Estate duty on personalty.
Equivalent grants were made for Scotland based on 7/16ths of
the rates on agricultural subjects in 1895-96.
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central control was retained by provisions in the Act that no
authority would receive its full share of the subventions unless it
maintained prescribed standards in the services. When the Police
(Scotland) Act 1890 made it obligatory for police authorities to set
up Police Pension Funds additional grant was made available partly
out of surtaxes on beer and spirits to meet this new charge. Once
again, Scotland's share of these surtaxes was fixed at ll/100ths.
Thus, the Local Taxation Return for Scotland for 1895-96
0-4)







School Boards 981, 953 1170, 749 74 • 6
£1570,580




In general, however, it had been visualised that as the
local authorities grew and expanded so too would the licence duties
which fed the Local Taxation Account grow and expand, and the grant
aspect of local finance would be to some extent self-supporting. It
was an ingenious enough idea but very soon it became obvious that the
desired /
(14) House of Commons Accounts and Papers. Vol.34. 1899.
37
desired effect was not forthcoming. New grants for a variety of
purposes were made and old ones increased. \ny one of these early
grants would provide an absorbing topic of discussion. The
man-in-the-street barely knew of their existence, but in official
circles discussion centered round their proper distribution, while
experimentation with different bases slowly crystallised through
trial and error into informed opinion.
"I think earmarking to any specific purpose to which the
Legislature may say it sould be applied is what we should do. I
think that giving generally in aid of the rates is a system which
(15)
does not tend to the best administration". Here was the real
distinction between a direct subvention and a grant-in-aid, terms
which have nowadays largely lost their original meanings, even if
the ideas implicit in them have gained in importance. Out of all
the arguments and expedients and the seeming confusion of the late
19th century grants emerged the ideas on which our modern grant system
rests.
There was for example, the "residue grant". In 1890 a
Temperance Bill was introduced in Parliament which provided for a
reduction in public-house licences, and which visualised compensation
to those deprived of their licences. Funds for this compensation
were made available, but at the last moment the Bill failed to become
law and it was resolved to return the money, which had been raised by
an/
(15) Patten MacDougall in evidence before the Royal Commission
on Local Taxation, 1899.
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an extra tax on beer and spirits, through the Local Taxation Account
for the relief of rates. As a result of pressure brought to bear
by educationists, however, the sum in question was eventually
distributed to meet certain fixed charges, such as the Police pensions
mentioned above, with the residue optionally available for technical
education. We are told that for many years Glasgow used its "Whiskey
(16)
money" in building up the Mitchell library.
Another development of the Local Taxation Account was the
"equivalent" grant, which arose out of the fee grants paid in
England from 1891 to compensate authorities for foregoing school
fees - an attempt at free education. Scotland's "equivalent" was
handed over from 1892 onwards and was distributed to county and
burgh councils on the basis of the mean of population and rateable
value Ibr the relief of rates.
Services, however, kept expanding and local expenditures
mounted so that the grants lagged far behind, and before long
criticism arose of the whole machinery of grants so recently set up.
Then, too, the book-keeping attached to the distribution of the
assigned revenue was so unnecessarily complex that, in the words bf
the report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation of 1896: "only
those whose official duty it is to be constantly threading the maze
are able to carry in their memory the clue to its intricate
convolutions".
This Royal Commission which was set up in 1896 under Lord
Balfour /
(16) Local Government in Scotland. M.Atkinson. (1902).
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Balfaur of Burleigh had terras of reference which required them to
report "whether all kinds of real and personal property contribute
equitably to taxation raised for local purposes, and if not, what
alterations in the law are desirable in order to secure that result".
The reports of the Commission? which probed deep to the very roots
of the technique of giving grants, are interesting in that they
classified local services into two main categories - those which
were "national and onerous" and those which were "local and
beneficial".
In the former case there were certain services which
local authorities were bound to provide as part of State policy,
services which were mainly of benefit to individuals. These
would include, for example, education, police, poor relief and main
roads. The second category embraced services which were provided
locally and optionally and which tended to benefit property taxed
for their provision. The Commission felt that the national and
onerous services should be financed on the basis of "ability to pay",
and since rateable value failed to reflect a person*s ability to
pay with any degree of accuracy the State should preferably bear the
whole cost out of national taxation. So as to avoid "nationalising"
such services and taking them out of the control of the local
authorities the Commission recommended an equal partnership.





taxation, position in Scotland in 190E drew attention to the wide
variations in rateable value between authorities. There the parish,
which was the unit for poor law purposes, was often pitiably small,
and the need for equalisation was greater than in England where,
though the parishes themselves might be small the Poor Law Unions
were much larger ana consequently more viable.
Meanwhile the local authorities were developing quickly
under the recent Local Government Acts, and new local Act powers
were constantly being obtained to extend their spheres of influence
still further. In 1902 the administration of education in England
was transferred from the School Boards to the local authorities
bringing with it an increase in the grant. It was not until 1918
that the school boards in Scotland were finally taken over by 38
local education authorities - five large burghs and thirty-three
(20)
counties.
During the next twenty years the assigned revenues system
suffered a gradual disintegration and fell into disrepute.
Expanding services called for new grants which were never sufficient
to meet the steeply mounting oosts of the local authorities; in the
twenty years up to 1911 local expenditure on "national and onerous"
services alone increased threefold. Moreover the constant drain
on state resources was something that had never been visualised in
1888, and matters were not improved by the freezing of certain of
the revenues assignable to the local taxation account at their
1908-9 yield.
In /
(18) Cmd 1067, 1902.
(19) Education Aot 1902.
(20) Education (Scotland) Act, 1918.
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In 1911 the Kempe Committee was appointed to consider
the situation in the light of the Balfour Commission*s report
and make recommendations. They reported in 'that the assigned
revenues system should be discontinued, and the amount of money
allocated to the local authorities from State sources should be
substantially increased. Instead of the term "national and
onerous" they preferred to distinguish between "local" ana
"semi-national" services, such as Public Health, Police, Education,
Poor relief, Pauper lunatics, and Roads.
No action was taken on the report of the Kempe Committee,
nor did it have the opportunity to deal separately with Scotland,
for the Great War intervened. New subsidies, mostly on a
percentage basis, continued to be made both during the war years
and after - grants for maternity and child welfare in 1915, for
the treatment of venereal disease in 1916, for electoral
registration and for education in 1918. In 1919, the first
of the long succession of housing Acts relieved Scottish housing
authorities of the estimated loss in providing new houses under
deduction of the produce of 4/5ths of a penny in the pound on
rateable value, and stimulated the provision of new houses for
the increasing population, a burden which, apart from private
building, the authorities had had up to then to shoulder unaided
under optional powers given by the Housing Act 1890, or by local
Act$.
The /
(21) Cmd 7315, 1914.
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The history of the grant system is the history of modern
local government. It is the record of continuous and tremendous
expansion and improvement of local services under the pressure of
social event3, and the chronicle of periodic crises when the
authorities on the one hand never seemed to have enough money to
provide all the services demanded, and on the other hand the
government was dismayed at the seemingly uncontrollable calls on
its resources under existing grant arrangements.
Perhaps it will always be so, for it is not merely a
question of finding a just administrative balance between central
and local authorities and then developing a permanent financial
relationship to maintain that balanoe. There is never any
permanence in such relationships, for things are always changing,
and what may seem a workable system to-day becomes inadequate within
a few years. One of the shortcomings of grant systems up to the
present has been their failure all along to adapt themselves to
change.
Ill
In 1929, despite strong opposition and disregarding the
advices of the Meston Committee which had toyed with the grant BLOCK
GRANT.
problem since 1922, Churchill, the then Chancellor of the
Exchequer, brought a new principle into the relationship by
introducing the Black grant.
The Geddes Committee on National Expenditure^ had
underlined /
(22) Cmd 1581. 1921
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underlined the compelling need for government economies and it
was necessary to put a firm limit on the drain on the Exchequer.
The percentage grants, while they were a useful incentive to the
local authorities to develop those services which the government
wished to see developed, were not susceptible to control and were
therefore a -source of unease at the Treasury; there was to be no further
extension of them.
The Local Government Act of 1929 and the Local Government
(Scotland) Act of the same year which were making sweeping changes
in the structure of local government, were also partly derating
agriculture and industry, and the new Block grant was to take
account of the resulting loss of rates to the local authorities. In
addition, Block grant-in-aid was to take the place of:
the assigned revenues, (apart from those
specifically applied to education and police) - £ 4,501,300.
Agricultural rate3 grants 4,733,095.
Health percentage grants 3,907,621.
Roads grants 3,137,690.
and additional "new money" to be voted periodically 5,000,000.
£21,279,706.
together with the estimated loss by derating 22,292,203.
making a total of £43,571,909.
Scotland's share of this was fixed at eleven-eightieths,




the two countries' different levels of valuation, and the total
amount so arrived at was to be distributed among the counties and
counties of cities according to a grant formula which took account
of population, sparsity, rateable Value and unemployment. This
formula is discussed elsewhere; it is sufficient for our present
purpose to observe that the new Block grant hinged round three
principal ideas. First, it reocgnised that the State should
contribute to the local authorities in aid of expenditure incurred
in carrying out State policies, not only as specific advances but
as general lump sums for the authorities to spend as they pleased.
Secondly, it took account of needs - the fact that some authorities
were more necessitous than others, a disparity which was being
accentuated at the timeby industrial unemployment. And, thirdly,
it put an end, for the time being at any rate, to the main percentage
grants.
In conception the general exchequer contribution, which
owed much to the work done by the Balfour Commission of 1896, was
something quite novel and in its detailed application it was highly
ingenious. In order to allow the country to settle down to the
working of the formula it was arranged that during the first four
fixed grant periods of three, four, five and five years the weighted
population /
(23) The Government of Northern Ireland Act of 1920 established
separate financial administrative arrangements for that part of
the United Kingdom, which made it no longer comparable for those
purposes with Scotland, England and Wales. As a result the
old Goschen ratio of 80,11, and 9 was simply adapted to exclude
Ireland.
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population formula would be applied to 25%, 85%, 50% and 75% of the
Block grant respectively. There was, too, a general guarantee that
the ratio of the block grant to the total rate and block grant borne
expenditure should be fixed at 25*18% , the proportion fbr the first
fixed grant period, in future revisions of the amount of the block
grant, so that the grant would rise in proportion to expenditure.
Each year a total pool of State-found money was made available, this
pool being calculated anew for each grant period.
In 1936 the formula was reviewed and adjustments made to
the unemployment and sparslty factors which had the effect of making
(24)
them more responsive to change. It would be unrealistic to think
of these changes out of the oontext of the general economic
situation obtaining at the time. After a brief revival in trade
immediately following the 1914-18 War, the depression of the early
1930's had caused mass unemployment throughout the country. In
Scotland in particular, shipyards and factories were idle and a
depressed area comprising the whole Lowland industrial belt was created -
now a development area - marked down for any government assistance
which could be given.
Numerous schemes to relieve the situation were engaged in,
among them the use of municipal relief works. An Unemployment
(25)
Grants Committee had been appointed in 1920 with power to assist
local authorities and other public bodies to carry out approved schemes
of/
(24) by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland)
Act, 1937.
(25) given by the Unemployment (Relief Works) Act 1920 and the
Public Works Facilities Act 1930.
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of useful work, and this committee continued making grants for these
purposes until 1931 when, as a result of the economy campaign, it
was allowed to lapse and no further grants were made. By 1934, 23*1%
of the working population was unemployed and the same high incidence
persisted throughout the decade up to 1939. In retrospect it is
doubtful whether the grant system was ever sufficiently flexible
to play its full part during these troubled years.
The Block grant, however, was not to be allowed to evolve
according to the original intention. The War of 1939-45 intervened,
(26)
and the grant allocations were fixed at the third phase and continued
until 1948, with supplementary contributions being made during the
last three years, allocated so as to favour those authorities with a
relatively high rate in the pound.
By then, the State was diverting some £269 millions a year
of the national income in axd of local services, or 47*7^ of local
expenditure. Of these grants, 11*2$? were of a general nature.
IV.
In the years immediately following the war EXCHB'irER
E-"y,U\ US '\TION
the new government hastened to introduce a veritable CONTP.IPUTION.
spate of new legislation, some of it designed to adjust the
country to the post-war situation, and some to implement the
ambitious conception of the Welfare State put forward by Sir William
Bevoridge in 1942. Many health services previously carried out by
the /
(26) Local Government(Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1941.
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the local authorities were transferred to the State under the National
Health Service Acts of 1946 and 1947. The Fire Service, nationalised
for the duration of the war, was handed hack to the local authorities
by the State in 1947. Hie Electricity and Gas industries were
nationalised in 1947 and 1948, and the National Assistance Act of
1948 finally transferred the raain responsibility for Poor law
administration from the local authorities to the State, where it
found a central place in the Welfare plan. Many new grants, mostly
on a percentage basis accompanied these changes, grants for town and
country planning, for education, for local health services, for
housing and for the children service.
All these transfers of authority, apart from the many
administrative problems they raised, created a situation which was
quite different to that which has previously existed, and the
administrative balance between central and local government was
profoundly affected, so that a reappraisal of the grant system
became inevitable. Over the years the idea of a general subsidy
had become established, but since the block grant itself still did
not prevent wide variations in local rate poundages it was not now
considered adequate to meet the new conditions. Nor was this
surprising, for now there was full employment and rising inflation
in the country, then deflation and unemployment were the predominant
features. A different approach was being proposed and in 1S47 the
Minister of Health explained this in the following terms: ".... we
are principally concerned with what happens to the individual and
what we should find out therefore, is whether two citizens of equal
substance in different parts of the country have to make an equal
contribution/ "
48
"contribution for the same local services".
In 1948 the existing Block grant was discontinued, and a
new general contribution was pro/iaed for by the Local Government Act
of that year based once more on an entirely different principle.
This was the Exchequer Equalisation Contribution. The intention of the
new grant was to give assistance to those authorities whose resources
failed to come up to a national standard, and this standard was to be
determined by reference to the average level of financial resources
of the country as a whole, measured according tc average rateable
value per head of weighted population.
For Scotland the national standard against which local
financial resources would be compared was to be the average rateable
value per head of weighted population in England and Wales increased
by 25%, so as to take account of the different level of valuations
in the two countries. The intention was that the standard used
in both countries should be as nearly as possible the same.
Briefly, the plan was to fix a standard statistically and
then oompare each local authority with this standard. Local authorities
which fell below the standard would have rateable value "credited"
to them to bring them up to the standard, and would receive grant
equal to the amount which the credited rateable value would have
yielded at the local rate poundage if it had, in fact, been actual
rateable value. The State would become a ratepayer in respect of the
f
deficiency. Those authorities, on the other hand which were above
the. standard would receive no grant at all.
Since /
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Since 1948 there have been two Scottish investigations into
the working of the system* one in 1953 and the other in 1955. The
first committee to report criticised the standard which assumed the
average rateable value per head of weighted population in England
and Wales increased by 25$. This percentage -was not found in
practice to be a fair one for Scottish local needs ana the committee*
unable to find any more accurate measurement of the difference in .
valuations between the two countries, recommended the temporary
use of the Goschen equivalent of eleven-eightieths, a ratio which
has been used for many years in determining education grant and, as
we have seen, in distributing the old Block grant. It is curious to
see how this ratio, arrived at some eighty years ago, is still found
to be of use despite its complete lack of justification at the present
time. It is not so much that the ratio works, in fact, but that,
although this v=ould be difficult to demonstrate, it is probable that
it acts in favour of Scotland. The Local Government (Financial
Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 2934 at all events adopted this basis
applied to the equalisation grant payable in England and Wales, the
standard being fixed- at such a level as would absorb all the grant
available under the Goschen formula, and the result was to increase
the percentage from 25$ to 38$, ana the total sum available to
Scotland by over two million pounds.
Even at this new figure the criticism of unfairness to
>
Scotland continued to be made. The second Scottish investigation
quoted /
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quoted a burden of rate borne expenditure per head of population
in Scotland of £8.55 as compared to £7.78 in England and Wales.
The matter, indeed, went deeper than a mere readjustment
of formula. By 1952, the responsible Minister could say:
"The Equalisation Grant is not, and cannot be, designed to ensure
that individual citizens in different parts of the country bear equal
local burdens. The whole basis of our rating system by reference to
rents (which vary most markedly in different parts of the country)
(27)
by itself makes this an unwarrantable assumption." The Grant, it
was clear, would only work fairly provided there was complete
uniformity in valuation for rating throughout the country.
Accordingly, a wholesale revaluation of rateable subjects was
embarked on in England and Wales.
In Scotland, a Scottish Committee on Valuation and
Bating under Lord Sorn was appointed to examine the Scottish System
(28)
and in 1954 gave their opinion that owners1 rates in Scotland should
be abolished so as to bring Scotland broadly into line with England
and Wales by 1961. This recommendation was made law by the
Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act in 1956, which froze rateable
values at their existing levels, and made an interim adjustment
to the equalisation grant for Scotland, so that there was substituted as
an alternative to the Goschen ratio allocation one based on
comparative rate burdens. By these arrangements it was hoped that
by 1961 there would be a general measure of uniformity throughout
the whole country.
V. /
(27) Address to the Annual Conference of the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants. June 1952.
(28) Report of the Scottish Committee on Valuation and Rating.Cmd.9244
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V.
Meanwhile, despite the importance of the GENERAL
GRAN¥T~
equalisation grant since 1948 and the government's apparent
preference for general contributions of this type, the continuing
increase in speoific grants must not pass unnoticed. In the field
of education a new formula grant was introduced in 1946 to be
followed latter by an advanced technology grant of 75%; in the
twenty years up to now education grants had increased by 377%.
There were further grants, too,for housing and to encourage civil
defence - always a difficult service to foster. All these were
services which, for their various purposes the government felt
compelled to develop regardless of the added burden on the national
exchequer.
By 1955, acute inflationary pressure in the country made
it necessary for the government to take serious action, and a series
of measures were adopted to this end which were commonly known as
the "credit squeeze". These measures included the raising of Bank
rate and restrictions on bank credits and on hire purchase trading.
The boomerang of popular criticism of government and local government
spending activated a stern review of these fields. Local borrowing
from the Public Works Loans Board at favourable interest rates was
reduced to a minimum, local authorities being thus obliged to borrow
in the market, and in 1956 the Housing Subsidies Act reduced general
housing /
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housing grant in England with the intention of ending it.
In addition, there had been under review for some time
(29)
the question of local government reform, and the Edwards Committee
had given detailed consideration to the working of the equalisation
grant in England and Wales. Fundamental changes in the administrative
structure of the authorities were being envisaged, more particularly
in England and Wales, and with this in mind the government made
known its proposals early in 1957, at which time the intention
was announced of raising the rate contribution of industrial and
freight transport occupiers from 25$. to 50$» thereby increasing
rate income in Scotland by an estimated annual £2.3 milli§S! At
that time the Minister of Housing and Local Government said:
"The Government intend a major recasting of the financial
relationship between the Exchequer and the local authorities. This
will entail a radical revision of the structure of Exchequer grants,
as well as some reduction of the grants to take account of the new
rate income. With a few exceptions where technical considerations
make it not possible or desirable, specific grants will be replaced
by a general grant of an amount fixed in advance for a short period
of years, though not necessarily at the same level for each year of
the period. This general grant will be distributed to all county
and /
(29) Investigation into the operation of Exchequer Equalisation
Grants to Local Authorities in England and Wales.Cmd.9270,
1954.
(30) estimated on the basis of rate poundages for 1956-57 -
note that a corresponding reduction in general grant is
to be made to the extent of two-thirds of this figure.
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and county borough councils in England and Wales, and to county and
town councils in Scotland by reference to objective factors (mainly
of weighted population) which are readily ascertainable and afford a
fair and reasonable measure of the relative needs of each authority.
With this change, local authorities will acquire a great
increase of responsibility in determining the money to be spent
on the various services in accordance with local needs. Local
(31)
government will become more truly local".
In spite of a considerable amount of misgiving from local
authorities - at the second reading of the Bill it was said that
every authority in Scotland except the City of Edinburgh had opposed
the measure - and, in particular, from the teaching profession which
felt that the education service might be prejudiced by the new
arrangements, the Local Government and Miscellaneous Financial
Provisions (Scotland) Act 195G duly provided legislation taking effect
from 16th May,1959 to implement these proposals. A general grant was
created in place of a number of specific gri§£l which had amounted to
approximately £37 million; of these the most important was the education
(33).
grant. At the same time a few minor specific grants were discontinued.
The essential feature of the general grant, which is a
Scottish grant distributed according to a formula which pays attention
to Scottish local needs, is that no part of it is attributable to any
particular service. Population is the principal distribution base
chosen, but the exchequer equalisation contribution will remain to
level up local resources.
What /
(31)Hansard. P.1081. 12.2.57. (32) see Appendix B.
(33) see Appendix C.
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What is important to realise is that this new grant, while
it was perhaps initially an emergency control measure designed to
check local spending under the conditions prevailing at the time,
is more than just a short-term remedy. Indeed, the need to control
inflation which was vitally important until 1958, has changed since
then so that the emphasis is now in the opposite direction.
General grant, however, provides the central government with a much
increased flexibility of control ever local expenditure under
any extreme of external ecoraonic conditions. How the rating system
will respond to the use of this control remains to be seen.
It would be wrong to consider the grant in isolation for it
is meant to do more than simply pay the State's share of semi-national
services under inflationary or deflationary conditions. If it
succeeds in achieving its intention of bringing about a real popular
interest in local affairs it will have amply justified itself. Until
the experience of the next few years is available, however, no real
judgement can be passed upon it*
In thus outlining the development of the system of State
contributions in aid of local authorities up to the present time
we have spanned a whole era and witnessed the emergence of an entire
new way of life. Such a survey must necessarily be briefj we have
been dealing with a hundred years of growth and how can we catch the
processes of a century and epitomise them in a word?
When /
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When these grants were first used in Scotland in 1846, Peel's
sevenpenny income tax was but four years old and State interference
was limited to a minimum. Local services were negligible and living
standards and wages were at subsistence level, so that a man could
work for eighty hours a week and earn but nine shillings, while
women and girls were described in Royal Commission reports as
emerging from coal-mines, weeping from the excess of their labours.
There was no effective provision for education, no police force, no
proper roads, no health service. The gulf between Disraeli's "two
nations", the rich and the poor, was immense.
During the intervening years all that has altered, and we
may ask ourselves to what extent local government aided by State
subventions has played its part in achieving this alteration. We
now find ourselves at the start of a new technological revolution
which holds great promise if we turn it to our best advantage, and
we have again to ask ourselves whether our system of public finance
is the best we can get and in tune with the new age, or whether it is
simply an outworn makeshift of a system haphazardly devised for a day
and age that has gone for ever.
The temptation of history is always to try to extrapolate
the past in an effort to see some way into the future. It is as
though we are spectators of a moving film which stops - and we ask
with impatience; what comes next? It is all too easy, too, in
examining such problems to become snared in a Confusion of figures
and formulae and arguments of political expediency from one side or
the /
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the other, so that the real situation behind the arguments and
figures is lost.
If there is on© lesson we can draw from these eonsiderations
it Is that nothing ever stands still, and that whatever relationship
there may now exist between central and looal authorities will change
again almost before its implications can be analysed.
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I.
"lie ©sconce of the specific grant is that it ia directed
to soma particular service. St may he given as a percentage of
approved local expenditures on the service, or alternatively, as
a contribution per unit of cost of tho service. Sometimes a
combination of the two is used, but usually tho former method has
been preferred. "The Inglish grant Systran," it has boon remarked,
(I)
"ia predominantly a percentage grant system,"
Yet although of ell grants to local authorities P51KHSHT4QS
(&ah¥&
they have till lately formed the larger part, successive
governments have deplored the use of percentage grants and hav©
taken steps from time to time to disburden themselves of them.
(2)
The Get dee Committee in 1921, for example, stated categorically:
"The vice of the percentage grant system is that the
local authority which alone can really practise economy in these
services loses much of its incentive to reduce expenditure
the deciding voice as to what money should be spent is not that
of the government nor the House of Commons but that of the local
authorities,"
More recently, in a statement in the House of Commons
. A
in 1957 tho Minister of Housing and local Government said:
"Percentage grants, whatever their merits, carry two
disadvantages. First, there may be danger of an excessive
degree of detailed central supervision over the spending of the
money/ .
(1) local hxpeudituro and ixohequor Grants - i).h. Loos and others
p.150 (1956)
*2) Cad. 1581. 1921
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money. Secondly, there is no certainty from year to year what
the Exchequer may be called upon to contribute."
In spite of these condemnations, specific grants have
their uses and form a natural and necessary part in the development
of the grant system. Until 1887 all grants were for specific
purposes, being given either on a unit or a percentage basis. Of
these the percentage type was always by far the more usual.
Modern thinking on these matters shows a distinct preference for
the general allocation of monies rather than the direction of a
multitude of smaller amounts to specific services, but there
(3)
still remains a large number of grants of this typo, the more
important of which are those for Housing, Hoads and Police.
There were two reasons, for example, whatever other
considerations were in mind at the time, why general Police Grant,
which has remained at 50£ of net approved expenditure since 1874,
was not made part of a general contribution at the recent review.
One was the difficulty of comparing with the rest of the country
for these purposes the London Metropolitan Police Force - a quite
unique body with its very large establishment and the many special
duties entrusted to it; the other was that there was not the
same need to impose economy limits on local police authorities as
there was for other services.
X'olioe authorities in Scotland are counties and large
burghs with populations over 50,000 where a police force is main¬
tained, or combinations of these authorities for the purpose, and
the/
(3) see Appendix A.
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the cost of this asrvlee is largely determined by police pay and
allowances for the establishment approved by the Scottish Home
Department.
All questions relating to such pay and allowances are
decided by the National Police Council, so that an individual
local police authority can do little by itself to influence
spending on the service beyond implementing the decisions of
the national council which is representative of both the Home
Department and the Home Office as well as the local authorities.
Furthermore, payment of a grant to a police authority
is conditional upon the Secretary of State being satisfied that
the police area is efficiently policed, that adequate co-operation
is afforded to other police forces, that the police service is
efficiently and properly equipped and administered, and that "the
rates of pay and allowances of the force are as prescribed or
approved by him"* If he is not satisfied on any of these matters
he may withhold the grant in whole or in part, permanently, or for
(4)
such time as he may determine.
Consequently, it could hardly be said that the 50$ grant,
paid in accordance with the Police Grant (Scotland) Order 1947, was
an encouragement to extravagant spending, or that it removed the
control of expenditure on the service from the government.
The police grant described serves to draw attention,
albeit by way of exception, to the characteristic features of a
specific percentage grant, which may now be stated.
Firstly/
(4) o.K.O. 1947. No. 1659/S.66
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Firstly, such grants encourage the local authorities
to spend money on services regarded as of a State or semi-State
importance. In the knowledge that the State will meet half
the cost, the local authority wi3*l he encouraged to develop a
service until Its standard is as high as possible for the
benefit of Its local population, and, to the extent of the
government's percentage contribution, at any rate, there is no
inflationary problem for the local authority since the grant
moves with rising costs. Further, emphasis can readily enough
be placed on some special aspect of the service sought to be
encouraged; grant has been based for instance on the salaries
of teachers with a view to Increasing the general calibre of
staffs in schools. Again, by the simple expedient of setting
a date after which grant will not be payable, the State can
ensure that the particular servioe will be developed as quickly
as possible, a device which has been much used in the Housing
subsidies. A specific percentage grant, therefore, is a very
useful method of distribution in the case of new or developing
services, and the government always has these advantages In
mind initially* •
Unfortunately, grants used in this way have a habit
of rebounding on the State in a very short time, for money
continues to be spent on the service, over which the State has
no very great control; the government must simply go on meeting,
say, 50$ of all expenditure incurred on the service by the local
authority. The local authority, for Its part, has no incentive
to economise; indeed the reverse Is the case, for if it manages
by/
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by dint of skimping to reduce costs on the service, the percentage
grant, too, will be reduced, and only a part of the saving will be
felt by the local authority. Consequently, the council will pre¬
fer to keep its expenditure up, and may even, in theory at any
rate, engage in reckless spending .it is easy after all to
spend money that is not one*3 own. There is, happily, a measure
of responsibility on the part of most local authorities, together
with a regard for the level of rate-borne expenditure which will
act as a brake on any possible extravagances in this direction,
iuite obviously, of course, it is not sufficient for the local
authorities to protest that there has never been any evidence of
extravagance; the government, as a matter of simple financial
control, must endeavour to ensure that there cannot be.
Secondly, the State in the interests of securing
national standards of service and performance, together with a
natural desire to see that its money is being properly applied,
will tend to exercise statutory control over local services by
(5)
giving or partially withholding grant, a potent instrument when
combined with detailed audit and inspection by government depart¬
ments. Such control, however necessary, and indeed often useful
as it can be in the discussion of problems, represents an inter¬
ference into local affairs which, if carried too far, would
inhibit local initiative. Local councils would feel that they
were mere agents of the government, unable to take decisions of
their own accord until the policy of a government department had
been ascertained. This situation does in fact arise, for example,
in/
(5) A recent instance was the temporary withholding of police grant
from the City of York in August, 1959 following criticisn of
the standard of police accommodation by Home Office inspectors.
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in the duty entrusted to counties end burghs with a population
over 50,060 of collecting motor licence duties for the Ministry
of Transport under the Roads Act of 1960, Here the authority
is little'more than a branch of the civil service.
Again, Highways grants are paid each year out of a
sum fixed by Parliament, but the meticulous supervision attached
to the spending of the money robs the authority of any initiative
in the matter, The distribution of those highways grants con¬
stitutes a special problem at the present time, and no attempt
has been made to generalise them along with other specific grants
until the full effects of general grant are aeon, and some accept¬
able basis can be agreed between the government and the local
authorities.
(6)













Class 1 roads 4808 4536 75
icottieh Eon
Class 11 roads 3988 1539 60 Department
Class 111 roads 6318 1810 50 '
Unclassified roads 10,058 8466 m
Total £7,849 13,009
I
Here the chief difficulty is one of determining needs and
priorities in distributing grants. It is clearly not sufficient
to/
(6) Digest of {Scottish statistics - Hoottish Home Department.
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to fix a percentage; there has then to be determined where the
grant shall be given and this is the responsibility of the
Secretary of State acting through the Scottish Home department.
Normally the ivork of making trunk roads, for example, is carried
out for the Home Department by the appropriate local authorities
on an agency basis and paid for by reimbursement grants after
examination of the work and the costings. In a sense these are
not true grants at all but simply payment for work done with no
local contribution.
Trunk roads expenditure differs from other services in
that it is not necessarily annually recurring, so that the
Secretary of State must reconsider each year where to allocate
the money for specific projects. In doing so he will be guided
by:
the existing mileage of roads.
the use made of existing roads (e.g. freight
transport, tourism).
the suitability of roads for different types of
transport
the age and present condition of roads.
the physical character of the country.
the economic needs of area.
These considerations must remain a matter of national
policy to be determined centrally in accordance with the sums voted
annually by Parliament, and with the relative needs of the areas.
Roads other than national highways, on the other hand,
take on an increasing local character as reflected by the reducing
percentages of the classification grants and are more accurately
the/
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the joint responsibility of the local authorities and the
Secretary of State. similar factors to those listed above
will require annual reconsideration so that such grants are
not susceptible to being included in any general grant. It
must remain with the Secretary of State, who alone can have an
overall knowledge of the needs of the areas In Scotland, to
allocate these grants in consultation with local authority
representatives.
Roads, once made, require costly upkeep to maintain
them in proper condition and it is unfortunate that the sums
made available for maintenance and minor Improvement of the
classified roads are dependent to a large extent on external
economic considerations. One point which has proved trouble¬
some in the past has been that the large burghs, though high¬
way authorities, receive no maintenance grants. This position
has arisen no doubt as a matter of expediency, but it can
readily be argued that if classified roads pass through the
large burghs their maintenance should be aided by grant. The
difficulty of course is to determine the relative extent to
which such roads are used by local and by non-local traffic.
To the extent that non-local use is primarily Involved the
argument for giving grant is a good one, but experience seems
to show that this is not the case. Again, some highway
authorities spend more than others on this function and there is
always the problem of differing local costs.
Consultations are at present in progress between the
central and local authorities, and one suggestion appears to have
favoured/
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favoured a single uniform treatment of counties and counties
of cities for maintenance grants, the sum available being dis¬
tributed so as to give a "road equalisation bonus" to highway
authorities calculated by reference to annual expenditure and
the comparative burden of rate borne by expenditure per head
of population. There, inconclusively until the effects of
general grant are assessed, the matter rests.
Such road grants, then, though they are specific
percentage grants, are an exception to the general proposition
that percentage grants give "no certainty from year to year
what the Exchequer may be called upon to contribute". This
contribution is fixed centrally and the local authorities can
do little to influence it beyond making representation. A
further variant is seen to operate where a percentage grant is
provided, but it is left to the discretion of the Secretary of
(7)
State - as in the Rural Water applies grants to fix the per¬
centage where applications arise. In both cases detailed
central control remains.
The dangers inherent to over-close central control
are well enough understood by all concerned and, Indeed, efforts
have been made to counteract the tendency many times. The
local Government Manpower Committee appointed in 1949 had terms
of reference which read:
"To review and co-ordinate the existing arrangements
by ensuring economy in the use of manpower by local authorities
and by these Government departments which are concerned with
local government matters and to examine in particular the
distribution/
(7) Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act, 1944 and the Water
( 1 o rid i\ »+• 1.OA.0
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distribution of functions between central and local government
and the possibility of relaxing departmental supervision of
local authority activities and delegating more responsibility
to local authorities".
The efforts of the Committee were moderately success¬
ful in reducing State control, but the certainty remains that
the central government has no intention of surrendering its
detailed interest in the local services. To do so would go
counter to any established principles of administration by
delegation. As Sydney Webb remarked with some cynicism fifty
years ago:
"The National Government has successively "bought"
the rights of inspection, audit, supervision, Initiative,
criticism and control in respect of one service after another".
It Is unreasonable to suppose that it would now give up any portion
of these rights. At the same time it should be observed
that control through grants is only one method available to the
State. Even if there were no grants it is highly likely that
central control would be exercised at least to some extent.
Thirdly, percentage grants are simple to operate and
this is undoubtedly a strong point in their favour. Fifty
percent of net recognisable expenditure is a very convenient
ratio to use for all concerned. The obvious question that
must be asked Is : why 50$? Many specific grants are of this
amount and it seems logical to enquire whether 60$ or 45$ might
not reflect more accurately the State?s interest in the parti¬
cular service. How, after all, can this Interest be gauged
with/
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with any degree of accuracy for it is an abstract idea and
abstractions do not respond to statistical measurement"?
The best that can be done is to hazard a guess, or, as the
Balfour Committee suggested at the beginning of the century,
assume an equal partnership. This assumption is clearly un¬
satisfactory, for while it provides a rule of thumb, it is
inefficient finance.
Grant percentages, it is true, are generally
negotiated or at least discussed beforehand with the represen¬
tatives of the local authorities, but the dominant partner in
such discussions must inevitably be the government. There
have been instances, notably in the case of the Air Rail Pre¬
cautions grant, when the local authorities initially refused
to operate the service the government was pressing on them
till the grant percentage offered to than was raised con¬
siderably; opportunity for such action does not often arise.
In fact, grant percentages far from representing the measure
of the respective interests in the services, are more a measure
of the extent to which local interest and willingness to operate
the services economically can be maintained.
This willingness or unwillingness implies that in
using percentage grants the government may be obliged to persuade
the local authorities to develop a new service and that while
some of them may respond willingly, others may refuse because of
the additional rate burden involved. An example of this
occurred in 1957 v?heQ, following warnings by the British Medical
Association on the danger of lung cancer caused by smoking, the
government/
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government announced that a 50$ grant would be made available
to encourage the local authorities to engage in publicity
campaigns to bring these dangers clearly before the public.
Criticism was at once made in the national press that such a
grant was discriminatory since the large progressive authori¬
ties would use these powers, while the smaller council, being
more preoccupied with the level of rate-borne expenditure,
might not. Yet here was, unquestionably, a service which
affected every individual regardless of locality.
Considering the characteristics of the percentage
grant, then, the general principle suggests itself that grants
on this basis, while they may be used as an expedient on the
introduction of a new or developing service, should not be con¬
tinued beyond the shortest time required for a reasonable
development of the service throughout the country. They should
then merge into a universal grant which would be easier to
administer but not before the adequacy of the percentage adopted
has been discussed by representatives of the government depart¬
ments concerned and of the local authorities, with adjustments
be5.ng made if found necessary. This view requires to be related,
however, to the general state of the economy of the country at the
time, and to the needs of areas.
Percentage grants, while constituting a serious drawback
in periods of inflation may provide the State with a very useful
instrument in the carrying out of national economic policy when
conditions/
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conditions arc different, I3y the use of capital grant
specially directed to, soy, roads construction, the State
could speed up the rate of tksv capital investment cither for
the country as a whole or for a particular region. By with¬
drawing the grant the tempo could ho relaxed. The Unemploy¬
ment Grants Committee of the 1980*8 administered schemes of
tills type mid lately in 1906 the government * s intention was
again announced of using public works on such services as
(8)
roads, (education, water and sewerage la relief of unemployment.
In March 1959 the Secretary of state intimated a speed-tip in
public work of this nature valued at £9,575,000, and tha local
Smployraent Bill at present in Parliament provides for grants to
local authorities and industrial estates management corporations
so as to deal with areas of high unemployment.
This '♦stabilising device'' as Pigou has called it,
capable as It is of giving inflationary boosts where they are
needed, is indeed a necessary part of the equipment of any
Gtate committed, as the United Kingdom has been since 1944, to
a policy of full employment, as was scon In 1956 when the
Housing subsidies wore cut off.
In a similar way we note the use of ad hoc specific
grants in dealing with the special problems and needs of parti¬
cular areas - maritime counties, for example, for capital grant
(j>) (10)for coast protection works, or the Highlands, where, because of
the/
(6) Hansard, 3/11/58,
((9) Coast Protection Act, 1949,
(19) Comprising the counties of Argyll, Caithness, Inverness,
Orkney, Hoso and Cromarty, Sutherland and Getloud.
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the geography of the country and tho distribution of the
population the difficulty is to ''encourage people to live
there by making it possible to secure there in return for
reasonable efforts, proper standards of life and the means
of paying for thorn', J'or many years the government 1ms
taken tho view that these considerations justify expenditure
from public funds on a largo scale, though it is true that
much of this expenditure io not directly distributed through
the local authorities,
Discussion of these matters raises an important
question of principle which ia often overlooked ae to the
essential rigatnoss of applying the grant system, as a means
of economic control. It is arguable that the government. In
using tho node of "paying its share ' of semi-national services
for other then just that purpose, introduces a complicating
nnd distracting element which nay well reduce tho main efficiency
of the system.
Hero there is a connection with the system of national
taxation out of which these grants flow, for over many years the
tax system itself has been regarded as more than simply a device
for raising money. Thus, taxation has been consistently used
for politico-social as distinct from financial purposes to
improve health, to encourage an increasing population, to promote
industrial expansion, to control the volume of purchasing power,
and even, as Unstable pointed out, to elevate morals. All
those aims may be political or social or economic but their justi¬
fication io in the ultimate wall-being of the Utate. If,
therefore/
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therefore, in the course of assessing and collecting national
taxation the government can conveniently further this end then
the use of the tax as a control instrument is acceptable. The
state's opportunity for exercising such controls extends to many
fields other than Just taxation, as in the control of investment
through the Capital Issues Coxamittee and the control of credit
through tho Bank.
These and the use of the grant system, as control
instruments are all justifiable as means of attaining the primary
aim of government, the common good, to which all other purposes
are secondary. Here, too, is a justification for policies of
expediency so roundly condemned by writers in the past. Occasions
are bound to arise whe^L, in order to achieve a primary purpose,
formal principles in relation to the grant system must be sacri¬
ficed. It must rest with financial administration to see that In
adopting expedients and in using the grant system as a means of
control the secondary purposes are not defeated.
11
The principal disadvantages of the percentage UNIT
GRANTS
grant, namely the lack of certainty on the part of the
Exchequer as to what it may be asked to contribute from one
year to another and the possibility of extravagant spending
which cannot be controlled are overcome to some extent by-
specific/
72
specific contributions in a different form - unit grant.
The Geddes Committee, reporting in 1921 when economy measures
were as important ©s they are to-day, advised that the percen¬
tage grant system be stopped and replaced either by fixed grants
(11)
or by grants based on a definite unit.
One interesting example of the limiting nature of the
unit type of grant is the contribution given towards the employ¬
ment of blind persons in workshops under the Disabled Persons
(Jiiaployment) Act, 1944 at of actual expenditure, but with a
maximum grant of £100 per head. Another instance is the housing
subsidy which, in terms of the various Housing Acts has made
great use of the unit principle - £39. 15/- per 3 apartment house
per annum for 60 years, for example, under the Housing (Scotland)
Act 1952.
These housing grants given over the years under a series
of Housing Acts since 1919, have been remarkably successful and
illustrate well the political factor behind grant considerations.
The provision of houses for the people is a matter in which large
sections of the community are personally interested as individuals,
for housing shortages, the existence of slums and high rents for
low standard aceoijjibdation make for individual discontent and
misery. For this reason the housing subsidies have repeatedly
been the subject of election promises which, in their fulfilment,
have left us with a multitude of schemes each attracting grant
under a different act of Parliament.
The detailed intention of these different Statutes has
varied/
(11) Cmd. 1581. 1921.
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varied from time to time but the over-riding aim has been to
encourage the provision of houses for the people by offering
grants, leaving the local authorities to find the balance of
the money. For the local authorities' part this balance has
been raised in two ways; partly from rent charges on the
tenants of the houses, and partly from a general rate levy on
the community to reflect the consideration that the duty to
provide houses is a communal and a local one. What the amount
of this rate contribution is will therefore depend on ths level
at which council house rents are fixed and this is a local
political matter which has occasioned considerable controversy
in recent years.
We are not here directly concerned with this contro¬
versy for it is a matter of local policy which has little effect
on housing subsidy except to the extent that local councils use
tills subsidy wisely. As will be seen later, however, such
local policies may directly affect the amount of equalisation
grant receivable by them - an inequity which should be con¬
trolled.
One method of contribution, interesting because it by¬
passes the "rent" problem, has been the improvement grant or the
standard grant of the Housing Acts of 1950 and 1959 respectively.
Here the local authority is not the owner but simply passes on to
the individual a sum to be used specifically, receiving grant for
the purpose.
In July 1956 the Secretary of State announced that the
then/
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then existing grants woiild not apply to further houses the
tenders for •which were received after 51st July, 1956. Instead,
a grant for "approved need" houses was fixed at £84, irrespective
of 3ire„ The present r>osition is that subsidies received for
new houses are regarded not as for these new houses alone, but
simply as a further contribution towards the pool of Exchequer
(12)
subsidies.
As to the unit grants for existing houses, these must
of necessity continue to be paid on this basis during the remaining
life of the grant, until they fall out one by one.
The school dinner grant, 100$ of an approved unit cost,
is another illustration of the principle. All local education
authorities estimate their unit expenditure on shcool dinners in
(13)
the forthcoming year. These are submitted to the Scottish Educa¬
tion Department where the local unit is examined and approved.
Grant is paid on this approved unit and if an authority spends
more, the excess will fall on the rates. The use of a local
rather than a national unit takes local cost variations into account.
In such grants the more scientific notion of cost per unit
replaces the percentage of "net recognisable expenditure" so far
discussed. The measure of the central government's share of the
cost still remains as a problem - to this extent it will be noticed
that we are still dealing with a percentage of cost - but the fixing
of a contribution per unit does at least place a limit on what the
State/
(12) Report of the Working Party on Housing Subsidies in Scotland
(1956) p.l.
(13) Regulation 5 of the 32ducatlon Authorities (Scotland) Grant
Regulations, 1948,
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State is asked to pay. A local Housing authority, therefore,
will be much more inclined to economic spending in the knowledge
that whatever expenditure it incurs, no more than the stated con¬
tribution per unit will be forthcoming. The West Midland Study
Group of 1955 gave it as their opinion that there were great possi-
(14)
bilities for an extension of the unit cost principle.
The unit cost is undoubtedly an attracti\re idea, though
unit grants are no groat stimulus to development because of their
fixed nature and can never compare with percentage grants for this
purpose. Unfortunately it is not all services that have a natural
unit of cost which can readily be determined, and in any case local
costs very considerably from one area to another. For this reason -
"the present lamentable lack of knowledge about why local costs are
what they are" - any extension of the unit grant principle seems at
present an unlikely proposition, particularly now that expenditure
control has been otherwise secured.
With the exception of the school meals grant, unit grants
of the type referred to so far give little consideration to the
relative needs of different areas. House building costs in authority
A may be considerably higher than in authority B, yet both authorities
receive identical contributions from the State.
This drawback can be avoided to some extent by the intro¬
duction of some form of statistical "weighting" whereby greater
emphasis is permitted to fall on one section of the community FORMULA
GRANTS.
as compared to another, so that their relative needs are taken
into account. Specific grant given in this way must be calculated
according/ __ > . __
(14) Local Government and Central Control - West Midland Study Group
(1955)
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according to a forraulu, and la sometimes referred to as "formula
grant". Formula weighting has entered into a number of specific
grants in past years and into general contributions like the
block or equalisation grants. The weighting element of the
formula can, of course, deal with any factor chosen - relative
poverty, density of population, unemployment, birth-rates, death-
rates or any other social or economic factor which may be selected
provided it la not controllable by individual local authorities
so as to influence their share in the grant. The difficulty lies
in arriving at a comprehensive formula which will make a just com¬
parison between, say, Mlnburgh and Airdrio, between highly
industrialised Glasgow and the more rural area of Uontrose; one
can see that there are likely to be a host of factors both social
and economic which make conditions different in these localities.
It is highly doubtful whether any one formula could accurately
allow for all those differences. In general, too, because of the
possible confliot of weightings between one grant and another, it
is not considered suitable to link specifio grants to formulae.
The formula type of specific grant, however, was used
effectively though imperfectivoly in the operation of the education
main grant under the education (Scotland} Act 1946, a specific
grant which dwarfed all other grants in its magnitude and which put
Into perspective the importance which any great modem State must
inevitably place on the education of the people.
Under the Act of Parliament referred to the Education
(Scotland)/
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(Scotland) Fund, a curious remnant of the assigned revenues
(15)
system, was continued, and this fund was maintained until 1959
by annual payments of:
(a) An amount equivalent to the sums paid out
of the Local Taxation (Scotland) Account
for the year ended 31/3/1929, some £586,842.
(b) An amount equivalent to sums applicable to
education in Scotland expended from Parlia¬
mentary vote for education in Scotland in the
year ended 31/3/1914 - the standard year -
excluding the Royal Scottish Museum grant,
capital grant for the training of teachers,
sums spent on teachers* superannuation and
on the administration of the Scottish
Education Department, in all, £2,306,835.
(c) ll/80ths of the excess of actual expenditure
from the education vote' for England and Wales
over the equivalent figure for the standard
year subject to certain adjustments.
(d) ll/80ths of the amount estimated to be spent
on teachers* superannuation in England and
Wales.
Under regulations made by the Secretary of State various
head3 of expenditure were charged on the fund, and the balance re¬
maining was used as grant to educational establishments including
education/
(15) Originating out of earlier Education funds this Fund was
established by the Education (Scotland) Act, 1908, section 15.
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education authorities. The principal charge on the fund,
however, was the formula grant at present being discussed,
namely, main grant.
The grant was based on -
(a) £6 for each unit of the number of pupils attending
schools run by the authority, and "special arrangement" pupils.
(b) 60/1 of net recognisable expenditure.
(c) a deduction of a variable rate in the pound of either
(16)
standard or rateable value whichever was greater. This deduction
was determined each year by the Secretary of State.
If this formula Is broken down into its elements, it will
be seen to be a combination of unit and percentage grant speci¬
fically directed to education in Scotland but weighted to take
account of relative resources throughout the country.
While it was, in fact, in the field of education that
the relative needs of individual authorities were first taken notice
of In 1917, the deduction of a rate product which was then Intro¬
duced having been suggested as far back as 1901, the effect of this
particular deduction by reference to rateable value or standard
rateable value was not primarily an education matter but was designed
to withdraw the gains of certain authorities arising In 1948, paying
them over to below standard authorities. The "unit" part of the
formula provided for those areas where the child population was
heavier than others. The percentage element, 60%, is more difficult
to justify however, and one might say, of this, as of other percen¬
tage grants, why not 61%?
As/
(16) Education Authorities (Scotland) Grant (Amendment No. 4)
Regulations, 1954 (S.I. 1954. Mo. 727 (S.82) ).
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As we have seen, the principle behind ouch percentages
ie not bo much to fix on what Is a truly representative distinc¬
tion In terms of figures between central and local government
shares of the responsibility, but rather what minimum allocation
la seen to produce the desired results without casting an intoler¬
able burden upon the ratepayer. The State cannot normally be
expected to allow a greater percentage than will leave the local
authorities with an interest in economical spending.
111.
an from April 1959 the use of the Education (Scotland)
Fund has ceased and the specific grant for education has THE
TilANoX'TION
been discontinued and now forms the bull: of a general '"SFISTfic
TO BLOCK GRA.NT
grant baaed on the old percentage grants which it is left
to individual authorities to allocate to the particular services
they choose. Sundry small and separate grants have been swept
away, "thereby making an effective saving in accounting and auditing
(17)
manpower centrally and locally". This has not been done without
strenuous opposition, notably from bodies such as the national
Union of Teachers and the Educational Institute of cot land which
felt that without specific direction local authorities might be
tempted to spend less on education and more on other services.
This contingency has been provided for by giving the Secretary of
State power to intervene so as to control standards if he considers
it/
(17) "Local Government Finance". Cmnd. 209. 1957. p.8.
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it necessary, but it is inevitable that, initially at any rate,
specific direction, like the old assigned revenues, will die
hard. let us examine these difficulties further.
In the absence of specific direction the committees of
a local council may be expected to take the narrow view and see
their particular service as the most Important and the most
worthy of financial consideration; each will seek to obtain as
much finance provided in their estimates as possible. This
could result In a service which, like Children, has been
enjoying 50% grant, being prejudiced by the claims of others.
It will be for the Finance Committee in the first instance to
maintain a balance here, subject to overall review by the council
as a whole. A more detailed scrutiny of estimates and a degree
of vigorous discussion will follow which, in itself, by obliging
all concerned to take a sharper interest, will be a worth-while
achievement and one of the principal effects sought after by
the local Government and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions
(Scotland) Act 1958.
The Scottish local authorities have not been slow to
react to these changes, so that we find one county council, for
example, stating its conviction that "expenditure which will not
ensure a full return to the rate payers must be ruthlessly
eliminated". And again, that "there should be a more general
acceptance of the principle that even local authority services
should be limited to^the willingness and capacity of the rate¬
payers to finance them"'.
Beyond/
(18) Fife County Council; circular letter from Convener's
Committee to councillors and officials, December, 1958.
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Beyond the council chamber, too, is the wider body
of ratepayers to whom, in the end, the council is answerable.
The conception of a general grant depends very much upon the
interest displayed by these ratepayers. Real public control
over public expenditure calls for a more enlightened interest
than is often shown at the present time, but it is antici¬
pated that it will b© shown if it is seen that standards are
not being maintained or that money is being wasted or mis-
app li ed.
This heightened interest in local affairs on the part
of the ratepayers, which is in itself of primary importance,
taken in conjunction with the reduction in administrative time
previously devoted to many different grants, is the great
advantage of a block grant which in all but a relatively few
special cases will be superior to specific contributions.
Indeed there is but one respect in which a block grant falls
short in a comparison with percentage grants used for similar
purposes and that is In its inability to adapt Itself freely
to costchanges.
The relationship that exists between a specific
grant and a block grant is therefore a simple one for the
tendency has been for the former to mature Into the latter.
At this time such a merger is taking place, and a number of
grants which like education, have been allocated specifically
till now, have been integrated in a general sum, no part of
which is to be regarded as earmarked for any particular service.
By these arrangements the whole shape of the grant
system/
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system has been fundamentally changed, so that what was till
now "predominantly a pa reantago grant system' baaed on expendi¬


















r£hia new grant lias been widely discussed in the press,
and the average ratepayer might bo pardoned for thinking that
specific grants are therefore no longer of importance. «, Tvery
so often, as we have noted, there arises a revulsion against
thosa, not because they are bad In themselves, but because they
tend to be misused until outside economic circumstances draw
attention to their main weakness - they do nothing to dis¬
courage spending. This revulsion has been characteristic of
the past few years,
Specific grants have always been and will always be
an indispensable feature of the grant system In this country;
they have their function to perform but outside of that function
they have tended in the past to be used without discrimination.
Where the percentage grants are concerned their real "vie©51 is
that they arc not fixed, and so are not controllable. A percen¬
tage grant could be fixed - as, indeed, the roads grants are;
the/
b3
the conception of a fixed grant for each service was thought
of over sixty years ago and has since been improved so as to
contemplate a fixed lump sum for a number of services formerly
financed by separate specific grants.
There are two ideas involved here which are so fre¬
quently associated together as to be thought of as one, yet
they are important enough to be separately distinguished, for
this is the point of transition from specific to general con¬
tributions. On the one hand there is the choice of having
specific grants which are fixed, partly fixed or not fixed -
the extent to which they are so fixed will depend on how closely
the government desire to secure economy through financial control*
On the other hand the decision has to be taken whether to have
many such specific grants or one consolidation of them. Putting
these two ideas together again we have something approaching the
new general grant.
One "block" grant instead of several has obvious adminis¬
trative advantages, but from such a block grant will still be ex¬
cluded contributions which, if specifically distributed, either:
(a) promote a desired development,
or (b) give assistance to non-uniform services or areas.
This, then, is the proper field of the specific grant,
(19)
and an examination of those in use at present shows that most of
them, though not all, fall into one or other of these categories,
while there are very few which, like the police grant, are not
perfectly capable of being controlled by the government in some
way other than by being absorbed in a general grant.
The/
(19) see Appendix A,
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The principle, however, remains. Otherwise controll¬
able or not, unless specific grants can be justified for their
promotional value or for some special reason of non-uniformity
they should merge into one general contribution. Considerations
of expediency on one side there would seera to be no reason why
this principle should not now be fully applied.
b5
4. - GANSRAL COHThlBUTTONS.
1
While specific grants are directed to some particular
service, general grants are not. This provides them with a new
set of primary characteristics, which may be stated at once as
follows:
They (1) provide for one contribution instead of many.
(2) more readily permit the government to fix its
contribution at a determinable figure.
(3) give greater freedom of choice to the local
authorities in applying the money,
(4) limit the neoessity for detailed central
control over the spending of the grant.
In addition, being universal contributions of large lump
sums they lend themselves particularly well to statistical weighting
for selected purposes. In this chapter we shall be concerned main¬
ly with the form of these grants, leaving till later a discussion of
their effects and oonsequeaces.
The form taken by such general contributions may first
be examined by referring back to the block grant introduced THE
(i) bsock
in 1929. The circumstances of its introduction have already GllAtrt1
been mentioned; it was an economy measure intended to provide the
local authorities with a semi-fixed general sum in place of the
specific grants and assigned revenues given hitherto, over which
they would have fairly complete eontrol. This general exchequer
contribution/
(1) by the local Government (Scotland) Act 1929.
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contribution, the first large-scale experiment in differential
atate aid, originally conceived in principle in a Minority
(2)
Report of the Royal Commission of 1896, was linked to a formula
which attempted to take into account the fact that some authori¬
ties were more in need of assistance than others, because of
local conditions. Inequalities between authorities had for
long been a troublesome anomaly. In the Minority Report referred
to the view had been expressed that "in the allocation of Exchequer
subventions one would naturally expect that needs and means would
be the governing considerations", while in 1902, the local Taxation
Commission for Scotland in their final report had drawn attention
to the position of the parishes in the following terms:
"One Scottish parish may, by some fortunate circum¬
stance, have within its boundaries an amount of rateable
property out of all proportion to its needs, while another
may be composed of property which represents a rateable
capacity inadequate to the barest needs of civilisation.
For instance, the parish of Temple, in Midlothian, has a
gros3 valuation of over £44 to each inhabitant, while
Barvas in Ross and Cromarty has only 9/- per inhabitant
and a penny rate will therefore produce nearly 100 times
(3)
as much per inhabitant in Temple as in Barvas".
By the end of the 19th oentury grants-in-aid of the rates
generally had become common, indeed necessary; the "equivalent"
(4)
grant earlier described was one instance, and, to a considerable
extent, the "residue" grant was another. The notion, too, of a
fixed/
(2) Cmd, 638. 1901
(3) Cmd. 1067. 1902
I A \ —— 4. O
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fixed "block" grant for each service - education, police, poor
relief, for example, was slowly growing. These ideas took
shape in the conception of one fixed amount for all services
which would be used to tackle rates relief by formula.,
This was a logical enough development of approach,
though there is little doubt that the full advantages for its
purpose of a block grant over the then existing specific grants
were not immediately recognised.. There has always been a
tendency to confuse the purposes of the two grant types, a
tendency from which we are not entirely free even to-day, for the
principle and the practice have commonly been two different things.
duch ideas were put into practice in framing the 1989
block grant foanula, a complicated device which attempted to give
due weight to four factors: population, rateable value, sparsity
of population and unemployment.- Though there is little more than
an academic interest in the calculation to-day it does contain
features that foreshadow the new general grant, and the original
working in Scotland of the weighted population formula was as
follows:
(5)
(A) To the estimated poptilation P
was added (a) a weighting for each unit
Vfhereby the number of children under 5 per +p (c-50)
1000 of the population exceeded a normal 50
figure of 50 per 1000.
(b) a weighting for each ill by which the
rateable value per head of population was
less than the normal figure of £12. 10/-
per head. — +p (£ig.,5-R)
"£12.5
The/
(5) P = J'opulation as estimated by the Registrar General.
G =* Number of children under 5 per 1000 of population.
R » Rateable value per head of population.
U.r » Percentage of unemployment.
3 * Population per mile of road.
I ■ Pirst Intermediate Weighted Population.
SO
The sura of the population and the weightings
for children and rateable value constituted
the first intermediate weighted population ■ I
(B) The first Intermediate weighted population
was then further weighted by 10% for each
unit whereby the average number of unemployed I (U - 1.5) 1(
insured men plus one-tenth of the unemployed 100
insured women exceeded a normal figure of 1.5.
(C) In counties I was further weighted for sparsity
by two alternative formulas -
(a) If the population per mile of road (S) was
less than 10C, I was weighted by f of 1%
for each unit whereby 8 was less than 200 I (200 - S)
200
(b) If 3 was more than 100, I was weighted by
the proportion which 50 bore to 3, I ( 50 )
S
This formula was used to apportion the total sum
available to counties and counties of cities in Scotland,
£6,127,000, in the first fixed grant period from 1930 to
1933. The Goschen formula of ll/80ths was used to determine
the foregoing amount, the total figure of which represented
the ascertained losses in 1928-29 by local authorities through
derating, together with the discontinued percentage grants.
It had been provided that the ratio of grant to the
total of rate and grant borne expenditure was to be maintained,
so that for the second fixed grant period an additional £850,000
(6}
was required to take account of increased expenditure. Despite
the ingenious calculation of the formula and the guarantees for
the preservation of the ratio, the grant still had the tendency
to lag behind expenditure. To be really effective the contri¬
bution would have required to increase continuously, an impossi¬
bility for any grant short of a pure percentage grant.
Over the four fixed grant periods, the formula was to
be applied to the block grant by gradual steps, first 25% then
50%/
(6) Local Government (General iSxchequer Contributions) Act. 1933
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50$, then 75$. It was originally intended that by the fifth
period in 1947 the whole money would be allocated on the basis
of weighted population.
The formula for determining weighted population was
(7)
changed in 1937 and was ultimately based on:
Population weighted for -
Children under 5
low rateable value per head of population
unemployment
low population per mile of road (in counties)
and the allocation of the grant between county landward
areas and small burghs was put on a capitation basis. The effect
of this 1937 revision in Scotland was to give further weighting to
the unemployment and sparsity factors to take account of changing
circumstances, and the formula was adjusted as follows:
(1) The First Intermediate Weighted Population
was as before I
(2) (a) the multiple of 10$ which it was meant to




(b) an additional weighting of 5$ was added
for each unit whereby TJ exceeds 5$ + I (U - ) 5
(3) The First Intermediate Weighted Population
weighted for unemployment formed the Second
Intermediate Weighted Population * W
(4) In counties W was weighted for sparsity by
two alternative formulas:
(a) If the population per mile of road was
less than 100, W was weighted by the
percentage represented by the proportion
which the difference between 230 and S
bore to 200 W (230 - S)
200
(b) If 3 was more than 100, W was weighted
by the percentage represented by the
proportion which 65 bore to 3 W 65
3
—.. _ vome/-
(7) Local Government (Financial Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1937.
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Bome idea of the relative influence of the factors
making up the total "weighted population" in the original and
the revised formulas can be obtained from the figures given
below which refer not particularly to Scotland but to the








Weighting for children 24.3 15.4
Low rateable value 15.2 13.2
High unemployment 8.5 14.9
Abnormally high unemployment - 1.7
Bparsity of population 13.8 14.8
101.3 100.8
The Block grant had many good features. For one thing
all authorities, and consequently every individual, had a share
in it since population was its essential measuring rod, and its
spending was not subject to Btate control and inspection; the
contribution was not affected by what a local authority spent.
On the other hand, since population was the principal
criterion, those authorities which had a declining population
were liable to find themselves with a reducing contribution and
an increasing rate burden. Furthermore, the loss to local
authorities by derating was not equalised, for some areas were
more industrial than others; in any case, with rising costs
these losses became notionally progressively greater than those
assumed in 1929 in calculating the available global sum. Then
too/
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too, rateable values,another factor in the equation, were
not and could not at the time be based on uniform valuations
everywhere, and it was as much this objection as any which led
to the substitution of Equalisation Grant in 1948.
There were many people who felt that the block grant
was worth continuing provided that modifications were made to
the formula.
11
The Exchequer Equalisation Grant introduced EXCHEQUER
EQUALISATION
in 1948 was designed to assist authorities whose GRANT,
rateable value per head of weighted population fell below the
national average. In its essentials the idea was a straight¬
forward one. First, It was necessary to calculate the national
average of rateable value per head of weighted population.
Secondly, compare with this the rateable value of each authority
calculated in the same way. Thirdly, credit these local authori¬
ties with rateable value equal to their deficiency, and pay them
grant equal to the rates on that credited value, having regard to
the actual relevant expenditure of the authority. In effect,
the State becomes a ratepayer of such receiving authorities to the
extent of the deficiency. In 1955-56, over £10 million or approxi¬
mately of total net expenditures was paid out to receiving
(8)
authorities in Scotland.
As before, weight was given to population for children
of/
(8) Rating Review. 1956.
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of school age and for sparsity, but now, as will be seen, the
emphasis has shifted from population to rateable value.
At first, in 1948, the average fixed for Scotland was
that arrived at for ISngland and Wales increased by 23$ to take
account of the different levels of valuation, but, as has been
pointed out, this basis was criticised, and in 1954 the 25$ was
discarded in favour of the old Goschen equivalent, and certain
transitional grants were given based on the year 1952-53. Thus,
if the amount chargeable by a local authority to rates in that
year under the Act of 1954 was greater than it would have been
under the 1948 Act then the authority received a transitional
grant to the extent of the notional loss. In this way Scot¬
land parted company with the original conception of the grant.
These and further adjustments to the original plan were
made, after investigations into its working, by the Local Govern¬
ment (financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1954, and the Valua¬
tion and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956. For one thing due allowance
was made for these authorities which, as a matter of housing policy,
kept their rents at a low level and thus attracted more grant. For
another an alternative method of determining the Scottish aggregate
of exchequer grant was provided, as follows:
There is first calculated the "notional relevant local
expenditure for Scotland" - a sum which bears the same WPjgj x ^
proportion to relevant local expenditure in England and
Wales as the weighted population in Scotland bears to the
weighted population in England and Wales.
Next, the sum is ascertained which bears the same
proportion/
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proportion to the rates burden for England and Wales (local
expenditure less equalisation grant) as the population P (S) „ rf,
FIE) ~ (Ein Scotland bears to the population in England and Wales.
This "notional rates burden for Scotland", de¬
ducted from notional relevant local expenditure for NRLS(S)-NRB (S)
Scotland gives the notional exchequer grant for Scotland,
and the aggregate of Scottish exchequer grant is the Ifexisjs) x RLS^3^
amount which this bears to notional relevant local expendi¬
ture in Scotland of the relevant local expenditure in
Scotland.
The present sum payable each year to Scottish local
authorities amounts therefore to ll/80ths of the amount paid
as equalisation grant to local authorities in England and Wales
less the total of any transitional grants paid to local authori¬
ties in Scotland, provided this sum is greater than the amount
which bears the same proportion to the relevant local expendi¬
ture of all burghs and landward areas in Scotland as the
notional exchequer grant for Scotland bears to the notional
(9)
relevant local expenditure for Scotland. The latter method
is now generally used.
Tliis sum is divided between those authorities whose
Adjusted Rateable Value (the actual rateable value scaled up
or down by the substitution in the case of local authority
houses of the average rateable value of all such houses in
Scotland for the year in which the Valuation and Rating
(Scotland)/
(9) the amount calculated under sec. 26 of the Valuation and
Rating (Scotland) Act 1956.
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(Scotland) Act 1956 was passed for the actual value shown
in the Valuation Roll) is leas than the Standard Rateable
Value, Authorities with an Adjusted Rateable Value greater
than the Standard receive no grant.
The Standard Rateable Value is found by multiplying
the Weighted Population by a figure known as the Governing
Factor fixed by the Secretary of State at a level which will
ensure that the total grant available is absorbed by those
authorities which are entitled to receive the grant. This
Governing Factor is mathematically calculated in several
(10)
stages as follows -
First Stage.
Step 1 Find E, P, V and £ for all authorities
Evaluate 1 « B x V x 2 to find 1 (equaticn
E « G F £ A)
Step S Eliminate from E, P, V and £ all authorities
whose adjusted rateable value per head of
weighted population is greater than 1, as
evaluated above. Evaluate equation A with
reduced values of 1, P, V and £.
Step/
(10) G«ll/8°'tRs of Equalisation grant in England less .Scottish
transitional grants, or amount calculated under the Valuation
and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956.
E =total relevant local expenditures of qualifying authorities.
P .total weighted populations of qualifying authorities.
V .total adjusted rateable values of qualifying authorities.
£ .total adjusted produce of £1 In the £ of qualifying authorities'
1 .estimated governing factor per head of weighted population at
first stage,
a, al, etc, . adjustments to 1.
g1» g11» etc = total equalisation grants produced by applying
1, 1+a, etc.
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Stop 3. Eliminate from reduced values of S, P, V,
and £ all authorities whose adjusted rate¬
able value divided by weighted population
Is greater than reduced 1. Evaluate
equation A with further reduced values of
S, P, V, and £. This will probably pro¬
duce a value for 1 which indicates that all
remaining authorities are qualifiers. If
not, the process must be repeated as a fourth
step.
Second Stage.
Step 1. Calculate the equalisation grants which would
be payable if the value of 1 produced by the
last step of the first stage were the governing
factor per head of weighted population. Call
the total of the equalisation grant so produced
.
Step 2. Evaluate E x V x a «G - G^ to find a1
PI - V~+ £ l+a
Calculate the total equalisation grants which
would be payable using (l*a) as governing factor
per head of weighted population. Call the total
on.
Step 3. Evaluate E x V x al mql _ GH to find a
iql+l+a
Calculate the total equalisation grants which
would be payable using (1+a+a-*-) as governing
factor per head of weighted population. Call
the total q.111.
The usual, but not necessarily invariable result of these calculations
is that, if q1 is greater than G, G will be less and G111 greater
than G. if G^ is less than G, olH will probably also be less, and
If payments are at a provisional stage, the calculations can probably
stop at since the "error" will probably be less than £2 in
£10,000.
The sum required to make up the Adjusted Rateable Value
to the Standard Rateable Value is the Rateable Value Credited, while
the net amount which would fall on rates if no equalisation grant were
available is the relevant Local Expenditure.
The/
96
The apportionment of the grant to an individual
authority is made by dividing the relevant Local Expenditure
by the sum of the Rateable Value Credited and the product of
a rate of £1 in the pound based on the Adjusted Rateable Value,
The dividend is the Relevant Erection which, when multiplied by
the Rateable Value Credited gives the Equalisation Grant due.
This is distributed to counties of cities, counties
and the large and small burghs on the basis of provisional cal¬
culations adjusted when more accurate figures become available.
Experience has shown that in Scotland there is a tendency for
these local authorities to over-estimate relevant local expendi-
(11)
ture by an average of 2$ , so that in order to avoid taking back
equalisation grant paid on such over-asti.mates provisional and
final payments become necessary. To preserve thQ income flow
to authorities payment has been spread over six instalments
during the year - as from May 1959, payment will be made in
monthly instalments. The equalisation grant to any county
council is apportioned by the Scottish Home Department between
that council and all district councils within the county on the
basis of the expenditure applicable to the various councils which
is inoluded in the total of relevant local expenditure.
mi actual example of the working of these calculations
is now given illustrating the distribution of the grant in the
case of a small burgh. Similar calculations would apply for a
large burgh or indeed for a county landward area if the county's
additional weighting figures were included.
Small/









(a) estimated population at
30th June
(b) estimated number of children
at 30th June
(c) additional weighting for sparsity
(d) additional weighting for rapidly
increasing population





2. Governing factor per head of weighted
population as provisionally calculated
3. Standard Rateable Value (item 1 (e) x
item 2)
4• Adjusted Rateable Value (see item 12)
5. Rateable Value Credited (item 3 minus
Item 4)
6* Adjusted Produce of a rate of £1 in
the £ (see item 13)
•i- ■
7» Expenditure on burghal functions
8. County Requisition
9. Adjustment to County Requisition on









10* Relevant local Expenditure (item 7
+ item 8 ♦ or *- item 9) 38,844
11. Exchequer Equalisation Grant for
1955/56 and advances for 1956/57
and 1957/58 (item 10 multiplied by
item 5 divided by the sum of items
5 and 6). 561
(12) South )ueensferry.
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12. Adjusted Rateable Value:
(a) number of local authority
houses in Valuation Roll
as at 16th May
(b) average rateable value of
local authority houses in
Scotland for previous year
(c) rateable value of houses
at (a) to be used in
calculating Exchequer
Equalisation Grant (a x b)
(d)rateable value at which
houses at (a) were entered
in the Valuation Roll as at
16th May
(e) adjustment under section 4 (1)
of the 1954 Act (c - d) or
(d - c)
(f) rateable value at 16th May
(g) adjusted rateable value
(f+ or - e)
13. Adjusted produce of a rate of £1
in the £
(a) produce of a rate of £1
in the £
(b) adjustment under section
5 (2) of 1954 Act (item 12 (a)
above)
(c) adjusted produce












For the purpose of later discussion of the equalisation
grant a more convenient formula than the foregoing will be useful,
and/
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and this can be simplified, as follows:
(33)
ww / Q \ — RLE x CRVEEGISJ CRy + Mp
These are calculations which in their complexity recall
the comment of the Royal Commission of 1896 with regard to the old
assigned revenues that "only those whose official duty it is to be
constantly threading the maze are able to carry in their memory the
clue to its intricate convolutions". Since the grant is payable
on the basis of provisional calculations, adjusted in the following
years when final figures become known, it would be almost impossible
for a chief financial officer to make a proper check on the correct¬
ness of the payment, while it is likely that not a few of these
officers have no very clear understanding of the working of the
grant.
In Scotland it might be agreed that the retention of the
Groschen formula even as a safeguard is no longer justifiable. The
notional rates burden method of calculating the Scottish pool is
without doubt a far more realistic approach to the achievement of
uniformity between Scotland and England and Wales but it is still
an artificial method and it does introduce still further compli¬
cation into a formula which is already involved enough.
Simplicity in grant arrangements is unquestionably an end
to/
(13) EEF(S) * Exchequer Equalisation Grant in Scotland.
RLE " Relevant Local Expenditure.
CRV * Credited Rateable Value.
ABP " Adjusted Produce of £1 in £1 of rateable value.
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to be sought after but mere complexity in itself would not
necessarily be a serious criticism of the grant provided it
was otherwise satisfactory; a digital computer could, after
all, be programmed to deal with far more complicated formula
calculations than these in the minimum of time. But, does
the grant work satisfactorily?
Looked at in its pure form as it now operates in
England and Wales one would say that it does. Bince 1948 it
has been the subject of the most rigorous examination. In
(14)
1951 it was found, for example, that "the best that can be said
is that for authorities with average or below average resources
in terms of rateable value it eliminates those disparities in
rate poundage which resulted from inequality in rateable value".
In 1958 we find the treasurers of non-receiving English county
boroughs testing the grant on its ability to ensure that "two
citizens of equal substance in different parts of the country
have to make an equal contribution for the same local services",
and finding that "no system of grant can import the ability to
(15)
pay principle into the existing rating system". If living in
houses of similar rental value were substituted in place of
"equal substance" then the Minister's desire ivould have been
more capable of achievement". Since then, the Edwards
Committee and later the Lees group have exjimined the grant and
made suggestions towards its improvement. Since then, too, the
necessary revaluation has been set in motion, so that within the
next/
(14) Accounting Research, Yol. 2. No. 3, 1951 - The Effects of
the Local Government Act, 1948.
(15) A curious conclusion considering that this is the very
purpose of any grant.
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next few years with rateable subjects uniformly valued through¬
out the country the original aims of the grant, namely the plain
equalisation of resources should be much more closely approximated.
111.
For the time being the equalisation grant has been re¬
tained in Scotland as a separate contribution on its existing
GENER
basis, subject to review when the results of the revaluation GRANT
whieh is to take place in 1961-62 are known. The title is
not at present to be altered to that of "rate deficiency grant"
(16)
as in England and Wales.
At the same time there has been introduced a new
general grant to take effect from 16th May 1959.
Aa has been earlier remarked, this general grant takes
(17)
the place of a number of specific grants, the most important of
which was for education. Accordingly, the aggregate amount
having been fixed, the grant is to be calculated in the first
instance for each education area, counties and counties of cities,
and paid to rating authorities throughout the country, the formula
allocation to each county being apportioned among the rating
authorities within the county according to their rateable or stan¬
dard rateable value, whichever is the higher, for the immediately
preceding/
(16) The Edwards Committee in 1954 had suggested "rateable value
deficiency grant".
(17) See Appendix B.
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preceding year.
The distribution of the grant in Scotland will be
according to formula and will be governed by the weighted
population of the areas involved,, as follows:
To the civilian population
Add (1) number of children under 15 years.
(2) where the proportion of landward population to
total population is
85% and over add 75% to civilian population
75% and under 85% add 50%
70% » " 75% " 35%
60% » " 70% " 15%
50% " » 60% " 5%
Under 50% •» nil
(3) where the number of pupils in education authority
primary and secondary schools per mile of road is:
Under 2.5 to 1 add 50% to the.,civilian population.
to the civilian
population.
rt tt tt ft
ft ft tt tt
ft ft ?t tt
ft it tf tt
ft ft ft ft
f? ft ft T?
♦? ft ft ft
2.5 and under 3*0 to 1 add
3.0 rt ft 3.5 to 1 tf
3.5 tt tt 4.0 to 1 tt
4.0 rt n 4.5 to 1 tf
4.5 rt it 5 0 to 1 ft
5.0 ft tt 5.5 to 1 ft
5.5 tf ft 6.0 to 1 ft
6.0 ft ft 6.5 to 1 tt
6.5 ft tt 7.0 to 1 ft
7.0 tt ft 7.5 to 1 tt
7.5 tf rt 8.0 to 1 ft
8.0 tt ft 8.5 to 1 tt
8.5 ft ft 9.0 to 1 ft
9.0 ft tt 9.5 to 1 Tt
9.5 ft Tt 10.0 to 1 rt
10.0 ft ft 10«5 to 1 rt
10.5 rt rt 11.0 to 1 ft
11.0 ft ft 11.5 to 1 ft
11.5 tt ft 12.0 to 1 ft
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For the purpose of this weighting the Secretary of State
may/
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may determine that any sea route between two places in a
oounty may be treated as a county road.
The additional weightings (2) and (3) are designed to
reflect the position that "the cost of educational and other
services provided for a predominantly landward population is
relatively greater than the compact urban units", and that educa¬
tional costs, which after all form a substantial part of the
total local authority budget, are specially high in sparsely
populated area.
It is intended to fix the total amount of the general
grant for periods of two to three years in advance, though the
sum to be paid out in each year of the period will not necessari¬
ly be the same. This sum was to be fixed after taking into
consideration:
"(a) the latest available figures of relevant
expenditure by local authorities on the
services involved.
(b) such factors beyond the control of local
authorities and occurring generally in
Scotland as are expected to increase or
reduce substantially the demands on the
local authorities in respect of these
services during the grant period.
(c) the need for development of the services,
and at the same time the general state
of the economy, as determining the amount
of improvement which can properly be
secured during the period'. (IB)
Following these principles the amount of the general
(19)
grant was duly fixed by the Secretary of State at £50,125,000
for 1959-60 (£52,o75,000 for 1960-61). This sum was arrived
by adjusting the estimated total of relevant expenditure for the
first/
(18) local Government Finance in Scotland. Cmnd.208. 1957.
(19) by the General Grant (Scotland) Order 1958.
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Physical training and recreation 9,000
School Crossing Patrols 141,214
V#elfare services for the Disabled 30,000
80,234,891
This total, increased to take into account expenditure
on compulsory acquisition of land (in respect of which legislation
was at the time pending), and certain capital expenditure on
accommodation under the National Assistance Act 1948, gave con¬
sideration to foreseen future variations in the level of costs,
prices and remuneration and possible fluctuations in the demand
for the services.
After the addition of a further sum to assist contri¬
butions made by education authorities to the Scottish Universi¬
ties, the grant figure relative to this aggregate sum was
determined/
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determined at £49.659 millions (representing approximately 61#
of relevant expenditure).
To this basic figure was then applied certain other
non-recurrent adjustments, as follows:
£ million
Grant as ascertained 49.659
less net deduction to offset rerating income 1.500
48.159
Add compensation for
(a) reduction in equalisation grant 1.900
(b) discontinued minor grants .065
50.124
- whioh was rounded to 50.125
After reduction in accordance with Part 1 and adjust¬
ments in accordance with Part 11 of the 3rd Schedule of the local
Government and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act,
1958, this aggregate is apportioned among the authorities in the
manner indioated. An illustration of such an apportionment is
given in Appendix S. The Part 1 reduction referred to, which
is shown in that Appendix, is intended to take account of certain
central expenditure on, for example, Fire Service Colleges and
on the Children service which had hitherto been recovered from the
local authorities by deduction from the respective percentage
grants. The adjustment under Part 11 is in respect of certain
"reckonable/
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expenditure" by individual local authorities which it is thought
should properly be pooled and shared out amongst all authorities,
the chief instance of this being expenditure on further education.
The introduction of general grant will inevitably
leave some rating authorities better and some worse TRANSITIONAL
PAYM5NTS
off in terms of State aid, and this despite the fact
that commitments will have been entered into and budgets prepared
on the assumption that existing conditions would hold good. To
(20)
meet this difficulty it is provided that initially the gains of
certain authorities will be applied to making good the increase in
rate burdens of other authorities by a system of transitional pay¬
ment s.
The amounts of such increases will bo calculated by
reference to a standard year, 1957/58, and certified. In the
first year of the new system the whole of these Increases will be
made up from the gains of other authorities. In the second year,
nine-tenths will be made good, and after three further intermediate
steps the transitional payments should come to an end by the sixth
year. By then all authorities should have settled down to the
new grant conditions. These transitional arrangements may require
review when any alteration in the incidence of rate burdens as
between authorities consequent on the revaluation in 1961-62 becomes
apparent.
— iYX-
(20) Local Government and Miscellaneous financial Provisions
(Scotland) Act, 1958, section 18.
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IV.
Now, taking a broader view of general contributions
such as those with which we have so far experimented, it will
be observed that they contain two fundamental and quite different
ideas. On the one hand, there is the desire to generalise specific
grants - particularly percentage grants - into one controllable
amount which may be fixed, semi-fixed or not fixed at all; this has
been done in the past as an economy measure on the part of the govern¬
ment, and theoretically the idea of one grant instead of many is an
attractive one for it has the merit of simplicity. On the other
hand, there is the intention to give special assistance where the
need for one reason or another is greatest. Under a general contri¬
bution, too, central control may be replaced to a considerable
extent by public control by the local electorate, which is politically
and administratively a desirable feature, for it is a stimulus to
local interest.
The old block grant of 1989 attempted to achieve both
generalisation and equalisation with one contribution; present-day
practice favours a distinction not only between the two forms of
assistance hut between the type of equalisation, namely of resources
and of needs.
The application of the principle of resources equalisation,
well established by now in England and Wales, is not wholly satis¬
factory where Scotland is concerned. A further problem that remains
is the equalisation of local needs. The relative needs of indivi¬
dual local authorities are so diversified that it cannot yet be said
that/
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that "two citizens of equal substance in clifforout psrta of the
country have to make equal contributions for the acme local
services", and until a more efficient "needs equaliser" than the
weightings w© haves at present is introduced this ideal of uniformity
will not be achieved.
It is hard to see how a tru3y effective equaliser of needs
could be devised; a multitude of factors would require to enter
into it, many of the® miaeasureable. The prime coat of land, labour
and materials may be naturally higher in on© district than another,
while no two authorities will ever have an exact correspondence in
their local characters and commitments. Hor, indeed, would this be
In any way desirable oven if it wore possible, for it ia of the
essence of local government that it is local and individual. If
local aorvioea cost a citizen more in authority A because thoy ar©
better services, that is not o matter for criticism. If they cost
more, however, because, say, of A«a geographical situation as com¬
pared to other areas, then there is a case for ranking com© compen¬
sating adjustment.
Xt is in the solution to this "needs" problem and to the
difficulty of applying an English resources equaliser to Scotland
that future refinements of the Scottish grant system will be found,
And even with such refinements it will still bo no more than a com¬
promise, for no formula can give us more than a close approximation
in this inManoe. Are we prepared to be content with a close
approximation and a compromise in return for retaining our existing
arrangementa? If we are not, we must be props* rod to throw the rating
system itself on the scrap heap.
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5. - ''he Mechanics of Grant.
(I)
"Every grant Implies a tax of equal amount from national
sources. The corollary of this is that for every such NATIONAL
TAXATiOlf
tax there will be a other from local sources, save in
the case of a 100$ grant. *&iether these taxes are national
or local the effect is to redistribute income by transferring
it from one sector to another.
In less generalised terms, if it is assumed that in
Scotland the Polio© service will cost £10,000,000 in the forth¬
coming year, £5,000,000 of this will be paid for by private
citizens as taxpayers, while the other £5,000,000 will be paid
for by private citizens as ratepayers; this will be the case if
for the present wo ignore the corrective of equalisation which
•simply represents an attempt to reconcile the two tax bases used.
This being so, it is now necessary to consider what constitutes
an acceptable tax.
It may be said at once that our British system of national
taxation involves not one tax but a tax structure... a conception
which has been steadily developed over the past hundred years-
Arthur Young, en 18th century contemporary of Adam Smith writes:
"If I were to define a good system of taxation, it should be that
of bearing lightly on an Infinite number of points, heavily on
(1)
none." No single tax has all the virtues we would look for;
purchase tax, for example, falls on everyone both rich and poor
with/
(1) Political Arithmetic. (1774) A. Young.
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with equal force, while estate duty falls on the very rich with
the most crushing incidence, but loaves the comparatively poor
untouched. A single tax, though theoretically attractive for
its administrative simplicity, is held to be dangerous because
r
in fact of its uniqueness. However carefully devised, the
possibility of unfairness to certain sections of the community
has to be reckoned with; alone, it is wide open to criticism.
A combination of taxes, judiciously admini tered, gives
a compensatory effect which makes the system highly flexible,
and the subjects chosen to be taxed will be selected so as to
contrive as wide a diffusion of incidence as possible. Some
idea of this structure is obtained in examining the revenue flow









Motor Vehicle licences 104
Stamp Duties 68
Each of these State taxes, soxae of which are direct and
others indirect, is capable of being adjusted in the Finance /ots
at regular short intervals to reflect changing government policies,
and their collective incidences fall on a multitude of taxpayers
continuously at different points, ensuring so far as possible an
even distribution of liability throughout the country.
In/
(2) Budget Estimates 1959/'o0
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In general, this structure fulfills certain requirements
which have been arrived at over the years as the result of experi¬
ment and discussion, requirements which are now considered to be
basic in any properly devised tax „sj;steia in this country. First,
the taxes within the structure should be each effective for their
particular purposes, that is, they should efficiently tax the
subject on which they fall. Thus, in the classic phrase, "income
(3)
tax is a tax on income", and nothing else. At the same time, as
we have already seen, there is held to be no reason why the tax
should not, if required, have some secondary function such as, for
example, the discouragement or promotion of activities sought to
be discouraged or promoted as a matter of national policy.
Again, each tax should be universal within its class.
All citizens comparable within the class should bear its impact
without distinction. Oreat Britain has been fortunate in its
Inland .Revenue department and in a fiscal administration which
ensures reasonably uniform rules of valuation of subjects to be
taxed.
Thirdly, and of great importance, taxation should be based
so far as possible on the taxpayers' ability to pay, and when this
is so a tax is said to be progressive. Adam Smith had something
like this In mind when he asked of a tax that it should be equal
as between persons, but it was not for a century after the "T^alth
of Nations" was published that the progressive ideal in its modern
form/
(3) Lord Ma oNa lighten in London County Council v. ".G. (1901)
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form was fully appreciated. Although there exists nowadays a
variety of refined explanations of this ideal it may still
perhaps be most convincingly demonstrated by reference to neo¬
classical economic theory. As incomes rise the marginal utility
of further money increments falls, calling for le3S of a sacrifice
when tax is applied. Thus, a tax should bear most heavily on those
best able to pay it; this principle is part and parcel of such
levies as the income tax, surtax and estate duty.
Moreover, the argument goes on, the tax structure as a
whole should be based on "ability to pay", and while the progressive-
ness of some of its taxes is offset by the regressiveness of others,
the general effect should be one of progressiveness. This proposition
will be adopted for the purpose of the present thesis, chiefly
because it is a generally acceptable one, though it is fair to add
that progressive taxation could be objected to in principle on a
number of not unimportant grounds#
The chief difficulty is in determining the precise degree
of progressiveness which, at any time,is to operate. In recent
years the tfnited Kingdom has experienced higher levels of progres¬
sive taxation than most countries, and this feature is of some
significance to our subsequent discussion*' A recent comparison
of this position with that in the United States, for example, has
yielded the following figures of marginal income tax rates on the
(4)
next unit of income earned in the two countries in 1955/56.
(4) Income Taxes and Incentives to Work, by G. F* Break, in the
American Economic Review* September, 1957.
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Incomes Marginal tax rates
as percentages.
U.K. • ■ >. I\» U.K. U.S.A.
£ £
600 » 1680 26.35 30
800 - 3240 33,5 30
1500 - 4200 33.5 22
2035 - 5670 52.5 26
5000 - 16800 75.0 50
In considering degress of progress!veness, of course,
"precision" i3 an inappropriate word - there can be none.
Nevertheless, there should be some measure of control exer¬
cisable over total incidence, for what may be convenient and best
at one moment of time may not be so at another* The idea of
"ability to pay". important as it is to a discussion of grants, is
not, therefore, free from ambiguity.
"Theories of taxation have been formed by first taking
things as they were, and. then searching for the principle on which
(5)
the system was founded." hir approach to these matters has always
been practical and experimental, but the justice and Tightness of
all these requirements seems nowadays so manifest that we tend to
accept them as commonplace; in fact they are the outcome of a great
deal of careful thought, and incorporated in the overall tax structure
which has been described they provide the government with a fiscal
instrument/
(5) report of the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation, 1938. Ctmd.
1574.
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instrument of considerable worth. Used in conjunction with planned
budgetting such an instrument is capable of a great deal more than simply
raising money for the needs of the State*
YX
A local tax, on the other hand, while conforming in very
general terms to such ideals, does not bear a true comparison with
the national tax structure, for it is designed for a different LOCAL
XAXAflQH
purpose, namely to raise money to pay for that part of the
services whioh is considered to be of purely local benefit. It
is, however, possible to say what is expected of a local tax in
general, and then to enquire whether the specific form of local tax
in this country, the rote, meets these expectations.
A local tax should be local; it should serve to raise money
for local purposes within the area to be served. It should not
overlap into other localities and it- should not conflict with State
taxes. In the Netherlands, for example, some thirty years ago,
there existed side by 3ide a local income tax and a national income
tax both based on the same valuations, which resulted in considerable
confusion of interests until the system was finally abolished in 1929.
The local tax should be capable of a reasonable amount of
expansion. One based upon, say, bicycles, would obviously not meet
this requirement since there would very quickly appear an upper limit
to the amounts that could be raised in this way. T hat is required,
above all, is a tax which will bring in all the revenue that is neede d,
not/
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not merely now in the present, but twenty years hence when prices
have all risen*., a flexible tax which is uninfluenced by long-term
inflation. Yet in itself it should be fairly stable so that its
yield can be anticipated from one year to another, in good times
and bad with some degree of certainty.
If, on the other hand, our ideal local tax was one based
on incomes, differences between richer and poorer authorities would
be accentuated. Those persons being highly taxed in one area would
tend to move on to another. For this reason a local tax which bears
fairly equally upon all local taxpayers is more useful that one which
is steeply progressive. ndced, it ha3 been suggested that a certain
(<3 )
arniaount of regression v;ould be a desirable feature, a point which will
be examined further in a later chapter.
In short, then, what we are looking for is a local tax which
is individual and always effective, capable of expansion yet 3table,
\
and which, if anything, displays slight regressive features. In
addition, it should be conveniently and cheaply collected and admin¬
istered, and its Incidence should fall no more heavily on taxpayers
in one area as compared to another. These are ideals which are
unlikely to be found in any one tax. "e are looking for perfection
in a single tax and the experience of national taxation has shown
this to be impossible of attainment.
"•he problem is seen in a quite different perspective, how¬
ever, if we cease to think of local taxation, or at anyrate that part
of it which is raised to finance the serai-national services, as some¬
thing separate and apart, and regard it instead as simply an element
in the total national tax structure, to which it contributes its own
measure of compensation.
There/
fc ftrinnce* U- Hicks7 and the Problem of "Valuation rfqr,^Rating
p. 9 Hicks and Laser U '
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There is of course no conscious design in this unity, nor
any basis in law in the sense that regard is had to it in notional
budgetting. Yet the validity of the assumption con be tested by
reference to the individual, who cares little whether the sura he pays
each year for services is called a local or a national tax, but is
concerned rather with the combined incidence - the net effect on his
purse in comparison with every other taxpayer.
In the TJnited Kingdom there is but one local tax - the rate,
and if for the time being we discount the differences in point of
detail between rating practice in Scotland and the rest of the country,
the basis of the rate is the value of the real property within the
rating authority*s area. Such an authority, arriving at a total annual
valuation of its real property may raise the sum required to meet the
forthcoming year's budgetted expenditure by charging that expenditure
proportionally on the occupiers of the properties.
As a method of local taxation the rate used in this way is a
very old one; in Scotland it can be traced back as far as the loth
century. It has stood up very well to the demands placed upon it
over the years and to a large extent it lives up to the ideals we
have laid down for a good local tax. In general it displays a
local individuality combined with the other properties postulated of
stability and the ability to raise large sums of money efficiently and
reasonably cheaply. The rating system in its modern form has been
shown to work - indeed for its purpose it is doubtful if any other tax
we could think of would work as well; the same cannot be said of any
other system as yet untried.
Against/
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Against all these advantages the rating system has many
obvious drawbacks which have come into sharp prominence particularly
in recent years when the demands on the system have grown so enormously*
wRebid inflation can soon turn into an antique a venerable institution
(7)
that has withstood the economic changes of centlalie3,', says a critic.
Firstly, being a tax on real property, the value of which
increases much more slowly than the total national Income it is in¬
elastic in its yield. As costs keep rising rates everywhere go up
and since they are the only local tax they attract to themselves the
brunt of public criticism. eventually, with rates at levels well
(S)
over 30/-, in some cases 30/- in the pound, a loss of population
through migration to lox-ver rated areas may result. Whether or not
it is possible to determine the limit of taxable capacity for any
local area it is likely that in some authorities this limit has been
closely approached in recent years.
Secondly, rates are unduly regressive. Curiously, moderate
regression was a quality we demanded of a local tax, but a quality can
become a serious disadvantage if it is overdone# This regression can
clearly enough be imagined if \-ve consider the effects of requiring the
local authorities to perform the same local services as at present
without any State aid whatsoever. Rates would rise draroatically
though there would be a drop in national taxation, and the poorer
ratepayers would be the most seriously affected. To take another
example, a rich bachelor may occupy a six-roomed house like his
poorer/
(7) The Economist, 7 January, 195b.
(8) 1953/57 - Rating evlew.






poorer neighbour who has a family of four children and is thus obliged
to live in a rooroyhome. Both pay the same rates and the family man
is penalised.
Considered in isolation these are serious defects and further
examples are not hard to find. Rates are, to a large extent, a tax
on housing, a service which the State has othenvise seen fit to sub¬
sidise, and this seems anomalous... just as much so as Shhedule A
income tax which does the same thing# Again, in the absence of state
equalisation the rate level will vary widely from one area to another
because of differing local costs and differing volumes of rateable value.
Contrast "etland's product of a penny rate, £95, with Lanark's £11,138.
Then, too, local populations are never of the same density in any two
places, which will have its obvious effect on rateable value per head
of population. Nor are all areas of the same character; one burgh
may be industrial, another residential, and a third may base its eco¬
nomy on the holiday trade. All have quite different needs which
destroy any ideals we may have as to uniformity in rating.
Equalisation devices have to be relied on to overcome these
variations, and while it might be said that all grants are equalisers
in a sense, this equalisation is mainly effected through equalisation
grant, and, to a considerable degree, general grant. Rate resources
equalisation is of importance, but even if the rates were not used as
a local tax base, other factors would still require equalisation.
Yet with it all the rate is fundamentally a sound local tax
and one which 13 traditional to British local government. It has
been unfortunate in recent years in being the subject of much loose
thinking and adverse comment• Too often, rising rates have caused the
rating/
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rating system to be condemned out of hand, when In fact It is inflation
itself which should be condemned* This is to put the cart before the
horse. In the past, faith has been placed in the rating system, partly
out of political expediency because of its highly "local" nature, partly
out of financial expediency because it existed, ready made, and while
it would be wrong to proceed to justify "things as we find them", these
arguments still hold good. But if we decide that the rates shall be
our local tax then we must be prepared to arrange for inter-authority
equalisation.
The purpose of our analysis up to now has been to suggest that
no single tax, national or local, is perfect. The shortcomings of the
rate as a local tax are so apparent because there is no other local tax.
"To disguise the burden is, so far aa sacrifice is concerned, to reduce
it, and the breaking up of the system into several distinct forms un-
(9)
doubtedly lias this advantage." There is a need to broaden the basis
of local taxation open to the local authorities, and this can be done
either by making available to them rateable subjects which do not at
present fall into the rating net, or else by allowing them to seek new
sources of local incorao by methods of tax other than the rate.
One such alternative source, for example, would be a local
income tsx. Undoubtedly, this is an idea which has its attractions
and it will be discussed more fully later; briefly, it would involve
a discontinuance of the present rating system and the substitution of a
locally assessed tax based on ability to pay. It has sometimes been
suggested that this could take the place of grants raised by national
taxation - that, indeed, the ability to pay principle could only effect¬
ively operate in a local income tax if it did involve a discontinuance
of exchequer grants. This view has to be modified, however, as will be
shown/
(9) Public finance. 0. ?. 38stable p.343
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shown hereafter.
From 1896 the proposal has been raised at regular
Intervals by one Royal Commission after another. All have found
on examination that there are difficulties in the way which appear
to outweigh any advantages offered. Sir Henry Keith's scheme, for
instance, which was considered by the Dunedin Committee in 1922,
was in many ways a model of ingenuity, yet it was rejected on a
number of technical grounds. The most compelling of these grounds,
which was not technical at all, however, was that adoption of the
scheme would be "too great a leap In the dark, unless it is clearly
shown that the substituted system would work well and ensure
(10)
equity..
Here is the acid teat. How, in short, could we ever be
sure until we triad? And, from an administrative point of view,
this is a risk which could only be taken with a great deal of
courage.
The truth is - and this what Horsfall Turner might have
called the "almost maddening" difficulty - the rating system works,
and works with a certain degree of efficiency.
(10) Report of the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation in
Scotland, 1922. Cmd. 1674. p.11.
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B3
How, then, do grants fit into this pattern'?
As we have seen, a grant is simply a transfer of funds
from the private to the public sector, and by extension back again
to the private sector; such transfers currently amount to about THIS
r~n?
3$ of the gross national product* In the process, since grants 3A3T1SM
are found out of State taxation, a progressive redistribution of
private incomes has taken place. 3y the payment of general grant
to a particular local authority which devotes a part of it for
education purposes, citizen A, a rich bachelor, who makes no use of
local education services whatsoever, has had his income more markedly
depleted by national taxation than extiz- n B, \»;ho is poor and has four
children all at State schools. The same effect would have been ob¬
tained if citizen A had made citizen B a present of a part of his in¬
come only to be spent on educating 13*a four children. To this extent
citizen B is on less sure ground in complaining of the regressiveness
of the local rates he pays on his house, although he might very well
advance the conception of "> ducatioif Hf:,a national duty from which
universal benefits result*
Grant, it is clear, is therefore a mere agent, the link
which binds local taxation into the national tax structure which is
(11)
itself the basic equaliser, for the effect of progression must always
be to reduce inequality. In itself grant has but one underlying
function - to bring local and national taxation together by introducing,
however/
(11) Compare this view with the suggestion put forward in "Accountancy",
April 1957, that there should be a multitude of grants so as to
obtain the benefit of compensatory effects*
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however crudely, the requisite degree of progressiveness. In the long
run, the measure of this degree of piogressiveness (and therefore of
the total volume of grant) can only be the extent to which ratepayers
are prepared to go on financing the operation of the services on the
basis offered by central government. The only excuse for the exist¬
ence of grant is that it helps in.preserving the individuality of
local units of self-government.
The question now to be asked is: what kind of a grant will
best serve this purpose? Will it, for example, be a general grant
or a specific one? Will it be fixed in amount or capable of being
increased in response to need? And will it be simply a grant of
money for carrying on thelocal services, or will It be so devisodaas
to produce calculated side-effects in the interests of the national
economy?
One recent responsible view has been that the ideal grant
should be simple, intelligible and equitable; it should encourage
local autonomy, yet leave the central government with a general
control over standards. As a rider, it has been added that "the
ideal grant does not exist and cannot exist", for these character¬
istics are often impossible to achieve simultaneously. "Just where
(12)
the emphasis should lie is a matter of judgement", and any decision
as to this must rest with central government.
There is not likely to be any single grant, as there was
no single tax, which is perfect. T,fe must look rather for a system of
grants, and we may start our search for such a system by going back
some/
(12) Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants - D.3. Lees and others,
1956. (I.M.T.A. H©search Study)
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some thirty years. In 1938, at a time when the central/local relation¬
ship was being periodically reviewed, a White Paper was issued by the
Ministry of Health in which the features of a proper grant system were
postulated. Such a system it was considered, should -
(a) recognise that a fair contribution should be made from the
exchequer towards the cost of local services.
(b) ensure that local authorities have complete financial interest
in their administration.
(c) permit the greatest freedom of local administration and Initiative.
(d) provide for sufficient general control and advice from the central
departments to ensure a reasonable standard of performance.
Since these days there have been remarkable changes in the
social and economic pattern, and little remains the same as it was
before. Since 1928 the country has experienced the extremes of
deflation and widespread unemployment and of over-full employment and
persistent inflation; indeed the condition of inflation has exasperated
and overshadowed recent planning as is evidenced by the steadily de¬
clining value of the £ over the past years -
1938 1948 1949 1951 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 195o
20/— 11.4/ 11.1/ 10.8/ 0 1 V- 8.7/ -0.37/- 8.37, ' 7.8/
A T,'elfare State has replaced what existed formerly bringing
with it the necessity for the Otate to be ready to intervene to correct
the performance of the economy,and a six-years war has brought about a
technological revolution the consequences of which are hardly even now
becoming apparent. It would be surprising if our thoughts about the
grant system and the central/local relationship had not moved forward
also.
If/
(13) London and Cambridge Bulletin, No23* September 1957, based on
Hetall Price Index.
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If \m More to recant the theorotlosl conditions of a propor
grant aystem at th© p csont time they might read as fallows:
(a) the system should arrange to transfer to the local authorities tote
funds as a contribution to the cost of scrai-Jintionnl services, so
as to leave them to find the balance themselves and this income
equalising transfer should bo at a level which will maintain active
local Interest in spending the money wisely# In rcJcing these
transfers the Control CaverflBeat should bo free to use the® as a
control instrument in any way which will further the :>:; imary pur¬
poses of the: - tate.
(b) a standard ratio between the two contributions should bo established
and this ratio should be adhered to, not merely at thro© yearly in¬
tervals but on the basis -f costs ascertained over much ahorfcbr
periods, so as to ovoid the characteristic time lag ooussd by rising
prices#
(c) Create should not be given beyond the l^vol of the ratio determined}
for their own good the. local authorities must be required tfind the
balance# 'or this purpose the local tart must be made to be suf¬
ficiently elastic to raise the money both now and in the future#
(d) As much freedom as poeniblo should be allowed t> the local author¬
ities on the expenditure side, subject to a rrcesoary minimum of
over-all itate supervision# ' here services are fully developed,
control by the public should be relied on for the maintenance of
national standards and specific greats should bo generalised, a©
es to provide a stimulus t > l.oal interest* p cific grants should
be reserved for development purposes or for use in special cases*
(e) tato/
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(e) State grant, dther than that specifically applied, should be weighted
in its distribution to equalise resources so far as possible and to
take local needs into account.
How these conditions of a proper grant system are entirely
dependent on one fundamental question - is the existing pattern of
local government in this country, entailing responsibility for local
services, an administrative arrangement which it is worth while to
preserve? There are those who believe that the local government
system is inefficient and extravagant and that local services could
be organised more uniformly and perhaps more skilfully by a central de¬
partment of the government. This may be so, and if we take this view
then the need for a grant system disappears, for the cost of maintaining
the services would be borne out of national taxes. The arguments in
favour of the continuance of the local government system substantially in
(14)
its present form have already been given. They are powerful arguments
based on political and economic considerations which are difficult to
refute, and stated government policy in fact supports these arguments
most strongly*
If, therefore, we assume the continuance of present arrangements
as a matter of policy we will take all possible measures to foster the
efficiency and the independence, financial and administrative, of the
local authorities. Local taxation will thus be encouraged, primarily
in the form of rating which seems to be the best available local tax.
The rate, however, while in fact forming part of the general




the individual ratepayer to be a single local tax, thus attracting
criticism to itself, especially in times of rising prices. Now while
public criticism is a healthy enough sign of government by the people,
it can have an unduly hampering effect if it manifests itself at every
turn, as it tends to do. The argument, for example, that "the rate¬
payers would never stand for" rate Increases caused by salary claims is
a familiar one to local government staffs. Local administration could
be frustrated by this kind of excessive restraint. To avoid this we
should endeavour to widen the local tax base so as to enable larger sums
to be raised without marked increases in the rate.
This can be done either by permitting the local authorities
to supplement the rate with other sources of local income, or to in¬
crease the yield of the rate, or to combine both methods. 'hat must
not be done is to allow the htate to feed the authorities with increased
grants, for while there may be nothing against this course financially,
on administrative grounds the loss of local self-reliance and independence
would go against our original assumption as to the impootauce of local
units of self-government.
Our hypothesis, in the end, leads us to look further for the
answer to two questions; first, in what form should the transfer of
State funds to local authorities be made; secondly by what means may
the local tax base be widened* These two problems are complementary,
like the opposite sides of a penny. To them a third may be added,
perhaps the most important )f all, that of determining how best equali¬
sation between the authorities and countries concerned may be effected.
It is principally with these considerations that the second part of
this thesis will be concerned.
In concluding this oart it is of interest to observe how closely
a theoretical discussion has brought us to current practice. Broadly
speaking/
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speaking there is this oorrapondenoe; in point of detail, however, the
system remains to be delivered from the results of a long succession of
expedients. "The grant system is a haphazard growth of subventions
(15)
great and small", which, though perfectly workable, remains in need of
tidying up.
Consider the case, for example, of the Highland Schools grants
to which reference has been made. These grants, originally given in
183S and continued by the Highland Schools (Scotland) Act 1875, have
somehow lingered on and are still authorised by section 73 and the
2nd Schedule of the Education (Scotland) Act 1946, an annual total
of £899 being paid out towards the salaries of parish schoolmasters
in eight Highland counties. Perth County Council, for instance,
receives £31 every half-year for this purpose - a payment which has
little meaning alongside the massive staas allocated at the present
4| (16)time.
It would s©era, then, that the grant system in something like
its present form is well enough adapted to meet the present situation,
subject to any such modifications of detail hereafter suggested.
Bearing in mind the special administrative features of local government
as they are at present in this country, the existing arrangement of a
general grant with an equalisation contribution, together with specific
grants of either the percentage or the unit type where these are
considered necessary in particular circumstances, is efficient for its
purpose, which is to preserve the local government system.
It remains for local government, on its part, to see that its
methods of raising revenue locally are equally effective.
(15) Local Government Finance. Gmnd.209 (1957)p.8.
(16) The attention of the Treasury and of the Scottish Education Department
has been drawn to this matter, and this is reported in terms of
Regulation 13.
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SUMMARY OF PART I
1. The local authorities have been given responsibility, as a
matter of national policy, for the administration of the major
part of the country's social services, subject to overall
government control with a view to the maintenance of national
standards.
2. Since thejre are quasi-national services it would be appropriate
if the nation as a whole contributed to their cost through
national taxation. This would be equitable, for the "ability
to pay" principle, which is acceptable,would operate universally.
3. To preserve local financial interest and independence, however,
part of the cost of services is made to fall on local citizens
not as taxpayers but as ratepayers.
4. Rates thus become part of the general tax structure of the
country and this, too, would be justifiable on the principle
of compensatory taxation if rate burdens in all authorities
were the same.
5. Because of local factors, however, there is an inequality
between rates in one area as compared with another, sc that
efforts at equalisation become necessary. These attempts at
present are only partially successful since inequalities arise
additionally from causes unconnected with the rating system.
6. The rate, too, tends to inelasticity which is specially apparent
in times of rising prices. Being the only local tax,
constantly rising rates load to piiblie criticism of this basis.
7. It would be desirable, therefore, to find other sources of
looal revenue so as to achieve a greater local tax yield
without marked rate increases.
8. The other part of the cost of services, which is paid out of
national taxation, is transferred to the local authorities
as grant, either specificslly for named services or in general
allocations, depending on circumstances. In making such
payments the State is justified in adopting any method of
doing so which will further the common good.
PART II
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6. - THE NEW SYSTEM OF GRANTS CONSIDERED
I.
No single grant, as we have suggested, is likely to be
perfect. It may never be possible even to secure perfection, and
this may be acceptable provided the imperfections are fully
recognised. The advantages of any particular form of contribution
must be weighed against its disadvantages, remembering that it is
with a system that we are concerned rather than with just one
grant-type. There has been a very considerable amount of
criticism of the new general grant from many quarters, for example,
which would hardly have arisen had the grant been a perfect one,
and it is to these apparent imperfections that we must now give
our attention.
The new system substitutes for one which was largely
dependent on expenditure another which turns on population, thus:
| till 1959
*


















From these comparisons some indication of the magnitude
of the change which has been effected will be gathered. The
reversal of the part played by specific grants, particularly the
percentage grants in relation to the whole, is the most striking
feature /
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feature, for these have dwindled to comparative unimportance in
*
contrast to the general grant . "Percentage grants," said the
Minister at the second reading of the Bill, "will only be retained
when the general grant cannot be made to fit the needs." The
only major specific grants remaining will be those for Police,
Roads and Housing, and these, too, would almost certainly have been
generalised had they not been otherwise controllable, and had not
"technical considerations" made generalisation for the time
being impossible or undesirable!^
Apart from the specific grants, however, each of which
has its own special purpose, the chief feature of the new system
is the fixed general contribution, and here, too, it is necessary
to recall what has been said of such block grants. Their
intention is to bring a progressive contribution in general
aid of the rates. Broadly speaking central government grants
are nowadays given in this way, which commends itself by:
(a) consolidating many grants into one. GENERAL
(b) limiting detailed central control. STANDAifij^
(c) giving greater independence to the authorities.
(d) responding well to needs weightings.
(e) permitting the government to fix the total
contribution.
It was almost certainly the last of these advantages
which prompted the government to bring forward general grant
in 1957. In recent years, for example, the most urgent need
in the interests of the national economy has been to halt
inflation /
(1) see Chapter 3.
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inflation in the country, and while there is still no very
general agreement as to what tonstitute the root caaaes of
inflation, the control of public and private spending has
been regarded by the Government as one step in the required
direction. Here in the shape of the grant system was a con¬
trol instrument ready to hand and the Government made use of
it. By creating a general grant, for the time being fixed in
amount, in place of specific percentage grants which were not
fixed at all, the Government has applied an effective check on
local spending, a control which could just as readily operate
in the opposite direction if required,
In determining its share of general grant the amount
which a local authority spends on a particular service is not
important; what is of importance is the amount of population
which its education authority can command. In consequence, a
local council, reviewing its estimates for, say, the children
service for the forthcoming; year, will consider that beyond a
certain fixed level all expenditures will fall upon the rates,
and anxious to avoid further rate-increases and, if possible,
to show rate-reductions, will have very good reasons for budget-
ting as carefully and even as sparingly as possible. Admittedly,
the grant, though fixed for short periods of years, is capable of
being reviewed by the government within the periods so as to take
account of "the latest available figures of expenditure by local
authorities on the services", but this will inevitably take time,
and/
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ana in the meanwhile costs are rising continuously. There will be
no alternative for the local authority but to keep its expenditure
down or see the local rates go up.
Instead, therefore, of developing the children service,
as it was previously encouraged to do, the local authority may
find itself obliged to economise on the service to its possible
detriment, and this argument will apply not only to the children
service but to all other services whose grants have been general¬
ised. Of these, by far the most important in terms of cost is
education, and it is from teachers and educationists that a large
amount of the criticism of the general grant has come. This is
unoerstandable in view of the importance which all cbsses of the
community have placed on this service for a very long time. The
country has been conditioned over the years to regard the education
service as inviolable, and now the most powerful potential deterrent
to further progress is being set up.
The difficulty is that development cannot ever be said to
have been completed in a service like education, and the dividing
line between maintenance and development expenditure is not at all
easily fixed, "Progress in education depends on the aspirations
of one decade becoming the minimum of the next,.. Now theless a
local authority does the easier its financial position will be.
The effect of this over a generation could be very serious indeed".(2)
The/
(2) Hansard. 11/12/57. Mr, Michael Stewart, M.P, at the second
reading of the Bill.
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The conclusion could be drawn that the need for control has
commanded greater immediate concern than the development of
the education and other services and the question thus resolves
itself into one of primary and secondary aims*
On this the government intend that inter-grant-period
review of the need for the development of a particular service
will be possible, but link this need with the general state of
the economy* In short, if it can be afforded, some improvement
in standards may be secured, but this control over standards must
be dependent on the opinion of the government rather than that of
the local authorities* Once again it will take time to decide
whether or not the moment i3 ripe for development, and in the
meantime standards have dropped. The use of the general grant
in relation to development, which is traditionally the province
of specific grant, is unfortunate for its action is seen to be
sluggish.
Then, too, one of the Government*s arguments at the time
when general grant was first proposed was that it would give local
authorities increased financial independence. one of the chief
advantages of any fixed general contribution is that, because of
its fixed nature, it allows of a certain relaxation of central
control. In commending general grant to the public at the Bill
stage the government understandably stressed this aspect and at the
same
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same time set up a Working Party (3) to carry out a review of the
administrative arrangements so as further to reduce unnecessary
central controls. Independence is a goal worth striving for, for
without it the most effective local government will not be realised.
General Grant to this extent offers a challenge and an opportunity
to every authority.
While independence will undoubtedly result in the matter
of applying the grant to this or that service, the application of
these monies, in the end, must depend on standards, so that the
argument is not wholly convincing - not, at anyrate, in the sense
in which it was generally meant to be understood. It is hard to
see how it can ever be since control over standards and their
development must remain with the government. The recent Act gives
the Secretary of State power, in fact, to intervene so as to control
standards by reduction of grant where such action appears to him to
be required, (4) Expenditure on advanced technology, again, is
very much of a "development" nature, but since it is now to be stim¬
ulated through general grant it will be impossible to avoid the
closest central control over this function.
What it amounts to is that the government says in effect:
Here/
(3) Local Government and Central Departments in Scotland - cmnd.445,
1958.
(4) Local Government and Miscellaneous financial Provisions
OScotland) Act, 1958, section 3.
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Here is a fixed sum of money. Use it to help pay for services and
whatever else you spend you must find yourself. You have freedom to
apply it to education or children or fire purposes or anything else
you choose, provided you do not allow these services to drop below
the minimum standards we shall prescribe.
It it is accepted, however, that the government's need to
achieve control over local spending has been of such vital and urgent
importance in recent years that the development of services, or even
their maintenance at present standards is a matter of secondary
consideration, then there is little more to be added to what has been
said,
II
Our criticism, then, is not directed against a general
grant in principle, for this is simply the modern conception of
how central finance should best be provided and the development of
all that has gone before; it is not even directed against the fixed
general grant which happens to be presently expedient - the "point
of emphasis" for the time being.
Attention, instead, is unavoidably drawn to the lack of
proper provision in the grant for change.
The new grant has many points of similarity to the
original block grant introduced in 1929, and the two grants
have been compared by a number of people. Papulation for
example, is the chief element in both and both were brought
in at a time when economies were sought after; both, again,
- . . GUARANTEEI




The arrangements of the two grants differ, however, in
this one important respect, namely in the provision made for
protecting tho local authorities against the effects of inflation.
In any fixed grant difficulty is bound to be experienced because
of steadily rising costs. Apart from short-term tendencies these
rise continually and reduce the value of any global sura fixed for
a particular grant period. Realistic, perhaps, at the beginning
of a two year period this sum would be quite inadequate at it3
close, and the local authorities would bear this loos entirely.
The old block grant arrangements of 1939 provided for
this contingency by establishing a ratio between the block grant
and the total of rate and block grant borne expenditure, and
guaranteed that this ratio would be preserved in future revisions
of the grant. The grant therefore rose in proportion to expendi¬
ture, though not continuously as would have been in theory desirable.
General grant arrangements contain no such guarantees.
All that Is conceded is that "there xaay be unforseen increases
during the grant period of such magnitude that they cannot reason¬
ably be carried in full by the local authorities. In this event
the government will be prepared by way of exception to consider
interim revision of the grant.n{5) As in all these arrangements
this/
(5) Gmnd. 308. 1957. p.5.
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this will take time and the lag between rising costs and State aid
could constitute an embarrassment to the local authorities. The
clumsiness of general grant in operation compared to the automatic
adjustment to cost changes found in percentage grants cannot be overlooked.
This is not satisfactory so far as the local authorities
are concerned, for costs could quickly go beyond the fixed level and
force either an increase in local rates or a decrease in standards.
And, since "standards" are determined by the responsible Minister it
would seem as though the ratepayers would beat the brunt of any
inflationary tendencies. "We do not anticipate" said the Chairman
of Dumfries County Council Finance Committee in submitting his 1959-60
estimates, "that the general grant and the other financial consequences
of the 1958 .Act will compensate us for the increased expenditure we
must now meet." The rating system, strained as it is at the present
time, will inevitably be made a scapegoat, for being a single tax it
attracts to itself this kind of criticism.
On the other hand, the link between rates and taxes has been
pointed to; what the individual may be called upon to pay in extra
rates he should make up in reduced taxes, and following out the idea
of compensatory taxation which was developed in Chapter 5 it will
be recalled that it is with net effects that the individual is
primarily concern. The progressiveness of the tax structure,
however, will be, to this extent, appreciably modified, since the
regressive rating system is to play a larger part in the whole,
and it must be asked if this is a result which was intended, and if
so/
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so, whether it is a good one at the present time.
Steeply progressive income taxation can be shown to be
inflationary. It is a disincentive to saving for one thing, for
a man will be more reluctant to accumulate saved capital if the
income earned from it is ever mora steeply taxed; for another it
tends to discourage additional effort. The individual, offered
the opportunity to earn a further overtime increment may well
decline on the ground that the real money reward of such increments
is lost through progressive taxing. It is probably true, as Break
suggests (6), that the individual does not always consider the tax
aspect or even the money reward in opting to work more, but the
disincentive is there, and it must operate unfavourably in the face
of attempts to regulate the economy along other channel's.
For this reason, therefore, a cut-back in the present high
progressiveness of national taxation would seem to be one desirable
outcome which nay flow from the adoption of a general grant.
Time lags and uncertainties, however, can hardly be
beneficial to the local government system. In other countries where
block grants of relatively fixed amount are used - as, for example,
in Holland - there has been considerable dissatisfaction and frustration
on this account. It would not be a difficult matter to establish a
ratio/
(6) "Income Taxes and incentives to work" by George F» Break, in
the American Economic Review." September 1957. Vol. XLV11.
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ratio. *n arrangement similar to that used in 1919 would work
well enough and this would provide for change with soxae degree
of fairness. Distinction must be drawn, of course, between
change necessitated by development and the normal changes upwards
or downwards in costs. As far as "development" change is con-
corned this must remain to be decided by the government period¬
ically in the light of existing circumstances. But where "main¬
tenance ' change is involved there should be some more responsive
method of making the adjustment required. A ratio would provide
this method.
To establish 3uch a ratio for use in connection with
"maintenance " expenditure need not commit the government. As
the initial need for a completely fixed contribution became less
Imperative the ratio could be applied by percentages; equally
important, the ratio could b© removed once more by percentages,
if this was felt to be necessary.
Some such ratio would seem desirable, even if it were not
ixomedlately applied, for it would atrenghten confidence in the new
arrangements for general grant and encourage a more willing accept¬





At a first examination of the general grant
formula the population basis would appear to be a very
suitable one, and the distribution arrangements simple QPULATIOH
and effective. It is worth noting at the outset that A3 A
the contribution and its allocation has been fixed BA3I-3
separately for Scotland and is not linked to arrangements
in "England and ft'ales. It is, therefore, an equivalent.
In framing the formula the intention was not primarily
to leave the Bcottioh authorities in the same relative financial
position as they had been in before, (though there is little doubt
that this consideration could not have been entirely ignored), but
was meant rather to reflect what their '"costs would be If there
were throughout the country a uniform provision in quantity and
quality of the relevant services.^?) We are ultimately concerned
with individuals, and the more individuals an education authority
can muster the more general grant it will receive; the grant is,
in effect, a unit grant, the unit being people. The block grant
of 1929 was similarly based on population, and apart from other
considerations, proved to be perfectly workable in practice.
3inoe, however, the care and education of children Is the
chief element in general grant and sinoe Scotland"s child population
is/
(7) A.L. Xmrle, in an address to the Institute of Municipal
Treasurers and Accountants, Eastbourne, 13.6.58.
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is by no means evenly dispersed, the number of children under 15 has
been made to enter twice into the basic population. This population
is then weighted to take into account;
(a) The ratio of landward to total population in each
county. and
(bj The sparsi ty of school population.
Unlike the English distribution method where various
"supplementary shares" are given, these are true weightings which
do not require separate recalculation at each change in the volume
of the grant.
These weightings will be exasdned more carefully later;
both reflect in the first instance the fact that education, and to
some extent ether costs are greater in thinly populated areas than
in the closer-knit urban authorities. Both weightings go a certain
way In answering the requirement that grant should take local cost
variations into account#. Sparsity, of course, despite its special
importance as a variation factor in Scotland, is but one of many such
variances, and, as has been said, no single formula can ever satis¬
factorily be expected tomeet this requirement, but the advantage of
having a separate general grant in Scotland is that it can provide
for needs that are peculiar to Scotland.
The formula, then, gives particular attention to education
needs, for the education main grant now discontinued forms by far
the/
the largos part in it. This being 30, it is reasonable to on ,uire
what has happened to the former rate product deduction from edu¬
cation main grant.
It \>/ill be recalled that in 1948, at the time when the
old block grants were being discontinued and a number of services
were being taken over by the State, it was considered necessary
to withdraw the not gains arising to some authorities thereby
using these to augment the equalisation grant to below-average
authorities. The method of doing this was to apply a rate product
deduction to the largest specific grant, education. 't that time
there was, of course, no general grant which might hove been used
for this purpose. Now there is, yet the deduction has been omitted.
dinburgh and Glasgow, the two education authorities not
in receipt of equalisation grant may in theory benefit to some
extent from this, though any gain effected is likely to be small
end would in any case be absorbed through the syatari of transit¬
ional payments. The omission is justifiable on the grounds of
simplicity and the position vis-a-vis England and '"ales, where
the rate product deduction remains, is unaffected, since the aggre¬
gate amount of the grant is separately fixed for Scotland. The
view has been expressed that the deduction so far as the English
general grant is concerned is redundant since it serves the same
purpose es the rate deficiency grant.
Essentially, however, the formula is on© based on crude
population/
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population figures and, unless we could assume a perfectly static
population, this inevitably leads to certain difficulties.
Firstly, as in the old Blook grants, no account has been
taken in Scotland of declining population authorities. In England
wdight has been added to the formula for such authorities, but in
Scotland this weighting is absent. This is perhaps accounted for
by the distribution arrangements of the grant which is calculated
initially in terms of population for counties and counties of
cities, and then apportioned and paid to rating areas according to
rateable or standard rateable value, whichever is the higher, thus
adhering, incidentally, to the pattern set by the present method of
apportioning county expenditure. Cods equently, within the burghal
and landward areas of the county it is effective rateable resources
which determine grant allocations ana only ixidirectly population.
In this way a snail burgh with a declining population will not be
unduly prejudiced. In addition, the need for such a weighting was
rejected at the 1953 investigation into the working of the equalisa¬
tion grant in .Scotland, and until the next investigation takes place
a re-appraisal of this need will not be possible. Indeed, so far
as Scotland is concerned, the new arrangements for general grant
cannot be regarded as permanent for they may be affected by adjust¬
ments to the equalisation grant at the review which will follow the
1961-62.revaluation. It wilibe observed how it is at all times
necessary to have regard to the system as a whole, and within this
pattern the question of equalisation remains to be discussed in a
subsequent chapter.
It does mean, however, that an education authority with a
declining/
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declining population which may havebullt up high-standard services
for the benefit of its total population will find a diminishing use
for these services, but in many cases will be compelled to continue
to operate and finance them at the same level with diminishing grant
resources* The proportion of variable costs in a number of these
services is remarkably snail and loans charges and other expenses of
a fixed nature will not deelixie autoaatically with the population.
This was one complaint made against the former 19S9 type Block grant,
and the complaint is still a justifiable one.
A similar effect, Indeed will be obtained through any
inter-education area population movements whatsoever, and these, as
we have seen, are often unpredictable and in any case largely beyond
the control of the local council. n illustration of this it should
be noted that "population" for these purposes includes service persona®
- for instance, members of the United States armed forces • and this
would seem anomalous in view of the floating nature of this kind of
population. here such movements remain small no great harm will be
taken, but any serious outdrift of population will have immediate
repercussions on the fixed expenses of the exporting authority con¬
cerned. here the Highlands are concerned and to a lesser extent
Scotland as a whole, the problem has been to hold the population;
the tendency is in the oppos te direction. in 1956-57 Scotland, of
all employment districts in the United Kingdom, suffered the greatest
loss by migration - 8,oOG of her population.(8)
It/
(8) Ministry of labour Gazette: June 1958
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It may be thought tnat general grant in its present form might
work more effectively with a relatively few large authorities -
the fewer and larger the bettor - for then the effects of popula¬
tion movements would be spread, over the whole region. /gainst
these arguments there has to be set the chance that the large author¬
ity, the county,which alone has responsibility for providing certain
services, such as education, throughout its area, may in future
decide to spend less or more on such services to the possible
detriment of the smaller authorities within the county area, whose
control over such decisions will be somewhat limited.
The weighted population formula, however, is essentially
a simple one - much simpler than the equalisation grant formula
as a comparison of the flow charts in Appendices F and G will show,
the object of distributing a global sura among the boothish author¬
ities is achieved by first allocating to education areas, in pro¬
portion to population, this population being weighted to favour
sparse areas and areas where the number of children is above average.
These allocations are then shared out within the areas in the
manner in which expenditure is borne.
Let us test this formula further. Suppose that in the
future it is decided to include the police service for general
grant in the manner earlier suggested; would the existing formula
be adequate to deal with the inclusion? There would appear to be
no reason why it should not. The fire service, which is in many
ways comparable to police has now had its grant generalised and
if the present distribution formula is considered appropriate to
fire, then it should work also for police. Police costs, too,
which/
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which ore mainly made up of pay and allowances, are likely to be
influenced by population density and sparsity, and to some extent
at any rate by the density of child population, so that the exist¬
ing formula would seem to be adaptable enough to absorb this further
service without alteration.
By its universality population suggests itself as tho natural
basis of distribution where widespread and differing areas ar9
concerned.
XV
It would be possible bo pick out additional short-comings
of the general grant - the fact that the formula does not provide,
for every possible need, or that the authorities which, liko
Aberdeen, have preferred to maintain high standards end consequently
incur heavier costs are likely to gain tho least out of the grant.
All these are valid criticisms but they are not constructive, and as
much as anything constructive criticism is what is needed. During the
passage/
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passage of the Bill nearly everything that was said of the general
grant was in the spirit that this was a had grant and one to be
discouraged.
This view is not taken here. As has been said, a
general contribution in itself is nothing new and is in many ways
a far superior grant-form to any other. A fixed general grant,
too, though unpalatable, is hard to criticise for it must be the
responsibility of the government to decile whether it shall be
fixed or not. Despite its other defects - and defects are a
feature of any type of grant - there is no reason 'why the new
general grant should not operate effectively, provided its present
fixed nature can be relaxed when the economy of the country is reason
ably stable once more.
In the end, the main purpose of general grant is to intro¬
duce a certain desired level of progressiveness and this, as we
have seen,.will depend on the public's acceptance of the situation





It has been aptly remarked that while general grant is
an expenditure grant, the equalisation contribution is an income
grant, for, as the name now given to it in England, rate deficiency
grant, suggests, it is a rate contribution made by the government to
those authorities whose adjusted rateable value per head of weighted
population is less than the standard. From the following figures
it will be seen that in Scotland the great majority of authorities
fall into this category:





Large burghs 19 1
Small burghs 158 15
. i
212 18
The details of the present form and working of the grant in
Scotland have already been described in an earlier chapter; it will
be recalled that since 1954 Scottish authorities have not been
participating in the grant on a normal basis, but on a makeshift
arrangement designed to secure equity. The whole subject of the
equalisation grant, too, has been ably analysed by the research
(2)
group under the chairmanship of Dr. Lees in 1956, and it is not
proposed /
(1) 1956-57; 3rd provisional calculation.
(2) Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, 1956.
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proposed here to restate principles already postulated except to
the extent that they bear on the argument. In this chapter we
of the basis of the grant and will provide opportunity for
a reshaping of its main features, if this is considered desirable.
It will be appropriate, therefore, to examine these features at
this point.
noted from the fact that few local government areas are directly
comparable, for many different reasons. These areas, arbitrarily
fixed in past years, have often little connection with the present-
day needs of the localities, so that any attempt to ensure that
"two citizens of equal substance in different parts of the country
have to make an equal contribution" for equivalent local services
will be only moderately successful, and this would remain true,
though possibly less obvious, however it was decided to reshape
our areas, and whatever means was employed of taxing the individual
for the provision of functions. The differences which make it
hard to compare these areas with each other have been recognised as
falling into two categories, namely, differences in resources and
differences in needs; where Scotland is concerned a third difference
is apparent, namely that which exists between this country and the
rest of the United Kingdom.
shall be concerned rather with the possible role which
equalisation has to play in Scotland in future years.
The revaluation of rateable properties which was




The need for equalisation arises primarily, as has been
The /
(3) in terms of section 30 of the Local Government Act 1946.
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The needs of the Highlands, for example, are not those of
the Lowlands, while those of the Clyde Valley conurbation vary from
those of the Border counties. The costs of a sparsely populated
county are totally different from those of a compact urban area,
while the standard of service provided may be considerably CAUSES
OF
higher and more expensive in one authority as compared to DIFFERENCE
another. Some areas are wealthy in terms of the personal
incomes of their inhabitants, where others are poor. The
variations are without number - and these variations are not
by any means static - yet for local government purposes we must
endeavour to provide an equal charge for equivalent services
everywhere, and to do so using a system based on volumes of
rateable value which are themselves not comparable.
The best that can be done is to see that a rough measure
of Justice is obtained, and to do this we may start by selecting




(c) Special population groups
(d) Comparative wealth and poverty
(e) Degrees of development and standards of services
provided
(f) Other special factors affecting local costs.
We may then arrange to contribute or refrain from
contributing to the local government areas according to a formula
which takes into account their respective differences in terms of
the items listed, so as to bring them all roughly on to an equal
footing. As has been earlier remarked, the sharing out of a large
lump sum among all authorities lends itself well to the application
of formula in this way.
Thus, /
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Thus, by way of simple illustration, we could assume two
authorities, between which it is desired to divide a total grant sum
according to populations. 3ince> however, it is evident that the
cost of certain services is likely to be greater in one as compared
to the other because of the higher incidence of old people, it is
decided to weight population so as to favour the authority with the
higher age ratio:
i Authority A E Total
Population 50,000 100,000 150,000
Number of old persons
included therein 5.000 5.000 10.000
55.000 105.000 160.000
Grant available £10,000 £
Distributed as to -
A-- 55.0C0 X £10,000 3,438
B- 105.000 X £10,000 a 6.562
160,000 £ 10,000
In this way A's needs in a comparison with B have been
compensated for, though whether this has been over- or under¬
compensated depends on how important the matter of old age is felt
to be in the determination of total costs.
By such methods general grant takes account chiefly of
population dispersions, while equalisation grant provides for a
levelling out of rateable values so far as receiving authorities
are /
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are concerned (4). It la clear, then that when we talk of
equalisation we are not simply concerned with '^equalisation
grant , which is primarily a method of achieving equalisation
of resources in terms of rateable value for authorities below
the standard. ' e are also concerned with general grant or with
any other grant to which a weighting element can usefully be
added.
The problem of equalisation can be theoretically
approached in the following synthesis. First, let us
imagine Gotland, a country where everything is organised
in perfect uniformity; the population evenly spread, the
inhabitants all earning exactly the same incomes and
supporting the same size of families, and all living in
standardised houses which hove all the same rateable values.
**e will assume further that in no area is a better standard
of service being provided than in any other. Under such
conditions the rating system would work perfectly, and there
would be need neither for equalisation nor for central
government grants.
Next, let us introduce reality bit by hit. Populations,
as we have remarked, are never evenly spread nor even permanently
fixed /
(4) It is important, of course, to observe that, except in the
case of receiving authorities, any true equalisation of
resources under equalisation grant does not exist. Since
the withdrawal of the rate product deduction in the educa¬
tion main grant the additional rateable value enjoyed by
above-average authorities is not used in any way to supple¬
ment the deficiencies of those falling below the average.
This supplement is met from national taxation.
THE
■ "EE
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fixed. In Bootland, large parts of the country remain thinly
populated, while the bulk of the people are concentrated in a
few industrial areas. Ooae measure of equalisation at once
becomes necessary, therefore, for the cost per head of services
in the sparsely populated areas will be very much greater.
T owever, if this were the only disturbing feature, the rating
system with an equalising factor added could still be relied
upon exclusively. To the argument: why should the densely
populated area pay more to provide services for people in sparse
areas? - the simple answer is: - because we oblige them to take
these services.
But then, houses too, by the nature of things, cannot be
standard, and consequently rateable values will differ as between
areas. Hero again, to ensure that every individual enjoys the
equivalent semi-national services which he is obliged to take at
a similar cost, equalisation will have to be provided, and all
other assumptions remaining valid, this could still be done with¬
out recourse to central grants by further weighting the rating
system, ratepayers who live In bigger houses having been otherwise
called upon to contribute a larger amount than others. Since all
er© still, in our premise, earning the some, the regressive nature
of the rating system can incidentally bo observed.
Thirdly, personal incomes will in reality be no more uni¬
form than the other two factors so far referred to, and if no steps
were/
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were taken to adjust this differential then the rate charge for
local services w uld bear more heavily and inequitably on the
poorer than on the richer. The method adopted to deal with this
is, a3 we have seen, to separately tax individuals having regard
to their ability to pay and then return the money to them to be
used only for semi-national services. In this sense, then, any
form of government grant is essentially an equaliser.
In this connection the view is often put forward that a
local income tax would so ve the some purpose, and indeed thi3
would be so if the tax were carefully devised. It would not,
however, any more than the present method, eliminate the necessity
for equalisation of the other factors under discussion... so much
is proved by the experience of other countries - as, for instance,
Norway, where a local income tax is used.
In 3hort, then, if instead of a country where perfect
uniformity existed wo could assume a perfect system of equalisa¬
tion, it would matter little whether semi-national services were
paid for exclusively out of rates•
*•'© need take our synthesis no further; the notion of a
country where perfect uniformity exists is the reverse of things
as they are. The perfect equalisation system, too, will probably
never be achieved, but the weightings applied in both general
grant and equalisation grant go a considerable way to equalising











ratio of landward to
total population.








It may be remarked, too, that to the extent that local expenditure
is financed by both these general contributions and by other
specific grants the ability to pay principle, Itself an equalising
device, is in operation.
5
Guch weighting factors as have been used up to now are
not necessarily valid for all time; they can be adopted or dis¬
carded according to the needs of the day. The unemployment
weightings/
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weightings of the old block grant, for example, are not at present
felt to be required. Nor dc such weightings exhaust the causes of
local differences; they do achieve a reasonable degree of parity
between authorities, and the principle has been adopted in the past -
reasonably - of ignoring causes of difference unless they could be
shown to be significant and not simply trivial. The present
equalisation contribution makes use of a number of weightings
as shown above, and some of these may now be examined closely.
EXISTINGchildren WSIGnTINGS
The weighting for the number of children under 15 added
to the total population has the effect of increasing the grant
payable to areas where the proportion of children is above
average. This "children" factor, together with that for sparsity,
have been regarded for many years as two of the most important
causes of difference between localities. The special population
group made up of school children is particularly noteworthy in
determining local authority expenditures, mainly because the education
service is of such major importance. A similar "needs" weighting,
however, is applied in the general grant formula, so that there is
an effect of double weighting here. One formula, say the general
grant, could be used to apply this weighting, instead of the two
as at present.
Sparsity.
A further instance of double weighting is observed in
respect of sparsity. Such a weighting is necessary to reflect
primarily the greater costs of educational and health services in
landward as compared to burghal areas, and in particular in the
Highland /
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Highland counties such as Sutherland and Ross and Cromarty, where the
population is very thinly spread. But similar weightings are used
in both the general and the equalisation grant formula; again, one
base could be weighted instead of two.
It would, in short, be possible to transfer the main
weightings from equalisation grant to general grant where DOUBLE
WEIGHTING
they would operate with equal effectiveness, thus
leaving the equalisation grant as a simple equaliser of
rateable resources for receiving authorities.
A simplification along these lines would be theoretically
at any rate, desirable. At present there are two large grants,
each with a separate base:
Population
and Rateable value
to each of which various weightings are applied. It is proposed
to strip the latter of the duplicated weightings.
Such thoughts lead inevitably to the question: are both
these grants necessary? Might it not be possible with greater
administrative advantage to combine them into one general grant
where the benefit of weightings would accrue to all authorities
instead of, as in the present equalisation grant, to just the
receiving authorities?
If rateable values in the various areas draw closer
together in the future, as might reasonably be expected, the number
of authorities receiving equalisation grant would become progressively
less. There would always be some receivers, but eventually these
could /
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could be ao few and the volume of the grant so comparatively
small as to suggest a discontinuance of equalisation grant,
OMNIBtS
its remaining function of resources equalisation being taken QU*-ATX
over by the general grant# This could. lead us in the long,
run to an omnibus general grant - a refined version of the block
grant of 1929#
This is a possibility for the future# for the present we must
continue to use the two grants, iraprovlng general grant by any
further weightings which may seem desirable, but bearing in mind
that each additional weighting should have a significant purpose
which is reasonably universal, for it is otherwise simply a
complication of the formula# Certain sugh weightings which suggest
themselves are as follows
Inci-e- sing opulotlon
There is a weighting added to the existing aqua lis- OTRER
poUSSEe
ation grant formula in Scotland to adjust for rapidly M?IGfTIMGr8
increasing population, so that the population of 8 county is
increased to the extent of twice the number by which the increase
in civilian population over the past five years exceeds 5% of the
population in the first of the five years.
This would seem to be an important and useful weighting
in Scotland where, apart from normal increases, there are now
considerable movements of population planned to deal with the
problem of overcrowding in the Clyde valley# The high costs of
providing new services before the benefit of the additional rate
resources/
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resources Is available would constitute a hardship in such areas
which should be adjusted for, and in this connection a five-year
lapse would seem an unduly long period in certain cases. Where
planned migration is Involved it night be considered reasonable
to apply an imediute weighting.
A similar, though quite separate, consideration is
raised by population groups which are increasing, not rapidly
because of special airmrn.stances, but steadily and normally.
This will generally go hand-in-hand with areas in which industrial
expansion is evident, and it has been suggested that local costs
in such areas will tend to be comparatively greater than in others.
There appears, in fact, to be no evidence that this is the case, at
{5}
least not to any significant extent.
Deercasing iomiction ,
Certain aree3, on the other hand, are subject to a decline
in population, and whore this tendency is evident, hardship arises
by comparison with other areas, since the fixed expenses of exist¬
ing services must continue to be met and considerable time must
elapse before these fall back Into line with the reduced population.
In England and -Hales weight has been added to the general grant
(a)
distribution formula to adjust for this, by a supplementary share
of/
(5) Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, p. 141. D# 3* Less
and others.
(6) Local Government finance in England and Wales. Cmnd. 309,
1957.
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of half the percentage decline over the past twenty-one years in
exoessof 5^..».5/ because below this figure corresponding increases
i
in expenditure would not be significant to any great extent#
Earlier proposals had dealt with a fifteen year period for the
purpose, but this has since been considered an inadequate time lapse
to smooth out a long-term tendency of this type.
The difficulty here is that comparatively few authorities
are affected by this, factor» yet soma of those few are affected
badly. It is probably true to say that in England the county
borough of Pest Ham is the one most concerned, and weighting of
the typo mentioned tends to unduly favour the most affected by
comparison with the others, so creating anomalies.
In Scotland, at the time of the first investigation
into the working of the equalisation grant in 1953, it was felt that
the sraall gains to be derived by four counties and two large burghs
from introducing such a weighting made it not worth while. One
curious result which merged at that time was that Clydebank, beoause
of the differing time periods used in the weightings, would have had
simultaneously an increasing and a decreasing population. These
conclusions were based on calculations for the year 1951-58, since
when a decade has passed. It is thought that the desirability of
again reviewing this factor should be considered.
Housing
In some areas the cost of providing houses is well above
average/
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average. 3orae authorities, too, have to provide more now houses
than others, and in this matter .cotland is behind England and
wales. At the 1951 Census the comparison shown below was made;
percentage of copulations
cotl: nd ghJLLaM and ' klos
2 rooms or less 305* 4?'
3 rooms or less 60$ 15$
more than 3 persons
per room 13.8$ , 2.1$
In particular, this factor may be related to developments
in terms of overspill agreements under the Housing and Town Develop-
V
ment (Scotland) Act 1957. Apart from the high cost of providing
, new housing an authority may well find that because of the resulting
volume of now rateable value the equalisation grant receivable is
reduced, although specific grants are, of course, available under
the Act mentioned. This matter was referred to in tho reports of
the investigations into the working of the equalisation grant in
1953 and 1955, when it was agreed that the position must continue
to be closely watched. If action is now to be contemplated in
this matter the question may arise as to whether or not ad hoc
grants might be used more advantageously than weighting. In
general, specific grants of this nature would seen appropriate
only where isolated authorities were affected. In these overspill
agreements there are likely to be involved more than just a few




As has been noted, the population as a whole is changing
to reflect a proportions! overall ageing. This tendency may be
more evident in same areas than in others, and on the assumption
that the care of the aged Is an element of local costs which is
thus likely to increase, some weighting might usefully be applied
for this. Apart, of course, from the increasing cost of services
for the old, there is the fact that an ageing population will tend
to be a declining one. In England axid Wales, indeed, although
general grant in that country is for the time being at anyrate to
operate somewhat differently than in Scotland, a weighting in the
form of a "supplementary share'* in general grant is to be given
of £0.42 for each person over 65, and also for each child under 5.
In England and Wales the general grant distribution
GENERAL
formula will deal with: wi
■ 2F~
{a| a basic share of £5.75 per head of population, ENGLan L -
plus £0.53 for each child under 15 in this a$D'
population. m&ggg
(b) supplementary shares or weightings.
(c) a rate product deduction*
The supplementary shares will include additions fori
achoolchildi'en.
the very old and the very young,
high and low population densities,
declining population. {7}
high costs in the Greater London area.
(7) See Appendix D.
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It is of interest here, in view of what was earlier
remarked, to find that the new rate deficiency grant In England
and '-'ales has been shorn of the weightings for rapidly increasing
population and decreasing population and for children, the latter
two having been transferred to the general grant formula•
The effect of the introduction of general grant, together
with other attendant changes in England end Whles will be to reduce
the rate deficiency grant in that country. This will in turn
affect the pool of exchequer grant available to Scotland by a sum
estimated at 01.9 million - a point which has been provided for in
fixing the total amount of the general grant for the first grant
period.
Ill
Now it might reasonably be supposed that the more
reliance comes to be placed upon the rating system the more
becomes the necessity for equalisation of rate resources. One
possible effect of the general grant B$y be to cast, a heavier
burden upon the rates; local expenditure on services may well
rise/
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rise beyond fixed grant period levels because of rising prices which
are outside the control of the local authorities. As matters are
at present, this would adjust itself to a certain extent.
As "relevant expenditures" rose, so participation in
equalisation grant would increase, at anyrate for authorities
which were receiving the grant. This self-adjustment is a good
example of the flexibility of the equalisation grant in its guise
of percentage grant.
However, arising, no doubt, out of a suggestion made by
the Edwards Committee in 1954 that there should be a limit to in¬
creases in expenditure which earn grant, the intention of the
government was stated of applying some such form of limitation to
the rate deficiency grant in England and Wales. "The effect will
be that in considering a new project or an expansion of a &8PEHDI
TIL. d
service there can be no assurance that the increased co3t LirilTC
will attract rate deficiency grant; and so far as this grant
is conoerned each new project will have to be considered on
(9)
tha basis that the whole cost might fall on the rates."
Under the Local Government Act, 1958, Section 6 (3),
ell local authorities in " ngland and Wales are divided into six
main categories, and a total relevant expenditure ascertained for
each/
(9) Grand* 209 p. 12
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ghch of these groups. The relevant expenditure of any authority
in any year is then calculated by multiplying the authority's
weighted population by the group expenditure per head of popula¬
tion. In this way relevant expenditures are tied to group averages
This provision, of course, is entirely in keeping with
the other conditions of the general grant, which was to be distri¬
buted according to objective factors beyond the control of decisions
taken by individual authorities, but in England it will constitute
a further uncertainty and tend to operate harshly against the high-
standard authorities. Scottish authorities are at present only
indirectly affected by expenditure limits of this type by the extent
to which the Scottish allocation of money is thereby restricted.
The present Scottish formula does, in fact, take account
of one such limitation, namely that arising from the possibility
that some authorities, as a matter of housing policy, keep the
rents for council houses at a low level. These, in turn, by in¬
fluencing gross annual values and thereby rateable values per head
of weighted population, could attract a greater volume of equalisa¬
tion grant to the authorities in question.
This contingency is provided for; what is not at present
controlled is the rate contribution to council housing expenditure
which by reason of a low rent policy would be increased and enter¬
ing into relevant local expenditure would attract equalisation
grant and so reduce the objectivity of the arrangements.
It will shortly be suggested that a United Kingdom basis
may in fact have to be adopted for the future distribution of rate
deficiency/
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deficiency grant. In this event it would be necessary to classify
the Scottish authorities in a similar manner to that in use in
England and Wales', and to calculate annually their relevent ex¬
penditures on a group basis# If this were done it xvould go a
considerable way to overcoming the difficulties caused by housing
rents - a matter which may more appropriately be controlled by
action outside the grant system.
2
Finally, in attempting for those ourposes to THE LIKE:
WITH
correct the differences that exist between areas it is FKG&AKD
.'MD
not sufficient to consider Scotland alone, 'without
reference to the remainder of the United Kingdom. Indeed,
this differential is the raost intractable of all, and has left
us in deotland with an equalisation grant formula which is com¬
plex, unwieldy and artificial; throughout the pest decade con¬
tinuous/
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continuous efforts have been mad© to find ooiaraon {-round between the
two countries for grant purposes.
There would seem to b© several possible approaches to
this part of the problem. We could, for example, leave matters
in the future as they are at present; this would be the easy way
which would continue to provide Scotland with a distributable
"equivalent*' each year, nationally calculated and difficult to
justify, but causing the least disturbance to administrative
systems in Scotland and England and Ifcles. It is thought un¬
likely that this proposition would continue to meet with the
approval of the government
Alternatively, the view could be taken that, since
general grant is dealt with separately in .Scotland, there is no
reason why this country should not operate its own rate equalis¬
ing scheme quite independently of arrangements in England and
Wbles. There is precedent for this, for London has operated its
own internal scheme since 1948, whereby those metropolitan boroughs
in which the rateable value per head is below the London County
Council average receive contributions which are charged rateably
on all the boroughs. There is much that could be said for such
a plan; a Scottish equalising schemewmld ovoid the complicat¬
ing link with England and Wales entirely and could work with
comparative simplicity.
The objection would be on the grounds of equity as
between/
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between the two countries for under any separate scheme it would
be even more difficult than at present to say whether a citizen
in Scotland was ranking a greater or less contribution for local
services than his counterpart in England and 'ales.
Thirdly, we could wait until after the revaluation of
1961-63 and seek then to determine as accurately as possible by
what arithmetical percentage Scottish rateable values could be
compared with the "English average and dome beck on to the United
Kingdom basis which Mrs abandoned in 1954, using this percentage.
This third approach seems the one most likely to be adopted, and,
when the time comes it may even be found, possible to dispense with
arithmetical comparisons and arrive at one United Kingdom standard.
Much faith has been placed in the impending evaluation of
lands and heritages in Scotland which it is hoped will bring her
broadly into line for these purposes with England and Vales.
Logically, if revaluation in Scotland achieves this aim, the
Scottish distribution formula for equalisation grant together with
the method used to determine Eeotlend's share of the grant should
be exchanged for the system now in use in England end Wales.
If this were done two major changes would be involved.
Firstly, it would be necessary to adopt the use of rate products
for these purposes instead of rateable values, and secondly the
sparsity factor in rate deficiency grant would have to b© recal¬
culated or abandoned. All these changes will call for a consider¬
able degree of cooperation and goodwill between Scottish and " nglish
authorities. The pattern of local government is basically differ¬
ent between the two countries and it is unrealistic to assure that
needs/
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needs are the same north and south of the Border# Variation
factors, till now blanketed by the Goschen formula and even by
the rates burden basis, will inevitably present themselves and
oall for negotiation. But it is difficult to ignore the fact
that the present arrangements in Scotland were not intended to
be more than a temporary expedient.
moreover when the Scottish equalisation grant comes to
be reviewed after revaluation, five years will have elapsed since
the new pattern of general grant and rate deficiency grant in
England and T"feles ivas first devised, and there will be available
three years* experience of its full working outside Scotland.
with thl3 experience it should be possible to bring about the kind
of general uniformity that ha3 been discussed*
Revaluation will not bring perfect uniformity in rate¬
able values throughout the United Kingdom, though it will without
doubt make them more readily comparable. Under the new arrange¬
ments envisaged the problem would not simplybe todividea residual
of x between Scottish authorities; these Scottish authorities would
rank along with all other United Kingdom authorities for the purpose.
It Is suggested that, given a reasonable degree of co-operation,
there should be no reason why this arrangement would not only be
desirable but could bo acceptable.
A change-over along those lines could bo achieved without
any resulting loss to Scotland as a whole. Amy apparent differ¬
ential in the new total stun notionally available to Scotland as
compared to the old could bo made up by inclusion in the Scottish
general/
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general grant total and allocated on this basis# This adjustment
would only be required initially, for it would perpetuate itself.
It may of course be argued that in adjusting any notional
difference in equalisation grant in this way we will be distributing
it in Scotland according to the general grant formula to counties
and counties of cities in the first place, whereas under equalisa¬
tion grant arrangements not all authorities are receivers of the
(•
grant.
Several comments may be made on this criticism; first,
that until the results of revaluation are known it is impossible
to forsee the amount of this differential, which may be quite small.
Secondly, such an arrangement, while disposing once and for all of
the artificiality of the present system, would provide a guarantee
that Scotland as a whole would not lose by adopting a United Kingdom
basis# Thirdly, the only non-receiving authorities which would
notionally benefit from this arrangement would be Edinburgh and
Glasgow, and it could be provided that these did not participate
in the allocation of the differential sua in auestion. *nd lastly,
(XI)
the precedent for this has already been established in determining
the total amount of the general grant for the initial period to take
account of the transitional reduction in equalisation grant.
We begin now to vlsualiso more clearly the future pattern
of equalisation within the grant system, which, apart from the
specialised/
{11) Local Government Finance in Gotland# nnd# 308* para. 16.
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specialised specific grants, will involve:
General grant
and rate deficiency grant.
!.'e have regarded the future distribution of the latter
as being on a United Kingdom basis, uniformly applied, and as free
as possible of any complicating weightings which would make it
something more than just an equaliser of rate-resources for below-
standard authorities.
'he equalisation of needs, on the other hand, will be
dealt with through general grant, and weightings for this purpose
may continue to be applied on a Gcottish basis, subject to periodic
review. These need3 will be of an "internal" nature; that is,
they will adjust for differences between Scottish local authorities,
inter so.
In addition, needs of an "external" type may arise from
time to time. It could, be argued, to give a single example, that
acotland 13 out of step with the rest of the country by reason of
(12)
higher levels of unemployment. This may best be adjusted by
i
negotiation in fixing the amount of the general grant at each grant
period review.
Consideration of the particular variation factors which
may be adopted for weighting the general grant at the reappraisal
following revaluation must be left for the Working Party to decide,
for the need for this or that weighting may change; the foregoing
view/
(12; The Economist monthly average for April 1958 showed com¬




view of equalisation arrangements represents a tidy-Ing up, as it
were • If we would further improve on that then it is to the local
government areas themselves and their reorganisation into larger
units that we must look.
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8 - THE EnEKOIliG PATTKhN Jff LOCAL OUy?J^ffKT
At an early point in the development of this thesis two
questions which are fundamental to the argument were raised. Is
local government useful? If so, is it useful in its present
form? These questions must now be examined more fully.
The first may be deferred till later in this chapter;
as a basic premise the usefulness of the local government system
was assumed, and its continued use as an administrative framework
upon which reliance could be placed was regarded as a necessity.
This assumption was made on political grounds and has been supported
(1)
by policy statements by Ministers of the government. Moreover, it
is on assumption which requires to be made, for without it the pres¬
ent enquiry would be pointless.
The second question - i3 local government useful LOCAL
in its present form - is one over which a much greater ,ZZZ
measure of control is possible, for here there is not so
miofa a political issue as a simple desire to achieve the
most efficient administrative machine for oarrying out the
policies referred to. This consideration must inevitably touch
tbe grant question at its very foundations.
So far as the grant system is concerned the object
must surely bo first, to set up the best administration, and
then/
(1) See Chapter 1.
174
then to provide the most suitable system of finance to go with lt»
The one is dependent on the other, but it is essential to get the
relative importance of the two right; no system of finance will
operate successfully unless the system it serves is in itself
satisfactory. We have therefore to compare the present system
of finanoe with the administrative background against which it
may have to operate.
A hundred years ago Scotland was divided up for local
government purposes into parishes - a system which, as time passed,
proved cumbersome and defective, mainly on account of the smallness
of the local administrative unit. "Nearly every third parish in
13)
Scotland", wrote M'Neel Caird, "has fewer than 1,000 inhabitants;
nearly every tenth parish fewer than 5dQ. Yet these Lilliputian
communities have their organised Boards, their salaried officials,
their Parliamentary powers to tax their neighbours and spend the
money** Lord Cockburn tells of his having been at a meeting of
heritors where four were present... "Society", he adds, "is all
spotted and bubbling with these little senates*n
The present pattern of Scottish local government was
established by the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1889, and
modified in 1929 and 1947. So far as Scotland was concerned the
former parishes gave way to two-tier counties with landward and
burghal areas, the forraer being divided into districts, the latter
comprising/
(2) Cobden Club Essays, 1875.
Local Government and Taxation - A. M*Neel Gaird.
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comprising both large and small burghs in respect of which the
counties had only limited responsibilities. In addition there
remained the four cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen end
Dundee, which, like their counterparts in England and Dales, the
county boroughs, were all-purpose authorities entrusted with the
administration of all local government services in their area.
The position of the four counties of cities is clear
enough - they are very much larger than any of the other burghs,
with populations ranging from 178,000 in Dundee to over a million
in Glasgow. They are all powerful enough to provide efficient,
adequate and dynamic administration of services, and their areas
are compact and well-defined, with the possible exception of
Glasgow which is too big.
rr,he thirty-three Scottish counties, too, are generally
speaking a logical and convenient division of administrative
responsibility, having regard to local circumstances and territor-
(3)
ial groupings. In this connection certain criteria have been
suggested by the government in determining whether this division
is s fair one; it 3hould, for example, take account of:
(a) community of interest.
(b) development or anticipated development.
(c) economic and industrial characteristics.
(d) financial resources measured in relation
to financial need.
(e) physioal/





(g) record of past administration.
(h) size and shape of the areas.
(i) wishes of the inhabitants.
These tenets are far from being exhaustive, but it is
worth keeping them in mind, however, in considering the position
of the small burghs. Over eighty per cent of these have popula¬
tions under 9,000. Many of them are still little more than
large villages which are never likely to develop much beyond
their present size. They are often royal burghs with a history
that goes back many hundreds of years and a local pride founded
in tradition, but they have all the defects of the old parish
system.
An example of these which is typical is the royal burgh
of South Queensferry, an authority with a Charter granted by King Charles
I, in which the inhabitants take keen and justifiable pride. Yet
the population is a mere 3,744, and the rateable value £39,739.
Out of these resources there must be maintained a local council
with approp; iate buildings, and an administrative staff to see to
the provision of houses and other statutory services, the upkeep
of the town and the levy of rates. The-®own Clerk and the
Chamberlain are part-time employees who devote a few hurried hours
weekly to the affairs of the burgh, and the burgh surveyor i3 also
the local plumber.
There are xaany small burghs like Queensferry with
populations even below 3,000, as in some of the fishing burghs of
litest Fife, or in New Galloway with its tiny population of 393, and




rate to buy a typewriter." It seems wrong and wasteful to retain thorn
on what are very limited grounds. It is, moreover, an easy matter
to form new small burghs - an application to the sheriff by twelve
or more electors may result in his fixing the boundaries of a
(5)
"'populous place" and declaring it to be a small burgh, as happened
in 1958 for example in the case of Bearsden. A population of
2,000 is enough to justify the title "populous place", and lead
to the setting up of yet another miniature looal council with
insufficient resources end non-specialised staff, sure of nothing
except their desire to be independent and run their own affairs.
The grant implications of such a breakaway are worth
underlining. By its very lack of resources, such a newly-formed
small burgh could attract equalisation grant to itself and away
from the county of whose landward area It previously formed a
part and over which the grant was more evenly distributed. Con¬
versely, if its resources were high enough to bring it above the
standard it would receive no equalisation grant at all, although
its ratepayers may have formerly participated in the county
allocation. This latter position arises in the case of the new
3mall burgh of Bearsden referred to above. The point is that
any change in the existing areas must automatically have its
effect on finance and may well lead to unexpected results as far
as grant is concerned.
Essentially the same problem may be examined from the
point/
(4) Hansard 10.13.57.
(5) Local Government (Scotland Act, 1947. Sec. 13S.
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point of view of individual services, certain of which would
possibly work with greater efficiency if released from the
necessity to operate within their present sometimes unnatural
local boundaries. An example of this is the police service,
for which there is much to be said in favour of a regional organ¬
isation.
In any serious attempt, then, to provide a well devised
system of local government finance in the future it will be nec¬
essary to settle three questions first, namely,
(a) Milch services will Scottish Local Government
be required to administer?
(b) How best shall local government areas be
fixed?
(c) Milch services will best be handled by which
type of area?
To illustrate the point we may refer back to the
problem of local variations in costs, which, as we have seen,
make any true uniformity between authorities non-existent. In
two large burghs the cost to maintain a child, for example, may
be quite different; we could introduce uniformity by an equal¬
ising contribution. Alternatively, if these authorities were
merged in a large administrative county or if the service itself
were taken over by such a county, the disparity would be spread
and would be less anomalous*
In the meantime, with areas and functions as we have
them, the importance of really effective equalisation of needs
and resources is flmpbaaiAed* qualisatlon in itself cannot
remedy/
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remedy an Imperfect division of areas and services, but it can do
much to smooth out the effects of such a division.
On the grounds of economic efficiency, there
would seem to be an excellent case for larger udministra- TEB
tive units of local government - a movement parallelled 1?diiAKDS
in the fields of industry and commerce, though here the
i?r:8
basic considerations are essentially different. At
some sacrifice of tradition and local individuality it
could be argued that the•time for parochial finance has
passed, and that a new approach to local administration
must be attempted.
In recent years It is true that, under stimulus from
the central government, there has been increasing resort to
amalgamation through joint committees. powers in this matter
are simple and uncomplicated; any two or more local authorities
may combine for any purpose in which they are jointly interested.
Moreover, the responsible minister is himself given power to
direct combination by order if, after enquiry, it seems to him
(6)
that this would be in the public interest.
These combinations are. particularly useful in the case
of certain spoolflc services such as Fire, Police, Children and
Peter, but through they are indicative of the tendency towards
larger groupings, they go only a little way in the required dire¬
ction. There must, too, result a lessening of administrative
control/
(d) Local Government (Scotland) Act# 1947. sections 119-130.
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control, indeed of x->ukli° Interest, where such ad hoc arrangements
operate.
*\hat is needed at the present time is a long, hard look
et the local government system, and an objective reappraisal of its
administrative boundaries and the functions carried out within
those boundaries, and in assessing the worth of the present grant
system it is necessary to relate it to possible developments in
this direction.
Reform along such lines has been under discussion for a
number of years, although in Scotland the saiae urgency has notb
been attached to the matter as in the rest of the country.
Scotland, is, of course, essentially different from the rest of
the United Kingdom in these matters with the*mass of her popula¬
tion clustered in the lowland industrial belt, and the remainder
spread thinly over the rest of the country; with her highland
problem and the quite special features presented by the tangle
of islands that circle her; with her preoccupation with remote¬
ness. South of the Border there Is nothing like this.
In England, the government, after exhaustive consulta¬
tion with the representatives of the local authorities, is at
(7)
present engaged in preparing to implement recent legislation
designed to bring the local government system up to date, and
since it is possible that Scotland may wish to take the opportunity
of similarly reviewing her system, it may be useful here to outline
what/
.....Ml m --| !■ imp I w - -rr ~r - — 1 " — - - ~ " 11 —mn »m» «■»«. ■■ mn <mmm * ■
(7) Local Government Act 1958. Part TI
what has been done In England and Wales*
Under the Local Government Act of 1888, a borough
could be granted county borough status if it had a population
over 50,000 and counties could erfcehd their boundaries by con¬
sent of the Local Government Board, confirmed by Parliament*
(8)
Later, in 1926, as a result of the Onslow Commission*s recommend¬
ations, 75,000 was stipulated as a minimum population and the
creation of new county boroughswas to be effected by Private Act
of Parliament* County Councils were to review their areas at
specified intervals and recommend to the responsible Minister of
the Government any changes thought fit in county district boundar¬
ies. Between 1931 and 1987 many small authorities were amalgamated
as a result of such reviews.
In 1945, a Local Government Boundary Commission was set
up, but having made certain proposals which were not at that time
acceptable to the Government, it was dissolved in 1949. The
question of reform still remained, however, and under pressure
from the local government representatives in England and -Wales,
the government proceeded to a review of the areas and status of
(9)
local authorities. The government's proposals, which have since
been carried into effect by the Local Government Act of 1958, were
to set up separate Local Government Commissions for England ana for
Vteles to make appropriate recommendations as to reform* It will
be/
(8) Local Government (County Boroughs and Adjustments) Act, 1926*
(9) Areas and Btatus of Local Authorities In England and Wales.
Grand . 9831. 1956.
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be the ta3k of these Commissions to consider the division*
amalgamation, alteration and extension of counties, hear applic¬
ations for the promotion of boroughs with pdnulations in the
region of 100,000 to county borough status, and for the extension
of the boundaries of existing county boroughs. On the basis of
their recommendations the Minister of Rousing and Local Government
may submit to Parliament Orders giving effect to thera.
Any wholesale reform, therefore, is likely to be spread
over a considerable period and to proceed piecemeal. It is,
however, intended that each Order presented to Parliament should
cover a substantial portion of the country - a so-called special
review area - so that an overall assessment can be made of the eff¬
ects of the proposed changes, with provisions for standstills over
a period of years after each, issue in a particular area has been
settled.
Of particular interest to Scotland in these proposals for
reorganisation are the views of the government on the smaller
authorities, for this as much as anything, with the possible
exception of spar sity, is Scotland* s problem. These small author¬
ities are in a special uosition because of their Charters, and it
is the government's view that "every effort should be mad© to
preserve, so far as possible, their identity and dignities."
This view, however, should not preclude amalgamation with a larger
authority if, after enquiry, the Minister gives his specific con¬
sent to the alteration*
So/
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So far as Scotland is concerned the trend towards larger
groupings would be likely to result, over the next twenty years, in
the dissolution of a number of the smaller burghs, with a resulting
extension of the boundaries of counties and counties of cities.
<10)
This would normally be carried out under existing procedure; by
agreement between the councils concerned, and following a .poll of
the local electors, a petition would be presented to Her I ajesty
in the case of a royal burgh, or to the Secretary of State in other
cases, and a confirming order, ratified by Parliament would follow.
The small burgh would then merge into the landward area of the county
and would lose its separate identity.
<j J
It will thus be seen that agreement between the authorities
is the essence of these arrangements; unless a small burgh is a
willing party it would be extremely difficult to dissolve. If,
however, the local electorate could look forward to reduced county
rates, partly because the county, being a much larger organisation,
cou^d carry out their functions more cheaply, partly because the
county might be prepared to operate a system of differential rating
for a time at anyrate, and partly perhaps because the county as a
whole was below standard and so received the benefit of substantial
equalisation grant, then there would be an obvious incentive to
willing dissolution.
At all events, as has been remarked, no change of this
nature can fail to have its effect on finance. The inhabitants
of/ ,
'•'! — '— •— — .... i... '
(10) Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947. Section 134.
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of a dissolved small burgh are likely to be either better off
or worse off in terms of grant participation, and this faotor FIMgCJAL
Tmplxca
is bound to weigh in any negotiations towards integration. f'tcMs
In a discussion concerning the viability of existing
local authorities the question is inevitably raised: is there
an optimum size for the local unit? Population in itself, of
course, is but one of the factors which have to be thought about;
(11)
equally important arc the other criteria already referred to.
But since throughout the discussion it is individuals with whom we
are primarily concerned, population figures may provide a convenient
rule of thumb. Particularly is this of importance when it is
recalled that population is the main criterion in general grant and
so will influence any authority's share in the grant.
A reasonablemliiiiwm size for a small burgh, for instance,
might be 10,000, other factors being considered, while 30,000 might
serve as a guide for large burghs. Population densities of this
order would probably be able to provide rateable values on the aver¬
age capable of supporting the required administrative staffs.
Counties of citie3, as we have noted, are considered at the present
time to require populations of not ranch, less than 100,0X) - double
the requirements of seventy years ego. All our Scottish counties
of cities have greater populations than this. Some have consider¬
ably mo:e, to the extent that, unable to spread its boundaries
further, a city may find itself obliged to spill some of Its bound¬
ary population over into the conjoining authority's area. This
problem/
.inii! —■in*.iHim—hW" mm «n— mi niniiinii— ■ " mum • m «■! i» wnWumwrn mmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm mm
{11) page 3.
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problem has for long been acute, for example, in the Glasgow area and
in the Clyde valley generally, where the city of Glasgow has used the
powers given in the Housing and Town Development (Scotland) Act 1957
to enter into overspill agreements with receiving authorities as far
afield as Dunbar and Stranraer so as toprovide housing accommodation
and other services for its population furth of its own boundaries, a
clumsy administrative expedient which cannot do otherwise than aggra¬
vate the already difficult financial position, and emphasise the
urgent necessity for a general review of local boundaries in Scotland.
A similar situation, too, will arise where new towns, such
as those at Glenrothes, Cumbernauld and East Kilbride, are sought to
be developed and efforts are made to attract to them new industry
and existing populations from other areas. From what has been said
it is obvious that planning of this kind must be done with a clear
understanding of the financial repercussions wen in mind, for apart
from the resulting shift in rateable value and population, there may
be an equivalent shift in grant eligibility.
This thought leads us to the proposition that general grant
makes it necessary to consider not just a simple financial relationship
between the central government and each individual local authority,
but the far more complex financial relationships which exist between
authorities inter so. These are far-reaching and difficult matters which
would in any case form the subject of an entirely separata enquiry;
we are here concerned primarily with the grant aspect of the
question. It is likely to be the case, however, that no one authority
which finds itself involved over the next twenty years in these problems
of extension, dissolution, reorganisation and overspill can have
at its command the technical knowledge and information required to form a
complete/
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oaaplote and overall inpression of the effecta of change*
Jor this reason, It would mm. logical to set up a
permanent Scottish committee on local government finance which
would collect the statistical information necessary and bo pre*
pared to give a detailed analysis, in each revision arising, of
thp» probable results and repercussions, financial, social and
economic* There is no such committee at the present time, although
the Scottish Borne Department, in consultation with the local author*
itiea, would no doubt attempt some analysis along mich lines in
major cases* This will hardly be enough during any possible forth*
cosing period of reform* A ooiamittoo which meets once n. month and
which is composed of members who ocm devote only a mmll tart of
their time to its ptoblcaas, and who are in any event liable them*
selves to change, is unlifeely to be effective for the purpose*
what is 3"oquired is such a committee organised by the local author¬
ities themselves, but fully supported and assisted by th«« central
government, and until a 11ason ooBsaittee of this hind exists we
shall be working to a large extent In the dark as far as local fin¬
ance is concerned*
There remains the question with which wo began, that of
the usefulness of local government in the reformed state
envisaged* Ac was indicated, there socma little doubt
that the local govorament system is useful enough bo retain*
But is it sufficiently dynamic to give the best results of which
it is capable? Such results can be obtained only If those on
whom the system depends, the local electors, are prepared an a
civic duty and an a right to take a keen sad critical interest
in the running of the system* If they are not the system may
continue to work, but it will lack the life and driving force
which/
187
which 3hould be its mainspring.
Ft is true to say that many local councils have this
driving force behind them; attendance at their council meetings
reveals a vigour in the handling of local affairs that is alto¬
gether healthy and desirable. There are still citizens who are
public spirited enough to perform these duties voluntarily, and
they are supported by staffs who are second to none. There are
other councils whose members have retrained for years in office
without contest, councils, too, where it is well nigh impossible
to persuade local inhabitants to stand for election, where council
business is largely a matter of routine, and where the local
electorate is 30 apathetic at election time as to show polls of
under thirty per cent. It is dangerous to generalise in these
matters; the most that can be said is that some authorities are
good and others are bad.
How to encourage local electors to take a fresh ana
continuing interest in their affairs? Pbchortation alone is
likely to be valueless; there must be some xaore compelling spur,
and this spur is finance. If the individual feels that by his own
positive action he can influence the amount he pays out in rates,
he will be led to take that action.
It was partly with this and in view that the new general
grant arrangements wore drawn up, for by giving local councils inc¬
reased financial independence in the spending of grant monies it is




absent up to now. Given such interest the problem of the form of
local government may well solve itself.
Some critics of the general grant would take this to be
a naive view. The introduction of the new grant, they would say,
simply represented a rather shabby attempt on the part of the
government to throw off their responsibilities on to the local
authorities, at the same time as effecting economies. This view
is not acceptable.
General grant is part of the future pattern of a new and
more efficient system of local government, and as much as the re¬
vision of boundaries and the building up of more viable local units,
it is designed to bring new life into a system which was in danger of
becoming stale. Its success or failure in this respect will decide
whether its extension is justified.
(12) Local Government Finance in oootland, p»3. Grand.208.1957.
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9. - GRAHT 3YJT3!S ABROAD
I
In searching about for some measure of perfection
in systems of administration it has often been customary in
the past to look at the way3 in which similar problems are
dealt with in other countries. dueh comparisons may be valu¬
able in suggesting new approaches and in affording fresh points
CQMPA-
of view on topics which over the years have been seen always F.ATJW.
LOCAL
in the same contest. GOVFMm
M~NT
In 1956, for example, the Royal Institute of Public
Administration carried through a very comprehensive research
(1)
study which culminated in a published work, a supplement to
which described and compared the local financial systems of eleven
countries abroad. At first sight it would hero seam reasonable
to extend these enquiries in relation to systems of grant over a
wide variety of these countries.
Further reflection, however, leads to the conclusion
that the grant problem in this country is unique in that it depends
primarily upon the political and social system of the country as
reflected in its system of local administration - systems which have
evolved historically and which are now part of our life and tradi¬
tion. If it were ever possible to wipe the slate clean and start
afresh it is likely that our system might be differently arranged.
As/
(1) Hew Jourcos of Local Revenue, 1956 - Royal Institute of Public
Adrainistration Research Publication.
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As things are, however, this is hardly possible, and the fact remains
that our systems are in very few cases directly comparable with other
systems elsewhere.
In most of the Commonwealth countries, for example, direct
government grants to the local authorities are of relatively small
importance, for the reason that the local government system itself
has not been developed to any great extent. In Australia and Mew
Zealand local government has very limited functions, the main
services such es education, Health and.Police being provided either
by the central government or by delegated "ad hoc" boards. Even
in South Africa the central government contributes in grants to the
various authorities of the MrJLon a mere 7$ of their anual current
revenues.
Then, too, in certain of the more advanced European coun¬
tries where grant systems are well established, useful comparison
is made difficult because of the absence of a rating system upon
which our own grant system so closely depends.
How, then, do such countries finance their local
government expenditures? A general tabulation of these
ADDITIONAL
sources can be given, as follows: SOtteC^S OF
HILANCi;
Local taxes on land and buildings.
Local taxes on Income or Profits.
Miscellaneous minor local taxes.
Assigned tax revenues.
Surcharges on State taxes.
Central Covernraent grants.




Their relative importance is seen from the following
comparison:
Local tax on land
and buildings
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28 55.5 23 15.5 20.2 38
r~W*- IH 19 27.7 9 34.5 32.4 27
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
X includes 23$ in respect of surcharge on the State
"Value added" tax.
"'he year 1953 is shown for all countries to preserve
uniformity.
From an examination of these figures it is possible to
say that while in the United Kingdom local authorities finance
their activities from rates, grant and other income, the contin¬




(a) local taxes on income and profits.
(b) minor local taxes.
(c) assigned revenues.
and (d) surcharges on State taxes.
The volume of each of these additional sources varies
considerably from one country to another - in France, for example
the surcharge system of "Centimes additionals" is of main import¬
ance, while in the Scandinavian countries it is the local income
tax which provides the authorities with much of their revenue.
Since, however, it will later be necessary to consider the possibi¬
lity of adopting any of these methods in this country we must now
examine thorn more closely. For this purpose two countries with
dissimilar systems have been selected because between thorn they
combine all the additional sources of revenue mentioned, and the
financing of local government within these countries will now be
described.
These are Holland and Norway•
11
In Holland, where local government is organised DUTCH
L(JC"L
nominally on a two-tier basis of 999 municipalities and 11 dinTHHtFS
provinces, there has been considerable experimentation in
the past in the finding of suitable methods of local finance.
At the present time those methods are quite varied and include
three of the "additional sources" we have cited.
Apart from service charges, fees^ interest and trading
profits, accounting in all for some 25 per cent of local revenues,
the/
the sources of municipal finance have been as follows:
Local Surcharges Direct enterprise Payments Total











68.6 23.8 0.3 7.3 100
1933 11.1 34.9 19.5 - 34.5 100
1943 13.6 28.8 0.1 17.9 39.6 100
1950 9.8 12.3 0.3 24.3 53.3 100






Xinoludes local income tax, discontinued in 1929.
In the table items of tax income are grouped together.
The relative importance of each group is apparent over the span
of years chosen. The decline in local taxes, and the corresponding
increase in State-administered municipal fund subventions, can be
seen only too clearly. Since these increasing subventions from
State resources are directly reflected in ever-increasing State
control and intervention in local affairs, the trend of the figures
reflects a growing cause of contention.
Perhaps the most striking fact brought out by the table
is the very small contribution nowadays made by purely local taxes:
a point which will be referred to later. Meanwhile, these local
(3)
taxes may be considered in further detail. They are as follows:
Surcharge on two state taxes. Advertisement tax.
Street and canal tax. Dog Tax.
Benefit Tax# Non-residents tax*
Fire Insurance tax. Hotel licence fees-
entertainment tax. Liquor licence fees.
Surcharges/
(2) Oud Committee Report, November, 1954.
(3) See Commissi© Voor die Techniek der Gemeentelijke
Belastingverordeningen, 1956.
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Surcharges, besides yielding the major part of SU CHAR0713
AlfS
the local tax income of the municipalities and the whole ASSIGNED
tsossr
of that of the provinces, are the only local tax at all
comparable with the local rates levied. In the United Kingdom.
Municipalities are permitted to make these surcharges on the
land tax and the personal tax - two taxes levied by the State
but collected locally. The principal and the surcharge are
both paid by the State direct to the municipalities, as assigned
revenues.
Land Tax is assessed on owners of both vacant and built-
up land, the basis being valuations fixed on average values over
the period 1875-81 for vacant land and 1892-96 ft>r built-up land,
and the rates of tax being 8 per cent, and 4*86 per cent, of these
respective valuations* The comparative method is used in fixing
values for new properties, and revaluations are made only if there
have been substantial improvements- The municipalities may levy
a surcharge on the land tax up to a maximum of 30 per cent, of the
yield of the tax on vacant land and up to 60 per cent* of the yield
of the tax on built-up land. The provinces may levy a surcharge
on the land tax up to a maximum of 60 per cent.
The personal tax is levied on occupiers of all premises
other than offices, shops and factories. The basis of this tax is
the annual hypothetical rent on a comparative test, or 6 per cent,
of the capital value of the property. Certain deductions are made
from the assessed value according to the type of municipality in¬
volved. The tax is levied at the rate of 4.25 per cent, plus 1.5
per cent./
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per cent, on the sales value of any furniture on the premises* less
a deduction of 300 guilders. An allowance is made for children*
The municipality may levy a surcharge on this personal tax, but at a
rate exceeding 80 per cent* of the yield of the tax only if it is
also levying the surcharge on the land tax at the maximum rate.
In fact a few authorities are now levying surcharges at rates exceed¬
ing 200 per cent*
The Street and canal tax is an optional municipal KINOF;
IgCAL
tax which lias been increasingly used. It is assessed on TAXvS
the owners of properties adjoining public roads or waterways,
the purpose being to raise a contribution towards the maintenance
of streets and canals. The valuations for this tax are based on
rental values of the frontaging sites, either vacant or built-up
(as for land tax).
The benefit tax .is levied on owners of properties who
have derived direct benefit from public works improvements. The
tax may be charged only for a maximum of thirty years from the com¬
pletion of such works.
fhe fire insurance tax is levied by the larger municip¬
alities on properties as a contribution towards the cost of the
fire brigade service.
The other optional taxes which are available to the
municipalities include entertainment tax, a dog ta?, a tax on
certain advertisements (not including those which appear in news¬
papers), a built-up sites tax and a non-resident tax on persons
who spend at least ninety nights in the year in a municipality to
which/
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which they do not belong.
There is a noticeable absence of elasticity and importance
about all these looal taxes. It Is impossible for a municipality,
for example, to balance its budget by simply raising the rates of
tax - it must look to the central government for assistance, and
municipal administration tends in consequence to lose much of its
authority and any real independence.
There is in existence a fund called the municipal HIS
Mfecig*
fund, fed by a percentage of the proceeds of a number of Ah'"'FPnD
State taxes and used to make advances to the municipalities.
This fund is of central importance in Dutch local finance.
It was created in 1929, at the time when the municipal income
tax was discontinued because it was in conflict with the State
income tax and because of its lack of uniformity in assessments
from one section of the community to another.
The Municipal .Fund is administered by the Ministries of
the Interior and Finance with the assistance of an advisory council,
which includes representatives of the local authorities. Each year
the States General - Parliament.- fix the percentage to be taken
from the following State taxes and paidinto the Fund:
Income tax Directors' tax
Property tax Turnover tax
Corporate tax Import licences
Salary tax Excise duties
Dividend tax Stamp duties
Registration duties Succession duties
The percentage varies from year to year - for 1956, 11#?
per cent, was proposed, with an additional 4.15 per cent, in lieu of
a/
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charge on the enterprise tax formerly accruing to the municipal¬
ities. Any balance left after distributing the fund among the
municipalities is retained in the fund as a reserve.
For 1955, the total tax and grant income of the
municipalities was estimated as follows, and the magnitude of the
(4)
transfer from the Municipal Fund, will be observed:
(in thousands of guilders)
Proceeds of land tax ... ... ... ... 30,572
Surcharge on land tax.. ... ••• ... ... * 53,173
Proceeds of personal tax .. ... ... ... ... ... 24,663
Surcharge on personal tax.. ... ... ... ... ... ... 37,300
145,707
Local Tax Income.•• ... ... ... ... ... ... 67,000
Supplementary payments in lieu of discontinued
enterprise tax ... ... ... •«* ... ... ... ... 15,679
Municipal Fund payments:
General Payment ... .... ... ... §80,147
Tax Payment... *. ... ... 360,779
940,936
1,169,312 (4)
The present method of apportioning the municipal fund among
the municipalities is by means of a general payment and a tax
Payment:/




(1) A payment towards the salaries of the Burgomaster
and a secretary up to a maximum payment of 4,500 guilders, or,
for municipalities with a population of less than 5,000, up to
a maximum payment of 6,000 guilders or 75 per oent. of the
salaries, whichever is the smaller.
(2) A payment of 125 per oent. of the general and spec¬
ial payments received by the municipality in 1952. Phis payment
is calculated partly on average expenditure per inhabitant on
education and public assistance in 1939, 1940 and 1941. It can
also be used to cover a deficit in the budget of a municipality.
The grant is given as a fixed sum for every Inhabitant, though
the sums vary from one municipality to another.
(3) A further speoial payment may be received by a
municipality which proves that it has incurred special expenditure
or made important basic changes; the grant is given on a so-
called subjective basis. The payment is investigated by the
central government.
(b) Taxation Payment
This payment is designed to replace the former surcharge
made by municipalities on the discontinued enterprise tax. It is
calculated as 125. per cent, of the yield of the surcharge in 1950,
less 40 per cent, of the yield of the land and personal taxes, and
is given on a per capita basis.
These methods of apportioning the municipal fund are
generally acknowledged to be inadequate, mainly on the grounds
that they do not adequately reflect the individual requirements
of municipalities which vary widely in size and type, and a
better measurement of needs is looked for. The issue is one




although a permanent advisory committee on ATTEMPTS
To JIPRQV^
municipal finance exists to assist the appropriate #15 '3Y£>ffrf!
government departments, the Central Government
appointed in 1946 a special oornmittee under the chairman¬
ship of Professor P. I, Oud, the then Burgomaster of Rotter¬
dam, whose terms of reference were to inquire whether it would
be possible and practicable to effect a division of financial
burdens between the central government and the municipalities,
or whether changes in the division of functions should be made
by transferring a number of municipal services to the central
government.
The Oud Committee, which includes representatives of
the provinces# the municipalities, and the Ministries of Finance
and of the Interior, has already issued a number of reports and
has made various recommendations* In the first report, issued
in 1947, the Committee was unable to recommend any major re¬
distribution of functions because the position at that time was
constantly changing in respect of the most important services*
it was a period of the most energetic post-war reconstruction,
and the Committee felt that governamnt should have access to all
possible financial resources. Moreover there was not then
enough data on which to base new taxation proposals. The
Committee therefore recommended an increased use of the Muni¬
cipal Fund system and it was suggested that the fund should be
financed by a share of 'twelve national taxes - the taxes earlier
referred to - in addition to any other sources of revenue. In
short, the block grant system, was considered by the Committee to
be /
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bo preferable at that time to higher local taxation or to
iaereased ©pacific grants# Those proposals wore adopted by
the states General and the share of the twelve national taxes
was first fixed at 0 per cent#
The later reports of the oud Committee have been mainly
concerned with the share of national income which the Municipal
Fund should absorb, and the Hading of a formula for its dis¬
tribution#
In the following table an attempt Is made to compare
the payments from Stat© resources in aid of municipalities in
Foliand with similar payments in Gront Britain# The figures
shown are percentages of the respective national incomeo, and
while the comparison can only bo a rough one, a certain correspon¬
dence will be seen#
CJKFAgiaqH OF ;-X:~ AHD GJ-AHT fflCW,,-,
tftsj,qg. vkkmq)
1940 1949 193o 1951, 195.1 1955 1954 ourooa






taxes *»* 3.3 3*3 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.8 3.9 {8)
(b) Britain - Total
grants paid to
local author¬
ities ... 3.7 3.6 2*5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 {6)
(c) Britain/
(5) Be finanoiele Verhouding tusson hot ' ijk en d© gcaaeonten,
1953-1957
(6) Blue Book on National Income and Fxpeaditure for 1936.
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CQMPAi.JSON OF I .ATS AND GRAM* INCOMU3
(as percentages of the national income)
1948 1949 1950 1951 1953 1953 1954 Sources
(c) Britain - Block
grant payments
alone ... 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (7)
(d) Britain - Total
of all grants







local taxes... 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.5 (9)
Up to nov; it has p: oved exceedingly difficult to find a
proper yardstick of needs in allocating the fund among the munici¬
palities. Indeed, since municipal budgets are draxvn up in advance
and in ignorance of what will be forthcoming by way of specific
grant the tendency is for municipalities to budget for a deficit
and hope that it will be covered by an advance from the municipal
fund. Central control thus tends to be exercised through willing¬
ness or otherwise to cover the deficit. The position is acknow¬
ledged to be unsatisfactory - indeed, the Minister of the Interior,
in a recent circular, warned municipalities not to draw up their
budgets on the supposition that they would be balanced by a special
extra grant.
(10)
recent proposals of the Oud Committee have been for a new
municipal/
(7) and (8) Blue aook on National Income and expenditure for 1955.
(9) De financiele Yerhouciing tussen hot Ri jk en de gemeonten
1953-1957.
(10) Comiai3sie kerstel financiel Uelfstandigheid gemeenten en
fnovincien: Rerkrr-hs of Wnwcraw i »- a *
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municipal tax with certain maximum limits at low proportional rates
to be assessed and collected by the municipalities* The estimated
revenue from this so-called dwo11ing-place tax would be from 3 per
cent, to 9 per cent, of present local revenues. The obvious in¬
tention of this new tax is to restore a measure of financial ind¬
ependence "oo the municipalities, which over the years have more
and more tended to rely on subventions from the centre. It is
worth noticing that there were five members of the Committee who
could not agree with the proposal, feeling it to be an anachronism.
The disadvantages of state control are well recognised,
however, and there is a strong fooling that positive steps will
have to be taken to restore the balance. Side by side with these
new proposals there has been put forward by the Oud Committee an
entirely new conception of the municipal fund and the relations
between the State and local government. These ideas, which it
is hoped will be brought in for 1959 and subsequent years, may be
summer i sed *
1. The municipal fund should be used to make the following pay¬
ments to municipalities:
(a) Advance payments in connection with:
(1) the cost of social services;
(3) the cost of education;
(3) the equalising of local tax income as between one
authority and another.
(It is intended to replace (1) and (3) in the long
run by payments directly from the Exchequer.)
(b) A general payment on a sliding scale, but with equalising
factors included.
3. There should be an improvement in the share of State resources
made available to local authorities.
3. There should be an increase in the range of local tax income
of municipalities through the introduction of the new local income
tax already mentioned.
In essence, the problem is not one which is unique to
Holland/
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Holland. We are as familiar in the United Kingdom with arguments
for State control of certain services and the division of financial
responsibility between the central and local authorities as we are
with the difficulties Inherent in a system of block grants and
their equitable apportionment over all sections of the community.
We have experience of the post-war transfers of functions - for
example, the Health Services and National Assistance - from looal
to central government, with the consequent readjustment of ex¬
chequer subsidy. Such readjustments are a necessary concomitant
of any major shift in the relationship between local and central
functions.
The fundamental problem of grants exists in Holland as
elsewhere; specific grants, while helpful in developing local
services, are costly and tend to central interference; general
grants, on the other hand, while giving the local authorities a
freer hand, tend to be inflexible and to fall short of needs.
The responsibilities of every municipality in the
Netherlands have increased enormously in recent years, yet their
independent revenues are insignificant.
For itw own part, the central government, aiming, as a
matter of policy, at avoiding over-close State control, has had
recourse to block grants relatively fixed in amount. Yet these





Local government In Norway has many points of NQR'VKGIAN
L-)0'"-L
similarity to the Scottish system and Jhay be more rWmuss
quickly described* The country is divided into 18
counties (fylke) and 04 burghs (byor); within the counties
these are some 680 rural districts, or "herredene". In
addition there are the two counties of cities of Oslo and
Bergen. All these authorities have power to levy a local tax.
The local government system is, by contrast to some
of the Commonwealth countries earlier referred to, very highly
developed, the total of local government expenditures being
some 40$ of the total of all central and local government expendi¬
ture. Together with the usual services local authorities operate
water, gas and electricity undertakings as well as housing, many
restaurants and ciaetaas.
ith the exception of the counties, which have respons¬
ibility for the main roads, secondary education and health services,
raising a local tax on land and buildings to meet the cost, the
local authorities have for nearly eighty years financed their
activities principally by the levy of a local income tax. Asses¬
sments are made and collected by these authorities both for the
local Income tax and the central government* s income tax, and It is
interesting to observe that the yield of the former exceeds that of
the letter. In fact, the local income tax in Norway was a local
tax before It was also adopted as a State tax.
Of secondary importance the burghs, like the counties, must,
and the districts may raise money by the levy of the tax on land
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Apart from a few very Elinor local taxes, such as entertainments
tax, dog tax and harbour clues, these are the main sources of Mar-
weigan local revenues: the local income tax (6&p)» and the local
(11)
tax on land and buildings (2- .). The bulk of the remainder of local
revenue is derived from grants from the central government (83;'},
these being meinly specific grants for education, pensions and
family allowances, public health and highways.
As well as these grants for specific purposes further grants
of a general nature may be paid to particular authorities which
have a high burden of local taxation, or which are finding- diffic¬
ulty in maintaining standards. Such payments, which are in effect
equalisation grants, are made to the counties and burghs from an
Apportionment Fund administered by the Minister of Local Government.
The counties then reapportion their share among the districts*
The/
(11) Statist!sk Gentabyra: Hasjonafcegnskap. 1938 and 1948 - 195 3,
as reproduced in Mew Sources of Local revenues (Supplement),
1956*
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The Apportionment Fund is fed from;
(a) 30$ of a local surtax on incomes
above Kr. 30t000.
(b) a local surtax on shipping companies.
(o) payments by the State.
fd) reinvested interest of the fund.
The local income tax is charged on both income and capital
of individuals and companiess and there is a further surtax on
incomes above 30,000 Jsroner per annum. One return for both
local and State income tax is made by the taxpayer, and where the
taxpayer is resident in one area but derives part of his income
from a different area he will be taxed on that part by the second
local authority. Tax rates levied are proportional and central
approval is required for tax rates on income in excess of l?.5$i
Collection is made during the year for that year's tax and final
adjustment is made in the following year.
The capital tax is levied at low rates - about 0.4$ - on
land, buildings and other property, while the surtax rates are
from 3 - 5$. In addition, shipping companies are charged to tax
at a standard rate for the whole country* the yield being paid
into the Apportionment Fund for redistribution as has been des¬
cribed.
In these grant arrangements attention must be drawn to a
point of some importance. In Norway where local and central
government are possibly more closely integrated than in any
European country, and where it may fairly be said that local and
central taxes are more consciously based on ability to pay than
in the United Kingdom, state grants are still of importance. It
has often been assumed in this country that a local income tax
would solve all the grant problems, but here, despite the conslderabl
part/
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part which the ability to pay principle plays in local finances, the
ratio of government grant to total local authority incomes still
remains high at 23$. Much of this must be attributed to the equali¬
sation of local needs and resources, coupled with the highly local¬
ised nature of central administration.
Holland and Norway, then serve to illustrate contrasting
administrative and financial systems which, though differing con¬
siderably from, each other end from our own, have this in common
that they each seem to do the same thing - provide national social
services locally.
Is there, perhaps, something wo can learn from these
systems? For example, can we borrow some of these methods of raising
local finance with a view to providing income sources alternative
or additional to our own rating system? Could some assignment of
State taxes along the lines of the Dutch model bo introduced with
advantage in this country? The chapter which follows will ex¬
plore these possibilities; it should be regarded as an extension
of the present discussion.
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10. - OTHER SOURCES OF LOCAL REVENUES
Earlier in this thesis (1) it was argued that the rating
system, while it was well enough suited to its function of provid¬
ing local finance, was not in itself sufficient. This was so
because it was the only system of tax available to the local
authorities and thus sufi'oired from the drawback of any single
tax - it attracted criticism. "Of all British prejudices, the
belief that local rates should never rise, whatever may happen to
other prices end taxes, is the most deeply rooted".
it was therefore thought that alternative sources of
revenue must be explored, and to this end tiie previous chapter has
described some of the systems of local finance which are found in
other countries. As has been seen, local government in these
countries enjoys four main additional sources of revenue not avail¬
able in the United Kingdom, and these ares
(a) Miscellaneous minor local taxes.
(b) Assigned btate taxes.
(c) Surcharges on State taxes.
(d) Local income taxes.
"e must now ask ourselves whether any of these could
usefully be applied in this country to supplement the rating system,
or whether indeed there may not be soxae other source so far untried.
In doing so it will be well to remember that the strength of the





in its comparative simplicity - rates, grant and other income.
Administrative simplicity is something that should not lightly
be abandoned, and this would inevitably be the result if v/e MISC7XL
AljEQUa
augmented the rating system with additional minor local UrIIJP '
h !-• ' L
taxes* 'fffetSs
dome of these have already been described and nearly
every continental country has made use of than* In the
United States of America, in particular, considerable ingen¬
uity has been shown in devising such sources and their variety
can be seen from the following list:










Motor vehicle and ptstrol tax.
hotel occupancy tax.
Site-value tax.
Taxes on windows and nameplates.
etc.
The principal feature of most of these minor taxes is
that they raise but a relatively small fraction of total revenues.
The administrative inconvenience of assessing and collecting a
multitude of such minor taxes, coupled with the irritance to
ratepayers, hardly seems to be justified by their possible yield.
This yield moreover is largely inelastic for in most of
the local taxes listed above there is little possibility of expansion
beyond/
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beyond a certain limit. Nevertheless, most of them have from time
to time been intensively studied, and sometimes, as for example in
the case of the poll tax or the site value tax, hailed as a possible
new source# But none of them in itself seems to provide the answer
for which we are looking#
In that case, therefore, would It serve our purpose
any better to endeavour to have some State tax handed over
for local purposes? This, as a method of giving grants,
has dready been tried in this country between 1689 and 1989, ASSIGNED
and was proved a failure. This may of course have been "
simply due to the particular method used in applying the
system at the time, although as a control instrument such a method
could not compare with present systems. The assignment of state
taxes for the purposes of local government is a method which is
used, as has been seen, in Holland,where it works well enough.
It is curious, too, how the idea of the assignment of revenues
persists in the public mind. One still commonly hears the view
expressed by many motorists that whereas they contribute in motor
taxation over a hundred millions of pounds annually, only a ana11
fraction of this is returned to thera through the Road Fund in new
roads. As we have seen, specific taxes have not for- many years
b^en applied to specific purposes that will benefit the contributor.
It is true to say that the government of this country has
not been prepared to risk a second failure in this direction. As
the S^rn Committee of 1954 remarked, "the assignment of specific
revenues to particular purposes is not in accordance with modern




Government Finance in .Scotland made it clear that the government
"do not believe it right to earmark for the direct benefit of
local authorities any tax which is now levied nationally.n In
order to make any scheme of assigned revenues operate satisfact-
(4)
orily it was claimed it would be necessary to give the local
authorities freedom to alter the level of the tax locally, which
would not be an attractive prospect, and would nullify attempts at
equalisation. It is difficult to see why this should in fact be
necessary, though it would be andorstandable in the case of a sur¬
charge on a otate tax. On the other hand the whole basis of State
grants in this country rests on the idea that they should be paid
out of the Consolidated Fund which is fed from the proceeds of many
taxes. To divert a given tax from the Fund and switch its product
to the localities whence it originated for local purposes could
only reduce the effectiveness of multiple and compensatory taxation.
Surcharges on State taxes would carry similar
drawbacks for they are in effect a form of assigned revenue. STOCgAgOE
UB JTATx
These drawbacks can be visualised clearly enough if we ear- life's
mark in imagination a State tax, such as for example the
entertalaments duty on cinemas with its yield of approximately
£20 millions, and allow the local authorities to levy additional
percentages upon the yield in their areas, not exceeding a limit
of say
Central control over local spending would be impaired for
the/
(3) Cmnd. 208. tTuly 195?,
(4) Hansard, 30th July, 1957. Mr* Henry Brooke.
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the local authorities would h©V© to have freedom to adjust their
own levels of the surcharge# Furthermore, uniformity would be
lost for one authority might be levying a surcharge of 3f while
its neighbour was raising the loasimm of by. Then, too, urban
authorities would benefit at the expense of rural areas where
cineraa entertainments were not so well provided# Local budget-
ting also would be complicated by the parasitic action of the
surcharge which would vary with the yield of the prinicpal tax#
Most important of all, perhaps, would be the danger that
marginal local surcharge rates would lead to a drop in the demand
for entertainment and so endanger the yield of the principal State
tax itself.
The idea of a local income tax, however, is a much more
attractive one than any of the alternative sources so far LOCAL
■lAOOiff;
described, and thinking over the choice of methods that
could be used to raise local finance, one comes back again
and again to the realisation that here in a local income tax is
what could be the ideal solution# If such a local income tax
were superimposed on the national income tax it Is claimed that
it would bring the "ability to pay" principle finally into local
taxation, and while preserving the independence of local authorities,
could eliminate the need for government grants, apart from needs
equalisation contributions.
The tax could operate in one of two ways. Either the
rating system could be dispensed \?ith and replaced by a local income
tax/
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tax, or the rating system could be retained and supplemented by a •
local Income tax. The first of these two methods would be prefer¬
able. This is, of course, no new thought; local taxation committees
have for years lifted up this particular stone to see what was
underneath it, and in each case appear to have quietly dropped it
again, and turned to the rating system with a mixture of relief at
what was known, and regret at foregoing what was unknown* There
have been several notable schemes proposed for a local income tax,
but the necessary next step lias not so far been taken. The fact
is, the conception of a local income tax is so radical and would
involve such wide repercussions in other spheres of public finance
that the greatest of caution would need to be used in putting it
into practice. As always, regard must be had to the break-even
point of administrative advantage and political expediency.
A number of difficulties can readily be visualised.
For one thing the idea of progress!veness, despite its general
acceptability, is not necessarily a principle which can go unquestion¬
ed; it is not a fundamental lav/, perfect in itself. Objections
could be made, for example, that it is conducive to political ir¬
responsibility and that it weakens incentives. "The most distinct¬
ive and technical arguments advanced in its behalf are the weakest.
It is hard to gain much comfort from the special arguments, however
intricate their formulations, constructed on notions of benefit,
sacrifice, ability to pay or economic stability. The case has




(5) The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation - W» J. Blum and H.
Keiven, University of Chicago, 1953.
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Secondly, in introducing a local income tax it would
be necessary to overcome the confusion of interests that would
arise between the Inland Revenue and the local authorities, as
well as the effect on the public mind of burdening it with yet
another income tax. Less serious, perhaps, would be the tech¬
nical difficulties of assessment where an individual had income
sources and residence in more than one local tax area, and the
fact that many would avoid paying anything as their incomes
would be too small. Then, too, a grant system is in itself a
government control which would have to bo sacrificed if it were
to be replaced by local income taxation.
There are many other such difficulties - which in the
past have been described as ^insuperable'* - difficulties which
would have to be settled before any local income tax could serious¬
ly be considered# If we accept the objections, however, there
is little doubt that the principle is right, and there seems no
reason why an exhaustive study of the possibilities should not be
made at government level with long term aims in mind# The re¬
search team set up by the Royal Institute of Public Administration,
after a detailed examination of alternative sources of local revenue,
recorded their opinion in 1956 that a local income? tax at low rates
based on personal incomes was a feasible alternative to the rating
system, supplemented by a local entertainments tax and the reten¬
tion by the local authorities of motor licence duties.
Proposals therefore are not lacking as to what might con
stitute/
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constitute alternative sources of revenue to the local authorities.
Some of these - the civic lottery, for example - may be CHQIGS
•')?
politically undesirable; others, for a number of good
reasons, are unsuitable. One or two might be made to
work, but the difficulty is that this is not a choice
between good and bad systems, but between systems which each
have their own peculiarities and imperfections, so that in
giving up the rating system in favour of, say, a local income
tax, we should be exchanging a working system whose imperfections
we understood for a workable system with certain good features
and some imperfections too.
This choice between the lesser of two evils is typical
of the problem, where systems of finance are never wholly ideal.
"he Scottish Valuation and Rating Committee of 1954,
which is in many \*ays the key to subsequent developments in local
government finance in Scotland, found, after exhaustive enquiry,
that it was ''unable to propose any alternative or supplementary
method of raising money for local authority expenditure'1, and this
view was taken in issuing the 'hito Paper on Local Government
Finance in coot land in 1957, when it was made clear that "the
government, after thorough investigation, do not consider it
practicable to devise a satisfactory new source of local revenue."
These views, founded as they are on specialised sources
of information and arrived at by expert opinion, must command
respect. They are moreover long-term vlev?s, which are not in¬
tended to be modified for years, aid they leave us with the rating
system/
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system supplemented by government grants*
If, then, there is to be no new source of local finance,
can the existing ratine; system Itself be improved so as to give
a greater yield? The most obvious first line of approach here
would be to abolish the derating provisions of the Local Government
Act of 1929. At that time protection was afforded to agricultural
properties by exempting them from liability to rates to the extent
of 3even-eighths of gross annual value, while industrial and
freight transport properties were derated to the extent of 75
Both industry and agriculture were then in a depressed state and
the local authorities were partially compensated for this sub-
DKPJIT
sidising device by having their rate losses thereby brought into ILG
the block grant calculation. Over the years inflation ate into
this compensation, which was discontinued in any case when the
equalisation grant of 1948 was brought in.
There is no longer any real justification for the prot¬
ection of either agriculture or industry, and even if there were,
there is no reason to use the rating system for the purpose; the
national income tax could equally well be used, if it were necess¬
ary .
The Local government and Miscellaneous Financial provis¬
ions (Scotland) Act, 1958 provides for industrial and freight
transport re-rating to 50$ of net annual values, which on the basis
of rate poundages for 1956 - 57 will provide in Scotland an esti¬
mated additional rate revenue of about £2.3 million. The increased
rates payable by Industry will of course remain as an allowable
deduction/
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deduction for income tax and profits tax purposes, so that the yield
of national taxation will be reduced by an estimated half of the
increase in rate income* The government proposes, in consequence,
to reduce the level of grants to the local authorities by two-thirds
of this estimated £2*3 million, leaving Scottish local authorities
with a net gain of about £750,000.
One incidental effect of this increase in rateable
resources will be to reduce the total of Scottish equalisation grant
which is at present geared to the amount payable in England and
ffeles, but Instead of this reduction affecting areas which are likely
to derive benefit from industrial re-rating the reduction will be
applied generally according to the present equalisation grant for¬
mula. It is true that in fixing Scotland's total of general 'grant
this reduction has been taken account of but there is no correspon¬
dence between the two distribution bases. This adds point to the
argument in Chapter 7 for bringing equalisation grant on to a
United Kingdom basis as soon as possible so that future re-rating
will not require the same untidy treatment.
Partial re-rating is not enough. Derating is an anomaly
and an anachronism. The rating system should not be burdened in
this way, and if it is to be the only tax available to the local
authorities then it should be a clean tax without such complicating
features. Both agriculture and industry should be fully re-rated,
and if there must be a subsidy it should not be a "hidden" subsidy,
but one borne out of national taxation. On this occasion the
government are able to justify the two-thirds reduction of the
local authorities' estimated gain from the partial re-rating of
industry/
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industry on the general grounds that the level of grants to local
authorities is cm-rently too high in any case. This argument
will not be a good one in future revisions of the derating prov¬
isions.
There are undoubtedly other ways by which the
rating system could be improved, and a number of schemes AN
IMP! oygp
have been proposed over the years. One suggestion which HATING
seeras worthy of closer examination is for "rating on ability
to pay", a system developed by Mr. George Mitchell in a lecture
at Dudley on the 9th October, 1954, under which the local assess¬
ment on the individual would be based on a weighted rateable value,
the weighting being arrived at from his income and personal commit¬
ments. In this way the rating system, while being retained,
would have a degree of progress!veness brought into it which would
at least make the local authorities feel they were causing less
hardship to the individual in deciding to increase the rate, and
would at the same time make them less dependent on central grants.
Another less revolutionary approach would be to re¬
examine the discretion given to local authorities in the Valuation
and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956 to give relief for charitable occ¬
upations. It seems reasonable that if a charity occupies premises
it should pay occupiers' rates thereon, for if these premises were
occupied by some other person there would be no doubt as to the
charge. Any remission of rates made by the council at the request
of the charity's trustees simply represents a diminution of resources
and casts the burden on other ratepayers.
Gome councils refuse to exercise this discretion. In
1958/
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1958, for example, })unfermline Town Council refused to lower the
rates on buildings occupied by the Carnegie Trust and at that time
it was stated that "it is the general policy of the Council not to
(6)
grant a remission of rates to anybody whatsoever."
This view seams the right one. The rating system 3hould
not be eaten into by these subsidies which are never too clear to
ratepayers. If a contribution is to be made to charities it would
seem better that it should be a straightforward payment, preferably
by the individual, rather than one in the guise of rates relief.
It is not the intention of thi3 thesis to attempt to
discover new ways of providing local income; this i3 a separate
problem. But insofar as the problem bears on the grant system it
is necessary to record the opinion that it must be tackled and with
some degreee of urgency. We should now be looking ahead twenty or
thirty years, visualising the administration of local services
which will then exist and sifting out the alternative financial
systems to fit that administration, so that we find the best one.
(o) Compare with the decision in the Mersey Docks and I'arbour





In attempting now to bring together the multitude of
considerations which taken as a whole make up the grant system as
it applies to Scotland it must first be stated as clearly as poss¬
ible what we mean by two ideas which are very often the subjects
of misconception* These are, firstly, the nature of local govern¬
ment, and secondly, the nature of the relationship between Scotland
and England and hales.
Because these are ideas rather than terms they do not
lend themselves to rigid definition, and all along people tend to
find shades of meaning in them to suit their own purposes. Thus
it is that in approaching the problem of the financial aspect of
the central/local relationship wo so often find ourselves talking
at cross purposes and discussing matters which mean different
things to different people.
To a responsible official in a central government depart¬
ment in London, there might seem no great difficulty in this;
Scotland is simply a part of theUnited Kingdom and the local govern¬
ment system is a form of second-line civil service with delegated
authority to carry out services which by and large are a national
responsibility. For theoretical purposes our hypothetical official
might be prepared to modify this view to think of these relationships
as a "working partnership."
To/
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To the elected council of a Scottish local authority,
by contrast, the position may be seen in rather a different light.
To them Scotland may be viewed as a quite separate country with
its own history, traditions and institutions; there may well be
a certain mistrust of "Whitehall" and a hostility towards things
English. The local government system, too, may similarly be
regarded as pure local self-government, the administration of
which is regulated by legislation peculiar to Scotland. These are
both extreme views, but somewhere In between them no doubt lies the
popular conception.
In reality, both central and local government have the
same primary aim - the common good. Since for certain purposes
this goal can only bo achieved locally and since excessive central¬
isation Is in any case politically undesirable, a local government
system becomes a necessity, one which is naturally subject to the
control of central government as represented by Parliament from
which it derives its powers to act. Here, then, we have the core
of the relationship, which is seen to be truly a partnership, but
one in which the central government must inevitably be the dominant
partner.
In any close relationship of this type friction will
occasionally develop between the partners, and considerable tact
and understanding will at all times require to bo exercised,
particularly/
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particularly where, as in this ca3e, one of the partners is not a
single body but a group consisting of councils, each with its own
local interests ooloured by past traditioxis and present needs.
These issues should not be allowed to cloud the essential principle
upon which the system rests.
Feelings of nationalism or parochialism, too, however
unjustifiable, are as much as anything a dislike of centralised
administration which is deep-rooted in our people. Democracy is
more than a political theory; it is a basic need. Local indep¬
endence, then, is no mere catchword, but a prerequisite of that
form of effective government which will be acceptable to all.
If, then, there is to be loonl independence to manage
local affairs under the guidance and supervision of central govern¬
ment, this independence must imply the maximum possible freedom to
act and must be accompanied by a corresponding freedom to finance
these actions, for it would be useless to ask for local interest
unless this was stimulated by financial considerations. Without
such local Interest there can never by dynamic administration.
The local government system which has been postulated in
these few sentences, though fundamentally a simple one, is in
practice surrounded by complications. Yet it is a good one, and,
for our society, there is an inevitability about it that betokens
permanence. As a system it depends, as has been shown, on four
requirements, namely:
Central supervision
Central understanding of local needs




We may now move forward from this position to observe the working of
such a system in the practical administration of the services*
Tl
The education service provides us with a ready illustration
of the more detailed operation of the system described. Here is a
service which has strong claims to being considered a national one;
It would not be difficult to press such an argument home. At the
same time there is undoubtedly a local flavour' about the service,
the moreso when it is remembered that the administration of educa¬
tion in Scotland follows a different pattern reflecting different
local needs to that found in other parts of the country. If It
were expedient to overlook this "local™ element, education could
easily enough become a nationalised service and be financed wholly
out of national sources.
But it is not expedient; education is the largest of the
local government services and without it the local government system
would be reduced to a shadow without substance. *\nd, since the
local government system is to be regarded as a political necessity,
there can be no question of dealing with education save on the basis
of a central/local partnership.
Therefore, finance must bo provided out of national end
local taxation in an agreed and equitable manner, decidedon the
results of past experience of what sharing ratio achieves the
intention required, end grants will be paid by the government for
the purpose. How these grantswill be distributed will depend on
circumstances obtaining at any particular time - the need, for
example, to encourage the development of the service, or the recent
necessity to limit, or at anyrate to control expenditure; any
payment/
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payment, too, is capable of being made insuch a way that additional
purposes are served, and this practice is justified if it achieves
a primary aim* Historically, grants have been used for two pur¬
poses - for the development of services and for the relief of rates,
and the tendency has been for the latter to be consolidated period¬
ically.
Now, it has to be kept clearly in mind that while the State'
share of the cost of the service is met from national taxation, which
is uniformly based on accepted principles, the local share is met
from rates. These, being a single tax, suffer from a number of
drawbacks, but given an efficient system of resources equalisation
and assuming the rating system to be improved by re-rating and in
other ways, they would work well enough.
In any case, rates may be considered for thi3 purpose as
part of the total national tax structure which sets a certain ex¬
isting and accepted level of progressiveness, and this we must ass¬
ume to be a proper one. Any change in the method of local taxation,
such as the introduction©f a local income tax, would call for drastic
revision of the national tax structure so as to maintain approx¬
imately the same degree of progressivenoss.
For present purposes we must take the local government
system as we find it, and this involves an acceptance of the rating
system. Other forms of local taxation, and, in particular, a local
income tax, are rejected, partly because they do not enter into the
existing set of circumstances, and partly because there is no cer¬
tainty that their adoption would be beneficial. Assuming the correct
degree/
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degree of progressiveness to be introduced through grants, and in
particular through general grant, and given a system of equalisation
which is efficient, there is no reason why the rating system should
not work equally well if not better. From the government's point
of view a grant system gives a measure of control which would be
absent in a system of local income taxation# It is considered
desirable, however, that a detailed review should be instituted
so as to deterraine once and for all whether a local income tax
would in the future be a workable proposition. If we now include
with education all the other local authority services of a semi-nat¬
ional type, we may conclude that the net cost of these will be met
out of rates and grant, part of which will be set aside specifically
for resources equalisation.
Ill
We assume, therefore, a proportion of the national income
to be earmarked annually for the payment of those grants, and pro¬
ceed to distribute it among the local authorities. This may be
done in a variety of ways, but generally speaking the sura will be
transferred either
(a) specifically, for named services,
or (b) in general lump sums,
and (c) to give special aid where the need
is greatest.
Of these methods, (c) must be constant, but there is a
choice in using (a) or (b); this choice must rest with the govern¬
ment, who will exercise it bearing in mind the special character¬
istics of each type of grant and the circumstances in which the
total sum is being distributed.
The main characteristics of the various grants have been
noted/
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noted - the flexibility of percentage grants and their use in
developing services, the stimulus to local interest of general
grant, the fact that certain specific grants are directed at non¬
uniform functions or areas, like the afforestation grants* All
grants are primarily percentage grants in the respect that they
represent a percentage of total expenditure on services. In the
true percentage grant, however, there is no limit attached to this
expenditure; such a limit can bo fixed either by choosing to use
unit grants or general grants of the present type.
Little point is served in putting forward arguments in
support of the competing claims of percentage grants and general
grants to be considered "best"* Both have their purpose to fulfil.
We should concentrate rather on asking in respect of each service:
is development required, or is this a non- uniform service or one
applicable to one particular area? If this is the case, then a
percentage grant is called for. If not, the service should be
aided through general grant. It is tempting in this connection
to think in terms of "development grants" and "maintenance grants";
this is a simplification which does not tell the whole story, but
at least it provides a working principle.
As to unit grants, these are unlikely to have great impor¬
tance in the future. rIhey are neither true "development grants"
in that they lack the stimulus of a percentage grant, nor do they
have the advantages of general grant. Nevertheless, those that
exist at present - for example, the housing subsidies - must con¬
tinue till they fall out.
We/
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We are dealing, then, with a grant system, rather than a
series of isolated grants, and the decision to use this or that form
of grant at any time must re3t with the central governmentwhich, as
well as having final responsibility for the "common good", is also
alone in full knowledge of ell the circumstances. Beyond drawing
attention to grant characteristics, therefore, no informed comment
or criticism, can be made" here as to the merits of the methods and
emphasis from time to time employed.
At the present time adjustments to the grant system are
in process of being made, so that the central government*s control
over total expenditure on the services is now very much strengthened
by the creation of a fixed general grant in place of a number of
the percentage grants. The only services for which specific grants
will continue to be given will be those where the local authorities
have little chance to engage in uncontrolled expenditure. These
changes represent a normal development of the system which one would
expect to see continued; they are not without ample precedent. The
control of the grant system, it has been stressed, must remain in the
hands of the government, and a general grant is the most effective
way of securing this. It must be emphasised, however, that any
proper grant system should take continuous account of change, and
should be flexible enough as a whole to adjust itself or be adjusted
accordingly.
It is noteworthy that in making the recent adjustments to
the grant system for the United Kingdom as a whole Scotland has been
treated somewhat differently to the rest of the country. This was
done firstly because the education service in Scotland is not com¬
parable in its organisation and needs with the service in England and
h!ales/
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Wales so that a separate general grant was regarded as necessary,
and secondly because of adjustments which, are currently being made
to the Scottish rating system and which will not be complete until
after 1961-62 when revaluation of properties will have taken place.
By then, in theory at least, there should be enough uniformity in
rating throughout the United Kingdom for Scotland to be treated for
equalisation grant purposes as part of the whole Instead of, as at
present, a separate unit. This result may or may not be achieved,
and it will rest with the Working Party to be set up following
revaluation to decide this. From an administrative point of view
uniformity for equalisation grant purposes would be desirable, but
not if it was artificially based on an administrative uniformity
that did not exist. It is right and proper for example, that
Scotland with her own special needs should have her own general
grant, and it may well be found in 1963 that it is even then in-
prscticable to use the same equalisation grant formula for the
United Kingdom as a whole.
In Scotland, then, for the time being, the method of
grant distribution must be regarded as transitional, and for the
purposes of this thesis it has been thought desirable to:
(a) describe the existing system.
and (b) consider how this system might be





The first of these two assignments is factual, and the
present system in Scotland has already been described in detail
in earlier chapters. In summarised form grants are distributed
as follows:























and "ales, or the
amount calculated










Sach of the specific grants listed in Appendix A has been
examined and it is suggested that unless they can each be justified
as uromoting development or giving assistance to non-uniform services
or areas they should be merged into general grant.
There are, too, certain payments, which are still being
made by the Queen's and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer in Aid of
Highland Schools. These are an anachronism and should now either
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be discontinued or included in general grant#
Three further siain obearvut ions must be made on the present
systeaaj firstly the use of ths formula in equalisation grant#
even as a, safeguard which la not in Immediate use, ought now to bo
abandoned# Secondly# the rotes burden basis of ©alettlating the
separate dcottiah exchequer grant justifies itself by giving the
right results ts&tfc the minimum disturbance to the administrative
systems oonoeraetU It is affective fw* its purpose which is to sue
that cattish authorities ere eompm-ably treated to other local
authorities elsewhere# But it la a makeshift which v/aa not meant
to be permanent and it is difficult to sec that' its retention in the
future could bo justified# Thirdly# thorn should bo established a
ratio of general grant to total expenditure on services, and it
should be aado clear that the ratio will be applied and reviewed at
short intervala*
In attempting to suggest any reshaping of the foregoing
system to take place some years ahead# bay in 1934 or 1935, a
number of present uncertrtinijes present themselves# Tfcess includes
(a) the position to be revealed by the forth¬
coming revaluation#
(b) the possible consequential adjustment of
transitional payments.
(o) the general state of the economy of the
United Kingdom#
(d) the experience gained in both Tcatland and
Bnglaad end ""'ales of general grant In
operation.
(e) the then existing political climate.
(f) tiie possible futtre reorgaiitsatioc, of
local govoruaent areas in abotlsad#
It has been pointed out# for example, that any alterations
of areas &b In (f) above will have an effect locally on grant and
that it will he necessary to have continuous regard to relationships
between authorities Inter ms as well as to the general central/local
relationship/
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relationship. For this purpose a permanent specialised committee
on Scottish local government finance has earlier been proposed, a
committee whose duty it would be to watch the development of the
uncertainties listed and assess their effects under existing arrange¬
ments.
Secondly, in securing the dual equalisation of needs and
resources it is considered that we should work towards the position
where the rate deficiency grant would be kept as a resources equaliser
on a United Kingdom basis, and the needs weightings in the present
equalisation grant for children, sparsity and rapidly increasing popu¬
lation should be shifted to the Scottish general grant formula which
would, as at present, deal with internal needs. It has been suggested
too, that any initial differential in the amount of equalisation grant
accruing to Scotland on a United Kingdom basis as compared with the
sum allocated on the present system may be adjusted by including it in
the total for general grant purposes, so as to avoid loss to the
Scottish authorities on the change-over.
The grant system, then, in the form in which it is visualised
after, say, 1965 would be as follows:































* nclutJive of any rem®!,nine? specifio grants of a non-development
nature, with a ratio provided for %eint<inanoen ohanges in cost,
^development" cost change being provided for by' central decision*
The real problem of -Gotland in relation to the grant
system regains unsolved* Ther a is in fact no satisVictory solu¬
tion* The position to-day in little different In tills respect
to what it was over fifty years ago when burner wrote, w**«of course
it is impossible for >cotland to subscribe to national funds to be
given In relief of English rate-payera without obtaining an «njkIvs*
lent for itself**1
Scotland now haa its own general grant and it might even
fee possible to obtain a separate equalisation scheme similar to the
scheme used in the London area* But there would always fee the
thought that somehow Scotland was getting the worst of the bargain*
This idea of en "equivalent* has dogged us since X¥o? and
it is likely to continue doing no for Just as long am weoontinuo to
cherish/
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oheriah Scottish independence in these matters. Individuality must
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A TKKDIX A
The Mala Scottish Ueeolfle Grants*
The following specific greats era available to the
Scottish loosl authorities at the prosaist tliaej they do not
include those grants which have bean abolished or generalised
by the local Government and Miscellaneous financial revisions
{Scotland} Act 1958* Tho list of grants has been adapted from
a publication of the Institute of Municipal 'Sreaaurora qM
Accountants "tudents* Goeloty, and the following, abbreviations
have been used in tho tost:
OrIginoting Departments:
1. Scottish Pome Dopm'tramt 7. Queen's ami Lord treasurer* a
3* Ministry of Transport Peaabraaccr
3. Department of Health 8* Ministry of bbrks
4. Department of Agriculture 9- forestry Cocaaission
5. Scottish Hduoatioa Department ,10» Board of Trade




(b) Counties and Counties of Cities
(c) Counties and large burghs
id) Counties and ataall burghs
(e) Counties and burgh®
(f 5 Counties and burghs in ©.AVelopaent Areas
{&) Counties, burghs and districts.
(h) eritirae counties nnd large? burghs
( j} .infill burghs
(k) righlaad Counties listed in ohedule 2 of tho 'ducatlon












Act 1946 I 1 (c)
Classification
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Act 1919 3 (e)
17
Authorising Origin
Grant Basis Statute and
Destination
year3 for
3 (4)Subsidy houses completed
by 30*9.29 and Housing Act








per house per Housing
annum for 40 years (Financial
for houses completed Provisions)
before 30*6.34 Act 1924
£3 for those com-
Dieted between
30*6*34 and 1.4*35
50$ of loan charges Housing (Rural




per units dis¬ Housing (Scotland)
placed per annum Act 1930
for 40 years.
£6:15/- per house
Housing (Scot¬per annum for 40





between 1.1.39 and Housing (Fin¬
7.3.44 ancial Provi¬
£10:10/- per 3 sions) (Scot¬
apt. house land) Act
£11:15/- per 4 1938
apt. house
£13: per 5 apt.
house
£5:10/- for each
part of a hostel
designed for
separate occupa¬
tion for 40 v<3.
V
1 Atthori3ing Origin
Grant 13asis Statute and
! Destination
Subsidy £10:10/- £15: per 3 (e)
house per annum
for 40 years
1 for houses Housing1
i completed (Agricultural I
1 between 3.11.37 Population) 1
! i snd 7.3.44 (Scotland)
! ' Act 1938
1 £21:10/- £35:per
house per annum
for 60 years Housing (Fin¬
for houses ancial Provi¬
completed after sions) Act
1 8.3.44 for accomo¬ 1946 and















I £51:15/- jffer 3 &ct. 1952.
Apt. house i
I £54:5/- per 4 !
JSpt. houseI £58:15/- per 5
1 Apt. house per
j annum for 60
!
year s
{a) Houses completed !
after 8.3.44
£21: 10/- per 3 i
Apt. house
£23: per 4 Apt. Housing
1 house (Financial
j £25:1)/- per 5 Provisions)
Apt. house Act 1946
I £11 for each and Housing
part of a (Scotland)











Grant Basi s Statute and
Destination














( contribution Rousing |
of £6 por house (Financial
where population Provisions)
of county is Act 1946
under 100 per and Rousing j
square mile or (Scotland) j
population of Act 1950
,
biu'gh does not |j
escoed 3,000
and of £8 in
. ■ "
other cases.
(a) 75," of the
annual los3
in (1) pro¬
viding dwellings Housing i
by conversion (Scotland) 1 j
ill) improvement Act 1949 and
of building - Rousing
1
'
for 30 year (Scotland)
period
i . * *
Act 1950
(b) Increased cost o: A
providing new
houses due to '
use of stone, j










i (c) For each bed¬
! room in hostels |
provided by
! erection
| 1 of new buildings3 -
i up to £7 for
I 60 years
i For houses completed
! after 3 .3.53








£42:5/- per 4 Apt.
house.
£46*15/- per 5 Apt.
house.
£30 per annum -





£42 for 60 years
75$ of loans charge
in making standard




















£6 per house per
annum for 20 years
for houses com¬
pleted by 30.9.29











Hural areas - £12:19/-
Non-rural £9 per
house per annum






















years on lump sura









































Kote: Further grants are available) in respect of houses erected in
remote areas, re-devolopment areas, in tenements on central
sites, In tenements at least 4 storeys high where lifts are
installed, for houses whoa© cost has been substantially in¬
creased by reason of expenditure on rights of support, for




























ture and whole cost
of medical inspection
of aliens at certain
ports.
37|fa approved expendi¬































































































ture with a maxi¬
mum annual grant
of £20 per head.








































(Scotland) Act I 1 (c)
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Sheriff Court 1 Cost of ere*































































































Civil Defence i Re-irabursement
i of approved
! expenditure
j covered by grant
: regulations, 1953.























































































Specific Grants forming General -rant from 13th May 1959.
1. Education, (but not school milk and meals, or the removal
of defence works.)




5. Town Planning, (but not major re-development which is non¬
uniform in its application mainly to Glasgow.)
6. Road Safety.
7. Traffic patrols.
8. Registration of electors.
9. Physical training and recreation, (so far as payable to
local authorities.)
10. Residential and temporary accomodation under the National
Assistance Act, 1948.
11. school crossing patrols.
I
APPENDIX C
Specific Grants abolished from 16th ilay 1959.
1. Compensation for loss of foos from the licensing of
hackney carriages, trolley vehicles, etc.
2. Portable wheel weighers.
3. Rodent control.
4. Salaries and establishment charges of highway engineers
and surveyors.
APPENDIX D
Distribution of General Grant In Tnglund and T%lcs (1}
The Formula
(1} Basic hare:
£5.75 per head of population;
Plus £0.53 for each child under
15 in this population
Plus
(2) Supplementary :ha-t-ea
(a) School ohlldron: £0.058 per head
of1 population multiplied by the
excess (to the nearest whole
number) over 110 of the number
of children on the registers of
maintained and assisted schools
per 1,000 population.
(b) Young dhildren and old people: £0.42
for each child under"'5', anu''for each
person over 05.
(°) High density: a percentage of the
basic share equal to one half of
the density in escess of 18 persons
per aoro.
(d) Low density: a percentage of the basic
share equal to 3-^ times the number of
miles per 1,000 population in excess
of 2 (maximum 70%).
(4) Declining Population: A percentage of
the basic share equal to half the per¬
centage decline in population in the
past 31 years in excess of 5%
(f) Fjgfe Qo its in Greater London: 51 of the
basic shares payable to all areas wholly
or partly within the Metropolitan Police
Area.
TOTAL GRAFT before deduction of 9d. rate
jgjj(3) A rate product deduction of 9d.
Note; In fixing the numerical factors used in the above formula a
total of general grant of £392,915,500 has been assumed.
(1) The General Grant Order 1950.
I
APP Si-ID IX £
Statements showing, for the year 1959-60, the general grant payable
to a Council, after reduction in accordance with Part I and adjustments
in accordance with Part II of the Third Schedule to the Local
Government and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act, 1958.
APPENDIX I
Aggregate 0f General Grants for Scotland
Reductions in accordance with Part I, Third Schedules-
£50,125,000
Payments to Universities,
One-half of estimated expenditure on central
fire training institution,
Three-quarters of estimated expenditure on
local fire training centres,
Three-quarters of estimated expenditure on
central fire examination board,
One-half of estimated expenditure on training
in child care,








1. Aggregate of general grants as reduced
Adjustments in accordance with Part II, Third Schedule;-
Estimated amount of reckonable expenditure to be incurred
during 1959-60 by various authorities in Scotland on
Further education
Education in hospitals,
Education of certain pupils residing in voluntary
homes
Training of health visitors and midwives
Children not ordinarily resident in the area
2» Aggregate estimated reckonable expenditure to be
apportioned
3. Total of weighted populations (Second Schedule)
4. Factor for apportionment of aggregate general grants
as reduced (1 f 3)
















1. (a) Estimated population of County, including all burghs,
at 30th June, 1958. 107,733
(b) Estimated number of children under 15 years of age
at 30th June, 1958. £9,284
(q) Additional weighting (1(a) x 4) 5,387
(d) Weighted population ((a) » (b) ± (c)) ~142~403
2. (a) Number of pupils, 31st July, 1958 18,850
(b) Miles of road (and sea route) 542.10
(c) Pupils per mile (a(a) A (2(b)) 34.8
(d) Percentage of population to be added
3. (a) Estimated population of the landward
area at 30th June, 1958 63,397
(b) Proportion of landward area to total
population (3(a) £ 1(a)) 59$
(c) Percentage of population to be added
4. Total,percentage of population to be added 5^
5. General grant, as reduced in accordance with Part I
of Third Schedule to the Act (1(d) above x £7.38723617) £1,051,965
6. Amount of estimated reckonable expenditure apportioned
to the County (1(d) above x £0.32173733) 45,816
7. Amount of estimated reckonable expenditure to be
incurred directly by the County during 1959-60 37,756
8. Sum of the greater, In each case, of the rateable value
or standard rateable value for 1958-59, estimated in
accordance with section 7 of the Act, of all rating
authorities within the County. £1,567,276
Ill
County Council of Midlothian*(landward)
1959-60
APPENDIX III
1. Rateable value of the Council's area in 1958-59
estimated in accordance wltn section 7(7)(a) of
the Act
2. Standard rateable value of the Council's area
in 1958-59 estimated in accordance with section
7(^(b) of the Act
3. General grant, as reduced, for 1959-6C
(App.II,5 multiplied by the greater of 1 or 2
above, divided by App»II,8)
4* Amount of general grant, as reduced, to be advanced
during 1959-60 (9<£ of 3 above)
5* Amount of estimated reakon&bls expenditure, which
the Council is required to meet
(App.II,6 multiplied by the greater of 1 or 2 above,
divided by App,II,8)
3. Amount of estimated reckonable expenditure to be
reimbursed to the Council
(App#II,7 multiplied by the greater of 1 or 2 above,
divided by app.11,8)
7. Ret amount to be paid to the Council during 1959-60
(subject to adjustment under section 18) in twelve
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